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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This thesis analyses resilience as a value which constitutes a telos for contemporary liberal 
security initiatives.  In recent years, resilience strategies have been increasingly employed 
within liberal states a means of responding to the radical contingency of threat.  Rather than 
seeking to protect a referent through prophylactic measures, resilience strategies aim to 
optimize the capacity of complex systems to rapidly adapt to, and evolve through, crises.   
The advent of resilience strategies is premised upon a radical re-evaluation of the referents of 
security as complex systems.  The discovery of the natural resilience of systems integral to 
liberal life has enabled strategies of emergency governance seeking to harness these processes, 
and optimize their conditions of ‘freedom’.  By naturalising resilience these accounts serve to 
render its value self-evident.  This thesis problematises these accounts by offering a 
biopolitical genealogy directed at elucidating the historical conditions of possibility for 
resilience to emerge as a security value. 
This thesis takes as its empirical referent the case of the historical evolution of a British 
machinery of governance for responding to emergencies. Analysis makes explicit distinct, and 
indeed rival, rationalities of governance which can be read from its evolving design. 
Resilience is demonstrated to be an expression of an emergent neoliberal order of governance. 
Applying a biopolitical security analytic inspired by Foucault, this genealogy traces the 
historical consolidation of this order in respect of transformations in the regime of 
power/knowledge enacted by apparatus of security. 
A biopolitical genealogy demonstrates that resilience is the correlate of a broader restructuring 
of the rationalities and practices comprising liberal security governance.  By drawing attention 
to the complex historical processes and significant governmental efforts required to make 
resilience possible this thesis aims to open up a space through which the value of resilience 
may be more critically interrogated. 
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Introduction: 
The Value of Resilience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For that which one calls value presupposes a knowledge which is not itself questioned.   Values thus 
contain the risk of being extremely vague. 
(Nancy, 2005: 439) 
 
The problem of critique is that of the value of values, of the evaluation from which their value arises, 
thus the problem of their creation. 
(Deleuze, 1983: 1) 
 
 
Panic appeared frequently in the headlines of British dailies printed for the morning of July 
8, 2005: 
The Daily Mirror:  
“07/07: Terror In London: WE'RE GOING TO DIE! WE'RE GOING TO DIE! ; Cries 
pierce choking air as survivors flee twisted wreckage of Tube trains” (Moyes, 2005) 
The Times: 
 “Panic, shoving, fear of fire and bonding below ground” (Hamilton, 2005) 
The Guardian: 
 “Attack on London: Aldgate: Stunned silence, darkness, panic, then calm: 8.51am” 
(Henning, 2005) 
 
The corresponding articles drew heavily on eyewitness accounts to reconstruct, for a curious 
readership, the scenes which unfolded when three explosions erupted near simultaneously in 
the London Underground followed by a fourth blast, less than an hour later, on a city bus 
during the busy morning rush hour the day previous.  The stories told were mixed.  Ray 
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Wright, a relief train driver, described a "sea of blackened faces in a state of total panic" (BBC 
News, 2005b).  “There was immediately smoke everywhere and it was hot and everybody 
panicked. People thought they were just going to suffocate" told another witness (Muir and 
Cowan, 2005).  Others, however, focused on the acts of cooperation, solidarity, and ‘heroism’: 
virtues which many articles were quick to suggest demonstrated a resurgence of the ‘blitz-
spirit’ in the very place where many Londoners had gathered to seek cover from aerial 
bombardment half a century earlier.  "There was no panic, especially when people realised 
they were OK. Everyone then bonded together and helped each other. Then we got out and 
saw the second carriage. There was blood and stuff everywhere; it wasn't pretty" (Hamilton, 
2005). 
In the months that followed, these journalistic accounts would be supplemented by an 
academic discourse purporting to scientifically explain the forms of collective human 
behaviour displayed following the blasts.  Utilizing a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
methods to analyze newspapers articles, archived personal accounts, and eye-witness 
interviews these studies sought to apply and refine explanatory frameworks for the 
psychosocial behaviours which emerged during this, and other, emergencies (Drury et al., 
2009b, Cocking et al., 2009).  The studies suggested that participants were frightened, no 
doubt, but focused, cooperative.  Selfish forms of behaviour were marginal in comparison to 
incidences of mutual help and assistance.  Other studies suggested that the psychological 
effects of the events were short-lived with few members of the population experiencing any 
lasting stress or trauma (Page et al., 2008, Rubin et al., 2005).  Even financial markets 
rebounded quickly (BBC News, 2005a, Washington Post, 2005, cf. London Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 2005).  While some suggested that a historical experience with 
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terrorism, and perhaps even the memory of the war-time Blitz, had contributed to a particular 
immunity to panic amongst Londoners (Sheppard et al., 2006, Wessely, 2005a, Wessely, 
2005d), the studies broadly agreed that a natural ‘resiliency’ within emergency events was a 
more general phenomenon with incidences of panic being rare if, in fact, they ever manifest at 
all. 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, resilience has become a ‘buzz-word’ within 
emergency planning and response.  Since 2001, British Civil Contingencies—a network of 
organizations responsible for emergency planning and response in the UK—has been 
organized around the objective of optimizing British resilience to emergencies.  This strategy 
is premised on optimizing the ‘natural’ resilience demonstrated by a range of systems 
underpinning or constitutive of British life to ‘bounce-back’ from crisis.  These systems 
include human populations, infrastructure networks, ecosystems and numerous other complex 
systems which share the common capacity to adaptively self-organize in the midst of crises.  
To this end, the complexity sciences
1
 have proved influential: providing a matrix for 
understanding the common behaviour of these systems and advancing a blueprint for how they 
might be optimized.  Models developed in the natural sciences such as particle systems 
(Bouvier and Guilloteau, 1996, Bouvier et al., 1997) and fluid and gas dynamics (Hughes, 
2000, 2002, 2003, Takimoto and Nagatani, 2003) are purported to be as applicable to 
modelling crowd behaviour in an emergency as they are for understanding the self-
organizational flocking patterns of migrating birds (Reynolds, 1987, Cabinet Office, 2009b) or 
air-bag deployment (Bouvier et al., 1997).     
                                                          
1
 For an introduction to the complexity sciences see Gleick (1988), Urry (2003) or Waldrop (1992)  
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The advent of resilience strategies within UK civil contingencies has coincided with a 
remarkable shift in the understanding of the referents of emergency governance.  On the one 
hand, a radical re-evaluation of collective human behaviour in emergencies has all but 
eradicated the problematic of panic which preoccupied British emergency planning since at 
least its formal institutional inception in the final years of the First World War.  On the other 
hand, the concerns of emergency governance have widened from the behaviour of human 
populations in the midst of an emergency, to the ‘life-like’ processes of adaptive emergence 
displayed by a range of complex systems which collectively underpin ‘UK resilience’.  The 
advent of resilience strategies within UK Civil Contingencies has been explained as the result 
of these scientifically validated re-evaluations of the referents of security. This explanation 
also serves as a legitimation.  The resilience strategies of UK Civil Contingencies have failed 
to generate any substantial public criticism thus far comparable its predecessor—UK Civil 
Defence.
2
  Of course the reasons for this are numerous: the humanism of Civil Contingencies 
in contrast to the genocidal wager of Civil Defence; the focus on community participation 
rather than state secrecy; the celebration of human dynamism, creativity and freedom, rather 
than the brutal oppression of political dissidents and suppression of public panic.  Resilience 
strategies are celebrated as demonstrative of the growing humanism of emergency governance.  
Within these narratives, resilience enjoins the positivism of social science with the 
emancipatory project of liberalism: Knowledge of the nature of ‘the social’ permits less 
governance, less control and more ‘freedom’.   
                                                          
2
 Concerns raised with respect to UK Civil Contingencies have primarily focused on legislative changes to 
emergency powers contained within part two of the the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and their potential to be 
exercised arbitrarily or excessively within the context of the ‘war on terror’ (see, for example, Coaffee, 2003, 
2009, 2010, Coaffee and Rogers, 2008, Coaffee et al., 2009, Kearona, 2007, O'Brien and Read, 2005).  Far less 
crticism has been directed towards the actual logics and strategies of of UK Civil Contingencies operations 
themselves. 
Introduction 
 
10 
 
While one could take this positivism for granted, what if we were to remain stubbornly 
sceptical with regard to this ‘advance’ in the understanding of collective human behaviour.  
How then might we account for the transformations in emergency governance characteristic of 
contemporary UK Civil Contingencies?  How then might we account for the shift in the 
referents of emergency governance and the re-evaluation of social behaviour upon which these 
strategies are premised?  How might we explain the emergence of resilience?  This thesis 
offers an alternative explanation.  Resilience was not lying in wait for the march of science to 
provide the conditions for its recognition.  Nor was it concealed by the distortions of ideology 
which lifted with the culmination of the Cold War.  There is nothing natural about resilience.   
This study is organized as a biopolitical genealogy.  The aim of this genealogy is to 
show that resilience is the product of much more complex historical processes than the 
accounts listed above take into account.  Resilience, I argue, is the product, rather the cause, of 
a broader restructuring of rationalities and practices comprising liberal governance associated 
with a transition to neoliberalism (Barry et al., 1996a, Foucault, 2008).  Drawing on a 
biopolitical analytic inspired by Foucault, these transformations in liberal governance are 
investigated in relation to mutations in the regime of power/knowledge enacted by apparatus 
of security. In doing so, this study contributes to recent research in the biopolitics of security 
investigating how different ways of understanding and presenting 'life' lead to different 
problematisations of security (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009, Dillon and Reid, 2009, 
Reid, 2006).  Resilience is a mode of valuation for life understood in terms of its complexity 
and assessed on the basis of its capacity for adaptive emergence.  This genealogy traces the 
historical conditions underpinning resilience’s emergence as a value organizing security 
operations within UK emergency planning and response.  It is interested in elucidating the 
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historical processes of appreciation responsible for the growing value of this value within 
liberal security discourses. 
By drawing attention to the history of the value of resilience this genealogy aims to 
open a space within which the value of this value may be more rigorously questioned.  In 
recent years, a small but growing body of critical research has begun to emerge which has 
established links between resilience, developments in the ‘liberal way of war’ and 
neoliberalism (Cooper and Walker, 2011, Dillon and Reid, 2009, Duffield, 2011, Lundborg 
and Vaughan-Williams, 2011, O'Malley, 2010a).  These critiques are both important and 
timely.  Yet, their critical purchase may be diminished if neoliberalism continues to be 
understood primarily in terms of the rolling-back of the state (see Barry et al., 1996b).  
Resilience has been criticized as an abnegation of the duty of the state to provide security and 
an abandonment of citizens who are now left to fend for themselves (Duffield, 2011, Reid, 
forthcoming).  The danger of such criticisms is that they inadvertently perpetuate the myth that 
resilience is a natural phenomenon which appears in conditions free of governance.  In fact, 
resilience has required, and continues to depend upon, significant governmental support in 
order to produce the conditions in which citizens are permitted to ‘freely’ operate.  As will be 
detailed in the following chapters, resilience programmes have required the investment of 
significant amounts of time, money, planning and training.  In Britain, optimizing ‘UK 
resilience’ is the responsibility of rather disparate network of public, private and volunteer 
organizations indicative of “a ‘de-governmentalization’ of the state, but not ‘de-
governmentalization’ per se” (Barry et al., 1996b: 11).  Moreover, the state plays a critical role 
in the coordination of these efforts.  Bruce Mann, Head of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 
puts it simply: “Our approach is to enable and to encourage” (Mann, 2007).  Here, the British 
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state assumes responsibility for enhancing the conditions of operability for a vast network of 
agencies and individuals to collectively self-organize in the midst of crisis.  Resilience may 
therefore be affiliated with neoliberalism, not in respect of a retreat of the state, but insofar as 
it demonstrates a reorientation of the objectives of liberal governance in relation to referents of 
security understood as complex, self-organizing systems.  Resilience, in short, ‘re-inscribes’ 
the state (Campbell, 1998).   
The remainder of this introduction will be used to elaborate upon the genealogical 
method employed within this study.  First, I make the case that resilience should be 
understood as an emergent security value. A state of the art of resilience literature is provided 
in outlining this argument. This is followed by a discussion of the genealogical method 
employed by this study, understood as a critical historical inquiry into the emergence of values.  
Finally, this study is situated within contemporary scholarship in the biopolitics of security by 
detailing the biopolitical analytic employed by this study and showing how it advances this 
genealogy.  The introduction concludes with a brief outline of the following chapters. 
 
The Value(s) of Security 
 
Resilience is now a ubiquitous term across a diverse array of discourses with some 
purchase in risk management.  The notion of resilience can be found in discourses pertaining 
to environmental sustainability (Beatley, 2009, Gunderson and Holling, 2002, Kay et al., 
1999), natural disasters (Paton and Johnston, 2006, Trim, 2005), animal and public health 
(Schoch-Spana, 2008), anti-terrorism (Coaffee, 2003, Lentzos and Rose, 2009, Page et al., 
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2008), economics (Briguglio, 2008, Rose, 2003, 2007a), finance (McDonough, 2003), 
business contingency planning (Sheffi, 2005, Brookbanks et al., 2002, Waters, 2007), critical 
infrastructure protection (Gorman, 2005, Ottens et al., 2006, Radvanovsky and McDougall, 
2010, Scalingi, 2007), engineering (Hollnagel et al., 2006, 2011), network science (Barabási, 
2007, Cohen et al., 2006, Najjar and Gaudiot, 1990), economic development (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2004, United Nations Environment Programme, 2004), urban 
planning (2008, Coaffee, 2009, Coaffee et al., 2009), child psychology (Bancroft, 2004, 
Coleman and Hagell, 2007, Croft, 2006), and psychological trauma (Joseph and Linley, 2008, 
Paton et al., 2003, O'Malley, 2010a, Rynearson, 2006, Wessely, 2005c)—to name just a 
selection.  Yet, the ubiquity of the notion of resilience within these literatures conceals its 
more specific formulations within different applications and specialist literatures. 
At its most general level resilience is understood as the capacity to absorb, withstand 
and ‘bounce-back’ quickly and efficiently from a perturbation.  It is considered to be both a 
natural property and a quality which can be improved within a broad array of complex systems 
including critical infrastructures, ecosystems, societies and economies through proper 
governance.  However, as one moves across these resilience discourses, it is evident that 
distinct concepts of resilience are in operation.  For network scientists
3
 resilience is understood 
as the ability of a network to maintain systemic integrity in the event of fault or disruption: a 
function of the design of network architectures measured in terms of system functionality 
following the removal of successive nodes and links (Lewis, 2009: 375).  Resilience is thus 
often associated with network robustness, survivability and graceful degradation with less 
                                                          
3
 Network Science is an interdisciplary field that has sought to extend the mostly quantitiative studies on 
networks within computer science and engineering to other scientific and social scientific applications .  For an 
introduction see Barabasi (2002). 
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emphasis on regeneration or self-repair.  This understanding of resilience can be compared to 
psychological (Werner and Smith, 1989, 1992) and sociological (Fredrickson et al., 2003, 
Kindt, 2006)  research in which resilience is studied as a function of faculties which permit 
certain individuals to overcome risks and/or cope with psychological trauma better than others.  
Use of the term resilience here specifically relates to the capacity to return to ‘normal’ defined 
in terms of the lack of depression and the capacity to continue a similar ‘way of life’.  Finally, 
the concept of resilience found in complex ecosystems theory is defined as the “capacity of an 
ecosystem to tolerate disturbance without collapsing into a qualitatively different state that is 
controlled by a different set of processes” (Holling, 1973).  Here, resilience refers not simply 
to the capacity to ‘bounce-back’ to an original state but also contains the possibility of moving 
to alternative stable states in a complex system (Gunderson and Holling, 2002, Gunderson et 
al., 2002). As these authors note, enhancing resilience by optimizing the evolutionary capacity, 
or ‘fitness’, of a system, not only increases the capacity of a system to withstand the impact of 
potentially destabilizing shocks, but also permits the system to quickly and efficiently 
organize so as to capitalize on emerging opportunities—to realise and even produce ‘new 
normals’ (Gunderson and Holling, 2002: 8).  Resilience is not simply a conservative exercise, 
but a quality indicative of a heightened capacity to evolve towards something new. 
Given the heterogeneity of both the referents and concepts of resilience it should come 
as no surprise that there is considerable variation in the governmental arts used to enhance 
resilience.  Optimizing the resilience of different systems requires the exercise of distinct 
assemblages of specialist techniques and technologies which are informed and legitimated by 
expert bodies of knowledge: technical, scientific and academic.  Since July 2001, the United 
Kingdom’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat has been mandated with securing the UK from a 
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wide array of potential emergencies, including natural disaster, pandemics, industrial accidents 
and terrorist attacks through a strategy of enhancing UK resilience, understood as the “[a]bility 
of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary to 
withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges” (Cabinet Office, 2011).  To this end, 
the Civil Contingencies Secretariat coordinates a complex machinery of governance 
comprised of both private and public agencies performing diverse functions with the common 
goal of enhancing resilience.   
Inspired by this approach, distinct applications of resilience have been developed 
internationally.  Distinct formulations and strategies of resilience as an approach to state 
security governance are being exercised in the United States, Australia and Canada, while a 
marked interest in the concept has been shown within Switzerland, Germany and Singapore 
(Bara and Brönnimann, 2011).  At the level of international governance, complex historical 
problems such as underdevelopment, disaster risk and post-conflict reconstruction have all 
been recently re-problematised as issues arising, at least in part, from the lack of national 
resilience by agencies including the International Monetary Fund (International Monetary 
Fund, 1995, 2005, 2006, 2010), the World Bank (Prasad et al., 2009, Verner and Egset, 2007) 
and the United Nations (United Nations Development Programme, 2004, United Nations 
Environment Programme, 2004).  Resilience is also a pervasive term within contemporary 
self-help literatures which promise to build individual resilience through the exercise of varied 
techniques of self-governance (Cyrulnik, 2009, Clarke et al., 2010, Hadfield and Hassob, 2009, 
Neenan, 2009).  Variations in the approaches employed suggest that there is no single 
governmental discourse of resilience currently in operation.
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Rather than treating resilience as either a unified concept or technique of governance it 
might be more useful to think of resilience as a value.  As a value, resilience performs various 
functions with regards to governance.  Firstly, it provides a quality in relation to which 
systems, populations, individuals and even behaviours can be assessed and evaluated.  The 
concept of quality, Peter Burgess reminds us, refers both to a property which makes something 
identifiable and a statement regarding its standard of excellence (Burgess, 2011: 32).  
Attempts, currently underway, to establish a common metric for measuring resilience attest to 
the bureaucratic importance of these assessments (quantitative or otherwise) in allocating 
funding and guiding government policy (Birkmann, 2006, Brigilio et al., 2005).  But it should 
not be ignored that resilience also operates as a value in relation to which subjects evaluate, 
problematise and comport themselves thus informing the exercise of techniques for the 
government of the self (Foucault, 1988, 2011a, 2011b).  These evaluations problematise 
referents in different ways thus generating objectives for security governance in relation to 
which security programmes can be designed and evaluated.  Finally, the value of resilience, 
insofar as it is vague and undefined, is functional: facilitating the integration of diverse 
agencies, departments and actors by providing the semblance of a common objective where 
diverse concepts are necessarily being enacted.  Researching resilience as a value, rather than 
a concept, entails concerning one less with what resilience means and more with how the 
diverse ways in which resilience is enacted itself augments the value of this value. 
It is also crucially important to recognize how the value of resilience differs from those 
which formerly guided security programmes within the associated spheres of civil 
contingencies, civil defence and the military.  Indeed, one of the more remarkable aspects of 
the emergence of resilience discourses is how they have coincided with the problematisation 
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of the virtues of fortitude, robustness and stoicism traditionally associated with security 
(O'Malley, 2010a).  Specifically security programmes rooted in the logic of protection are 
increasingly portrayed as hubristic, criticized for generating forms of dependency, and 
generally problemetised as contributing to the very conditions of insecurity which they had 
formerly been mobilized to eradicate.  In their place a new economy of security virtues has 
emerged associated with ‘resilient’ qualities such as malleability, adaptability, flexibility and 
regeneration.  These transformations in this economy of security virtues suggests that what is 
at stake in the proliferation of resilience discourses is not simply the practices through which 
security is pursued.  Underlying these changes in what is recognized as secure is a shift in the 
semantic meaning of security itself. 
In light of these observations we should be prompted to ask: how can we account for 
the emergence of resilience as a security value?  This thesis performs a genealogy of resilience 
as an emergent security value.  As a critical historical inquiry into the conditions of 
resilience’s emergence, this genealogy aims to problematise positivistic narratives of 
resilience which serve to render the value of resilience self-evident by appealing to a clear 
origin established by scientific progress. 
 
Genealogy and the Critique of Values: 
 
Deleuze described genealogy as the ‘true realisation of critique’ (1983: 1).  For while 
Kant advanced critique to determine the legitimate limits of the authority of influential 
institutions including the Church and the State, he could not bring himself to critically reflect 
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upon the values in whose service this critical project was mobilized.  Kant, in short, failed to 
critically reflect upon the Enlightenment value of truth. Instead, critique was subsumed within 
a critical project designed to locate the limits of what was knowable in order to establish a 
secure foundation for truth.  Genealogy would liberate critique from its service within this 
Enlightenment security project.  Rather than securing values, most especially that of truth, 
critique would be folded back upon them.  Foucault recognized that genealogy entailed tracing 
the historical emergence of those things “we tend to feel [are] without history” (Foucault, 
1994: 369).  As a critique of values, genealogy is directed towards the problem of accounting 
for the emergence of values.  A genealogy of resilience aims to identify the historical 
processes through which resilience obtained its value and status. 
Genealogy is critical history.  It is a method which emerged from Nietzsche’s critique 
of the excessive value afforded to history in Europe at the turn of the twentieth century.  In the 
second essay of his Untimely Meditations (1997) entitled “The Uses and Abuses of History” 
Nietzsche identified the origins of this ‘historical malady’ within the ‘demand that history be a 
science.’  The scientification of History, Nietzsche shows, involved not only the migration of 
models of the natural sciences into History, but also the adoption of the scientific virtues of 
objectivity, neutrality and indifference by the historian.  In modelling itself upon the sciences, 
modern History had itself become a security project: its methods fashioned to establish 
certainty (epistemological security), and these ‘truths’ to provide a foundation for action and 
identity in the present (existential security).  Nietzsche’s critique of History stemmed from his 
belief that modern History—taken as a repository of objective truths and ‘lessons learned’—
sapped at the power to live life creatively in the present; to define oneself in reference to what 
one could be.  Nietzsche begins the essay by quoting Goethe: 'In any case, I hate everything 
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that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity' (Nietzsche, 
1997: 59).  What was required was a critical history which could be deployed against modern 
History:  
the origin of historical culture- its quite radical conflict with the spirit of any 'new 
age', any 'modem awareness' - this origin must itself be known historically, history 
must itself resolve the problem of history, knowledge must turn its sting against 
itself - this threefold must is the imperative of the 'new age', supposing this age 
really does contain anything new, powerful, original and promising more life 
(1997: 102-3). 
 
Genealogy was fashioned not simply as an alternative to modern History, but as an antidote to 
its anaesthetising effects on life.  It mobilizes critique to render problematic the search for 
ideal origins and upset grand narratives such as the progress of reason.  Operating on history, 
genealogy aims to critique that which is regarded as timeless.  As a critique of values, 
genealogy proceeds historically: systematically documenting the historical emergence and 
evolution of that which we take to be without history. 
Nietzsche rejected the idea that the foundation of values could somehow be located 
outside the subject. There is no transcendent source of value and nothing has value-in-itself.  
Instead he would understand values to be the product of processes of valuation ultimately 
rooted within particular modes of understanding and experiencing the world.  If the source of 
value is thus ultimately embedded in the experience of life itself then values exist only insofar 
as there are valuing beings (Sleinis, 1994: 1).  Nietzsche therefore understood values as the 
expression of particular modes of evaluation. Deleuze noted that this  
“implies a critical reversal.  On the one hand, values appear or are given as 
principles: and evaluations presuppose values on the basis of which phenomena 
are appraised.  But, on the other hand and more profoundly, it is values which 
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presuppose evaluations, ‘perspectives of appraisal’, from which their own value 
is derived.   
 
It is clear within Nietzsche’s writing that these processes of valuing—these evaluations—were 
what ultimately preoccupied him.  “Formerly one said of every morality: ‘By their fruit ye 
shall know them.’  I say of every morality: ‘it is a fruit by which I recognize the soil from 
which it sprang.’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 149).  These processes of valuation, he insisted, are far 
from obvious. As much as Nietzsche was critical of those who universalized values, he was 
equally severe to those who sought to explain the values of values through simple utilitarian 
calculus which presumed that these processes were immediately accessible to the observer 
(See Nietzsche, 1968: 164, 385, 1989: Part 6).  Values are rarely the product of immediate, 
self-evident rationalizations of the being who values and evaluates.  Instead, values are more 
often the expression of evaluations formed and performed in relation to more obscure 
historical processes.  Values are projections of particular modes of evaluation which become 
sedimented over time to the extent they are recalled, reactivated and reproduced.  Values, 
while ultimately rooted within subjectivities, thus often simultaneously precede and exceed the 
individual subject (Burgess, 2011).  Deleuze continued, 
“Evaluation is defined as the differential element of corresponding values, an 
element which is both critical and creative.  Evaluations, in essence, are not values 
but ways of being, modes of existence of those who judge and evaluate, serving as 
principles for the values on the basis of which they judge.  This is why we always 
have the beliefs, feelings and thoughts that we deserve given our way of being or 
our style of life.” (Deleuze, 1983: 1-2) 
 
In important ways then, values do not simply inform the ways in which one comports 
themselves.  They are simultaneously produced and reproduced through particular modes of 
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being. Processes of value creation are correlative with the unfolding of ways of being in the 
world.  Moreover, Deleuze recognizes evaluations as the element which distinguishes 
values—in both the sense that it differentiates between values (to distinguish) and produces 
value (to be distinguished).  Indeed, Deleuze is suggesting that evaluations, understood as 
ways of life, are themselves defined and produced through their differentiation from 
corresponding values and alternative ways of life.  This opening of a space between different 
evaluations is critical insofar as it is creative.  This space, the ‘pathos of distance’ at the origin’ 
(Nietzsche, 1989: 201, 2000: 462, see also Foucault, 1994), is constitutive of new perspectives 
of appraisal, new forms of evaluation, and thus new forms of life.  This differential element, so 
intrinsic to the exercise of evaluation, is later revealed by Deleuze to be the will to power. 
The will to power is defined by Deleuze as "the genealogical element of force, both 
differential and genetic" (Deleuze, 1983: 46).  It is an element common to all values.  It is that 
which differentiates modes of being, or ways of being in the world.  If the source of value lies 
in valuing beings, then the measure of value lies in the affective feeling of ‘enhanced and 
organized power’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 356, see also Deleuze, 1983: 57-59).  The origin of all 
values, therefore lies in the desire to distinguish a certain mode of evaluation or ‘way of being 
in the world’ which enhances the feelings associated with an increase of power.  The origin of 
this desire cannot be attributed to conscious psychological processes but is itself a 
manifestation of the will to power.  “Who therefore will power? An absurd question, if being 
is by itself will to power...” (Nietzsche as quoted in Deleuze, 1983: 46, Cf. Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1982: 109).  Power is itself not evaluated, but represents the condition of possibility 
for evaluations (See also Nancy, 2005).  Evaluations are manifestations of the will to power. 
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Recalling Nietzsche’s writings on the will to knowledge helps to clarify the relations 
between evaluation, the will to power and truth.  The will to know, Nietzsche makes clear, is a 
manifestation of the will to power.  The formation of reason and logic is an imposition onto 
the world proceeding from the need “[n]ot ‘to know’ but to schematize – to impose upon 
chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs require” (Nietzsche, 1968: 278).  
What our practical needs require is a reduction of that which is strange and unfamiliar to that 
which is similar, equal, calculable, and thus intelligible.  Processes of ordering, or rending 
familiar are necessary fictions imposed upon the world as “only when we see things coarsely 
and made equal do they become calculable and useful to us” (Nietzsche, 1968: 278).  The 
imposition of categories for knowledge thus proceeds from a subjective process of valuation 
distinguishing what is useful from what is not.  “The valuation ‘I believe that this and that is 
so’ as the essence of truth” (Nietzsche, 1968: 275).  Valuations are thus intimately allied to 
schemas imposed upon the world to render it intelligible and thus actionable. 
With Nietzsche, the  "whole of philosophy is a symptomatology, and a semeiology" 
(Deleuze, 1983: 3).  Values are recognized as signs, or symptoms, of underlying processes 
which themselves must be diagnosed. The genealogist must therefore discover underneath 
values, 
“the conditions and circumstances under which these values grew up developed 
and changed (morality as result as symptom, as mask, as tartuferry, as sickness, as 
misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, remedy, stimulant, inhibition, 
poison)” (Nietzsche quoted in Burgess, 2011: 30) 
 
The focus of this genealogy is the processes of valuation which afforded resilience its value.  
Resilience is understood to be the expression of a neoliberal order of security governance.  Its 
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appreciation as a security value is a function of the influence of this order in the field of 
security.  Orders of governance are here understood (to use Nietzsche’s terminology) as 
manifestations of distinct evaluations which enact specific constellations of values.  As with 
Nietzsche’s evaluations, it is crucially important not to psychologise orders of governance.  
Orders of governance are not the product of actor’s intentions, but are particular actualizations 
of evolving systems of power/knowledge.  This thesis proceeds from Foucault’s observation 
that the order of power/knowledge characteristic of security is biopolitical (Foucault, 1998, 
2003, 2007, 2008).  This genealogy traces the historical constitution of a neoliberal order of 
governance in relation to transformations in the systems of power/knowledge enacted by 
apparatus of security.  It does so through a detailed study of the governmental rationalities 
underpinning machineries of emergency governance within the empirical site of UK civil 
contingencies management.   
Chapter 1 reveals the biopolitical imperative behind the formal institutionalization of 
British emergency governance in the final years of the First World War.  It makes explicit the 
order of governance informing the design of this machinery and shows how this order became 
increasingly invested in the ‘sciences’ of Operational Research in pursuit of the value of 
stability.  Each subsequent chapter traces the constitution of a rival order of governance which 
would consolidate around promoting the value of resilience.  This process of distinction is 
investigated through the identification and analysis of events which problematised aspects of 
the established order of governance and opened a space for the colonization, consolidation and 
elaboration of techniques which would evolve into the neoliberal order expressed within 
contemporary resilience strategies.  Such a history, it must be stressed, does not conclude with 
the ‘triumph’ of resilience.  Nor does it purport to imply the inevitability of such a future.  
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Rather, it is to make explicit rival orders of governance which continue to structure the 
dynamics of UK Civil Contingencies through the complex patterns of resonance and 
dissonance produced by their simultaneous operation and struggle.  The composition of 
resilience discourses—the ambiguity surrounding ‘concepts’ of resilience, the form of 
resilience strategies, the migration patterns of these strategies and indeed the value of 
resilience itself—must be understood in relation to this contest.  The next section, outlines 
how contemporary research on the biopolitics of security assists in understanding the terms of 
this important contest. 
 
Resilience and the Biopolitics of Security 
 
In his lecture series Security, Territory, Population (2007) Foucault investigated the 
biopolitical orientation of security.  The lectures served to advance his earlier analyses of 
biopower: a mode of power distinguished from sovereign forms of power, based on the right 
to “take life or let live,” by the commitment to “making life live” (Foucault, 1998, 2003, 2007).  
Promoting and protecting life, it was clear, was operationally dependent however on the 
specific ways in which ‘life’ was understood and problematised.  Tracing a genealogy of 
security, Foucault showed how security mechanisms originally developed to promote and 
protect the ‘species-life’ exhibited by populations: a particular enframing of life which 
emerged in the early eighteenth century emphasizing the species-existence of humans 
understood in the aggregate (Foucault, 2003, 2007).  In recent years, revolutions in the 
scientific understanding of ‘life’ (advanced within the digital and molecular revolutions) and 
shifts in the referent of security (from ‘populations’ to a series of ‘complex systems’ 
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displaying life-like properties) have coincided with profound changes in the rationalities and 
practices of liberal security.  In light of these changes, contemporary research in the biopolitics 
of security has asked, “What happens to the biopolitics of security when their referent object – 
life as species existence – undergoes profound transformation and change” (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008: 269)?   
Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero argue that these transformations must be understood as the 
product of complex processes of ‘speciation’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009).  
Processes of speciation enact three distinct, yet interrelated, definitions enveloped within the 
term ‘species’: 
‘Species’ means classification as such, classification as living thing and 
classification as value, specifically monetary or capital value.  These three are 
locked into a very tight and radically interdependent triangulation…. These three 
poles of ‘speciation’ thus comprise a radically interdependent force field in which 
the changing correlation of forces transforms the composition of the respective 
‘trig’ points.  Each of the three—classification, living thing and valuation—
operates in mutually disclosive need of the other two (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 
2009: 8). 
 
Speciation, for Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, refers to a particular, but always insufficient, 
ontopolitical enframing of life.  Like Nietzsche, they stress the simultaneity of knowing 
and valuing.   Particular understandings of life always already advance a schema for 
valuing lives, while determinations of species-life are rooted in processes of ascribing 
and deriving value from life.  As the frameworks of intelligibility for knowing ‘life’ shift 
so too do the regimes of valuation used to evaluate lives.  This thesis takes resilience to 
be an expression of the modes of evaluation characteristic of an emergent order of 
security governance.  Resilience corresponds to a system of valuation which emerges 
alongside a speciation of biopolitical being enacted by neoliberal orders of governance.  
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To understand how resilience has emerged as a new biopolitical telos it is therefore 
helpful to review how biopolitical security orders have shifted in recent years. 
In his genealogy of security, Foucault demonstrates how biopolitical techniques of 
governance had their precursors in disciplinary technologies forged in the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries exercising a ‘subtle coercion’ (1977: 137) on the body for the 
“optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its 
usefulness and its docility, [and] its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls” 
(1998: 139).  Emerging through modifications in the ‘anatomo-politics’ of the body exercised 
by disciplinary technologies was a ‘bio-politics’ operating on the mass-body, or species-body, 
of the ‘population’. A ‘population’ departed in important ways from juridico-political notions 
of a people or nation bound by cultural, linguistic and legal ties.  The advent of the concept of 
a ‘population’ in the early eighteenth century (Foucault, 2007) was enabled by the insights of 
emergent academic fields including social statistics, epidemiology and biology which made it 
possible to understand and analyze the population as an independent biological body, 
characterized by its own processes, dynamics and laws which displayed a statistical regularity.  
As such, the population was conceptualized as a biological mass constitutive of a ‘species’ 
animated by forces of species-life rendered knowable, and thus governable, through the 
application of specialist knowledges (Foucault, 2007: 75).  Biopower emerged as a technique 
of governance whose referent was no longer the juridico-political bonds of the nation, but the 
species-life of populations.  This shift in the referent of power relations entailed the 
development of new techniques and technologies of government.  Taken together the 
assemblage of power/knowledge whose biopolitical function is the protection and promotion 
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of the species-life of the population would, over time, come to constitute an apparatus 
(dispositif) of security (Foucault, 2007).
4
 
Biopolitical technologies of security operate less in terms of prohibition, instituting 
moral/legal binaries of right and wrong, than on the regulation of norms governing the 
processes intrinsic to the species-life of populations.  Security technologies operated in 
relation to the patterns identified within statistical maps of the aleatory ‘events’ which 
enhanced or suppressed species-life (Foucault, 2003: 246, 1998: 139). To the extent that these 
events displayed a statistical regularity, regulatory mechanisms could thus be introduced “to 
compensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory field” (Foucault, 
2003: 246).  As a mode of power protecting life at the normative and aggregate level 
biopolitical techniques sought to secure populations by regulating how the ‘general’ rates of 
incidence of contingencies correlated with biological and environmental factors.  
Technologies of security aimed to tame the milieu in which the species-life operated by 
‘establishing a sort of homeostasis...by achieving overall equilibrium that protects the security 
of the whole from internal dangers’ (Foucault, 2003: 246).   
Ultimately, Foucault’s analysis of the biopolitics of security was motivated by an 
interest in performing a genealogy of the post-war welfare state.  In his elaboration upon this 
line of analysis, François Ewald (1986) analyzed risk-socialization schemes as the core 
technology of the welfare state, extending mutual risk exchange across the entirety of the 
nation.  However, in the last quarter of the twentieth century the rationalities and practices 
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 Simply put, the ‘coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus (dispositif) of 
knowledge-power’ (Foucault, 2008: 19).  This assemblage of knowledge/power itself has a ‘dominant strategic 
function’ which “has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need.” 
(Foucault, 1980: 195).  The study of such an apparatus entails identifying and analyzing “the system of relations 
which can be established between” a “thoroughly heterogenous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault, 1980: 194, my italics). 
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comprising the social liberalism of the welfare state were increasingly problematised (e.g. 
Barry et al., 1996b, Foucault, 2008, O'Malley, 2004, Rose, 1993, 1996a, 1996b).  The primary 
concern of contemporary security discourses is not the ‘general’ aleatory phenomenon which 
were the focus of early biopolitical security mechanisms, but the high-impact low probability 
threats—the ‘unknown unknowns’—which evade actuarial capture and strain actuarial-based 
technologies of risk management (Daase and Kessler, 2007, Ericson and Doyle, 2004, 
Massumi, 2009).  New techniques of risk management have risen to prominence, which are 
not grounded in probabilistic methods but instead look to invoke a cross-section of the 
multiple futures which could actualize in order to facilitate preparation and possible pre-
emption (Anderson, 2010a, 2010b, Aradau and Munster, 2007, Cooper, 2010, de Goede, 
2008a, de Goede and Randalls, 2009, Lakoff, 2007).  It is said in turn that liberal subjects 
cannot be sufficiently protected from risks by the state, and so must be responsibilised through 
good governance to become autonomous actors with a moral responsibility to better manage 
their own individual risks (Miller and Rose, 2008, Rose, 1996a, O'Malley, 1996).   
Resilience strategies have risen to prominence in response to the darkening of liberal 
security imaginaries haunted by unknowable and potentially catastrophic futures (Aradau and 
Van Munster, 2011).  It resonates with logics of precaution (Aradau and Munster, 2007, Ewald, 
2002, Massumi, 2005b), preparedness (Aradau, 2010, Collier, 2008, Lakoff, 2007, Collier and 
Lakoff, 2008a) and pre-emption (Cooper, 2006a, de Goede, 2008b, de Goede and Randalls, 
2009) within an increasingly influential anticipatory assemblage of security seeking to govern 
the radical contingency of contemporary threat (Dillon, 2006, 2007, 2008, Dillon and Reid, 
2009).  In stark contrast to risk-based logics of protection, resilience strategies aim at the 
production of systems capable of living-with, or even embracing (Baker and Simon, 2002), 
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risk.  In contrast to the predictive and standardizing techniques of the Welfare State, resilience 
technologies look to manufacture systems and subjectivities capable of adapting to change and 
uncertainty (Lentzos and Rose, 2009, O'Malley, 2010a). 
The radical transformation in the rationalities and practices underpinning biopolitical 
security techniques has led some to question whether this represents the ‘death of the social’ 
(Rose, 1996a) and others whether these techniques might still be rightfully recognized as 
biopolitical (Massumi, 2009)?  This thesis maintains that a biopolitical analytic is most 
appropriate for understanding these changes.  It does so in accord with contemporary research 
interested in the biopolitical implications of the profound changes in the understanding of 
species-life advanced within the associated digital and molecular revolutions (Rose, 2007b, 
Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009, Dillon and Reid, 2001, 2009, Cooper, 2006a, 2008, 
2010).  Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero explain that taken together these revolutions are advancing 
an particular speciation of life understood as “a complex adaptive and continuously emergent, 
informationally constituted,
 system” (2009: 1).  Resilience corresponds to a mode of valuing 
life in relation to its capacity to adapt and transform through processes of complex emergence.   
Such a speciation represents a distinct way of understanding, problematising and valuing life.  
As such, it issues new imperatives to biopolitical governance (Cooper, 2006b, 2008, Dillon 
and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008).  
Rather than struggle to tame the milieu of the population, contemporary biopolitical 
governance is directed towards mastering the conditions of regeneration and transformation of 
a range of open systems displaying the life-properties of complex emergence.  Resilience is a 
measure of evolutionary fitness required to thrive in radically uncertain and precarious worlds.  
Drawing on a myriad of specialist knowledges, resilience initiatives seek to invest life with the 
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capacity to quickly and efficiently adapt, regenerate and transform in the presence of an 
emergency event.   The contingency of emergent species-life and the correlative study of its 
complex adaptive behaviour respectively provide a target and an epistemic base for 
biopolitical security interventions.  When life became understood in terms of its 
pluripotentiality (Waldby, 2002, Cooper, 2006b, 2008)—that is, capable of differentiation 
through multiple developmental potentialities—the objective of biopolitical security initiatives 
shifted to asserting “control and command [over] the morphogenetic process itself” (Dillon 
and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 287).   The knowledge of how to provoke conditions of emergence 
to make life live may also inform initiatives designed to pre-empt the emergence of 
undesirable forms of life in increasingly effective and economical ways (Cooper, 2006a).  
Mastery over the conditions of emergence for life-itself thus offers a new threshold for 
biopolitical governance—but it also provides a new science for a thanatopolitics directed to 
killing those forms of life found inimical to liberal life (e.g. Gregory, 2011a, 2011b).  The 
value of resilience represents the new telos of these biopolitical security initiatives. 
 
Chapter Outline: 
 
The focus of this biopolitical genealogy of resilience is on the historical processes 
which have enabled resilience to emerge as a security value guiding contemporary UK civil 
contingencies management.  It takes as its empirical space, the historical evolution of a British 
machinery of governance for responding to emergencies.   A machinery of governance is 
understood as a localized actualization of broader and more abstract apparatus of security.  A 
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concerted analysis of this particular machinery of governance is conducted for the purpose of 
making explicit distinct, and indeed rival, rationalities of governance which can be read from 
its evolving design.  This history is not performed with the intent of tracing the growing 
perfection of its methods nor to morally condemn the rationalities of governance formerly 
animating this machinery by, as Foucault put it, “writ[ing] a history of the past in terms of the 
present” (1977: 31).  Rather, in presenting a ‘history of the present’ this thesis aims to identify, 
through historical elucidation, distinct orders of governance still discernible within the 
resilience discourses of UK Civil Contingencies.   
While this study proceeds chronologically it does not purport to provide an extensive 
history of UK civil contingencies management.
5
  Genealogy thus does not abide by the 
Platonic duty to representation (Deleuze, 1990b), but aims to effect a problematisation.  Rather 
than the unity and coherence of a discovered essence, a genealogy of resilience traces the 
historical contingency of the processes contributing to the actualization of this value in the 
field of security.  Each chapter is focused on analysing an important event in a constitution of 
resilience discourses.  Chapter 1 analyzes the inception, and early years, of a British 
machinery of governance for managing emergencies, detailing both its biopolitical orientation 
and the growing scientification of its operations.  Chapter 2 traces the earliest development of 
techniques associated with resilience in respect to the security problematics posed by the 
advent of thermonuclear war and the threat it posed to the ‘survivability’ of the nation.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the development of resilience discourses within the complex ecosystems 
theory of the 1970s.  It compares the programme of governance advanced within these 
discourses to that being advanced by neoliberal critics of economic Keynesianism at that time 
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 More detailed histories of British emergency planning and response are provided by Jeffery and Hennessy 
(1983) and Geary (1985). 
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to make explicit the epistemological order supportive of an order of governance common to 
resilience and neoliberal discourses.  Chapter 4 details the operationalisation of resilience 
strategies within the realm of state security via the application of concepts and strategies 
developed within the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which proved influential in the 
reorganization of UK civil contingencies management after the collapse of the Cold War.  
Chapter 5 investigates governmental programmes designed to promote ‘resilient subjects’ as a 
means of opening a discussion on the ethical and political implications of resilience strategies. 
A brief conclusion summarizes the argument and discusses the implications of this genealogy 
for resilience research. 
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Chapter 1 
State of Emergency 
 
 
 
 
At what point do the emergency powers invoked by liberal governance risk slipping 
into authoritarianism?  This problematic has concerned British legislators and emergency 
planners over the course of the twentieth century in the context of the drafting and execution 
of emergency powers.  From its initial drafting in 1920 to when it was eclipsed by the Civil 
Contingencies Act in 2004 the British Emergency Powers Act has been evoked twelve 
times—almost exclusively in the context of labour unrest (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983).  The 
requirement to set legislative limits on the ability of the Government to arbitrarily declare a 
state of emergency was a precaution taken to preserve the legitimacy and authority of the state 
in the context of the challenge issued by such an event.  Setting limits on the exercise of 
sovereign power ensured that the emergency powers afforded to liberal governance in the 
context of a ‘state of emergency’ did not risk a slippery slope into authoritarianism.  This was, 
however, only the (not uncontroversial) public face of UK emergency management.  
Preceding the legislation of the Emergency Powers Act, and existing alongside it over the 
entirety of the legislation’s history, was a secret machinery of emergency governance.  The 
secrecy surrounding this machinery attested to the difficulty of reconciling liberalism with 
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emergency management when the imaginary of ‘the emergency’ was focused on major 
industrial disputes. 
For Carl Schmitt (2005) it was precisely this concern with legitimacy, and in particular, 
the setting of legislative limits on emergency powers, which dangerously weakened the 
capacity of liberal governments to respond to ‘the exception’.  Schmitt famously commences 
Political Theology with a definition of political sovereignty: “Sovereign is he who decides on 
the exception” (2005: 5).  Schmitt’s emphasis on who decides rather than how to decide on the 
exception corresponds to his critique of normative liberal approaches to declaring a state of 
emergency. For Schmitt, no legal norm can be given which defined in advance the exceptional 
conditions under which the constitution giving authority to this norm could be suspended. 
Under these conditions, only the sovereign—that political force existing prior to the law—may 
decide on the exception, and institute a state of emergency under which the essence of the 
legal form could be secured.  For Schmitt, the sovereign’s capacity to decide on the exception, 
and thus invoke a state of emergency under which constitutional law is suspended, displays 
the primacy of the figure of the sovereign over and above the constitution from which their 
power is said to derive.  By subordinating the power of the sovereign to law, Schmitt 
suggested that liberal states were considerably weakened in their capacity to respond to 
exceptional events which existentially threaten the legal order of the state.   
In recent years, Schmitt’s writings on the state of exception have received renewed 
attention. Assisted by the Agamben’s engagement with these ideas (Agamben, 1998, 2005), 
the state of ‘exception/emergency’ has been utilized as a paradigm for analysing the 
exceptional measures resorted to by liberal regimes in the context of the war on terror (Aradau, 
2007, Doty, 2007, Huysmans, 2004, 2008, Johns, 2005, Neal, 2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2010).  As 
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important as this work has been, considerably less attention has been paid to the concrete 
mechanisms with which ‘the emergency’ has been historically governed within liberal states.6  
The risk is that in studying the ‘state of exception’ as a condition of possibility for political 
sovereignty, one can easily overlook the considerable variation in the ways in which ‘the 
emergency’ is imagined and responded to when actual ‘states of emergency’ have been 
historically invoked.  The focus of this chapter is therefore on the social and political 
conditions under which UK emergency legislation and a machinery of emergency governance 
emerged in the twentieth century.  It is motivated by the proposition that an analysis of the 
conditions of emergence of liberal arrangements for responding to emergencies is equally 
revealing of the power structures supporting liberal governance.  Specifically this chapter 
demonstrates, firstly, the biopolitical underpinnings of emergency governance from its formal 
institutionalization, and secondly, how this biopolitical imperative was differentially 
strategized by two distinct orders of governance between 1919 and 1970. 
The biopolitical enframing of British emergency governance is clear within Emergency 
Powers legislation.  From the Emergency Powers Act (1920) until the drafting of the Civil 
Contingencies Act (2004) a request by the British Government to the sovereign to declare a 
state of emergency has been legislatively conditioned on the presence of a threat to ‘the 
essentials of life’ to the community.  This immediately raises important political questions: 
What is essential to life? How has this changed over time? How were these essentials of life 
determined? What is understood by ‘life’ here? And finally, what form of life is thus being 
protected and promoted by these security technologies?  This chapter aims to address these 
questions by tracing a genealogy of the ‘essentials of life’ focused on locating the historical 
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 For an exception see Anderson and Adey (2011b). 
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conditions of possibility for such a category to emerge.  Drawing on archival research, this 
chapter traces the ‘essential of life’ to the logistical requirements perceived as ‘essential’ for 
Britain’s ability to sustain the war effort in the First World War and shows how this category 
became enshrined in UK emergency powers legislation in the inter-war years in the context of 
the threat posed by trade unionism. 
The second line of investigation pursued in this chapter focuses on how the ‘essentials 
of life’ have been secured. In doing so it argues that two distinct orders of governance can be 
discerned in the field of UK emergency management between 1919 and 1970.  These orders 
are distinguished on the basis of the techniques and rationalities employed to manage 
contingency.  The chapter begins with the first of these orders: tracing its military genealogy 
and detailing how it informed the initial design of the machinery of emergency governance 
which emerged at the end of the First World War.  Next, this chapter shows how this order 
was slowly displaced by the growing scientification of contingency management over the 
course of the Second World War by the influence of Operational Research (OR).   The 
persistent dialogue between UK emergency management and Civil Defence forged an avenue 
for this ‘scientific’ order of governance to colonize UK emergency management in the period 
following the Second World War. 
Taken together, these two lines of inquiry allude to the particular speciations of life 
enacted by biopolitical machinery of emergency governance.  In tracing the distinct orders of 
governance underpinning early British emergency response this chapter demonstrates that 
what was at stake in the contest between these rival orders of governance was not simply the 
authority to manage contingencies but the very nature of contingency itself.  As the source of 
contingency shifted from the irrationality of human emotions, to the architecture of ‘vital 
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systems’ so were the imaginaries of contingency themselves reconfigured.  Uncertainty was 
rendered calculable in the form of risk, thus making it amenable to ‘scientific’ forms of 
management.  The distinct orders of government investigated here thus operated in relation to 
different problematisations of life and imaginaries of uncertainty. 
   
Harnessing Uncertainty: Esprit de Corps and Moral Forces 
 
By the Second World War the notion of ‘morale’ had become elevated to a key 
strategic concept in the British war effort.  Civilian morale was understood as a vital 
prerequisite for the continuation of the war effort.  Maintaining the morale of the British 
population required its constant monitor through the application of a range of quantitative 
instruments developed by sociologists late in the inter-war years (Orr, 2006).  Whilst detailed 
weekly public opinion reports were being produced by the Ministry of Information (McLaine, 
1979), Operational Researchers employed across the British military were busy developing 
quantitative metrics to guide offensive strategies specifically targeting enemy civilian morale 
including strategic, or ‘morale’, bombing campaigns.  Within the context of total war—a 
mode of conflict which enveloped the whole of the nation within the war effort—civilian 
morale was a significant preoccupation of wartime governance.  Given the significance of 
considerations of civilian morale to the design of early British machineries of emergency 
governance it would be beneficial to undertake a brief genealogy of morale here.  Tracing this 
genealogy will, in turn, reveal the contours of an order of governance which emerged 
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alongside morale and which can discerned within the rationalities of early UK emergency 
governance.  
Given the predominance of scientific approaches to the measurement of morale by the 
Second World War, it is curious that a genealogy of morale locates its origins in the explicitly 
romantic military discourses of late eighteenth century France which consolidated in strict 
opposition to what some military theorists considered to be the excessive scientification of 
their occupation by strategists such as Bülow and Jomini.  From the middle of the eighteenth 
century an influential strand of Enlightenment military theory sought to significantly reduce, 
if not eradicate, the contingency of war through the application of scientific method to the 
battlefield (Gat, 1989).  A pervading sense that universal laws, such as those recently 
discovered by Newton, could be uncovered for the conduct of battle motivated efforts to 
discover these laws and systematically order the components of one’s own war effort in 
accordance with them (Gat, 2001: 30).  Geometrical principles which had been applied to 
bombardment and fortification were increasingly extended to inform military formations and 
tactics which became increasingly rigidified and subject to hierarchical control (Bousquet, 
2009: 53-55, De Landa, 1991: 40-41).  In an associated effort, military training and drilling 
took on special significance in the production of highly disciplined, orderly and predictable 
troop regiments, perhaps best exemplified by the so-called ‘clockwork armies’ of Prussian 
monarch Fredrich II.  The clockwork mechanism, as key metaphor and abstract machine 
operating within various discourses including those of the military during this period (see De 
Landa, 1991, Landes, 2000, Bousquet, 2009), provided an ideal for military order based on 
precision, regularity and ultimately, predictability (see Foucault, 1977: 135-141).   
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The organization of the Napoleonic armies departed in significant ways from the 
rigidly mechanistic armies of Fredrick the Great which had begun to display faults over the 
course of the Seven Year’s War (Bousquet, 2009: 76).  The French armies were highly 
informed  by the French military theorist Guibert who, while still very much committed to a 
scientific approach to war, developed manoeuvres and formations which permitted increased 
flexibility and autonomy for troops in battle (Gat, 1989: 43-53).  Military historian, Martin 
Van Creveld explains "whereas Napoleon's opponents sought to maintain control and 
minimise uncertainty by keeping their forces closely concentrated, Napoleon chose the 
opposite way, reorganising and decentralising his army in such a way as to enable its parts to 
operate independently for a limited period of time and consequently tolerate a higher degree 
of uncertainty" (quoted in Bousquet, 2009: 77).  This autonomy was enabled by, and reflected 
the ideals of, the popular composition of the Napoleonic armies whose commitment in the 
years following the Revolution was less a concern than that of conscript armies. 
The phrase esprit de corps has been traced to 1780.
7
 Its emergence would coincide 
with a profound restructuring in the tactical organization of fighting force within the 
Napoleonic armies.  Esprit de corps referred to the specifically intangible ‘spiritual’ (esprit) 
or ‘moral’ (morale) force which supplemented the physical capacities of a military unit.8  
Napoleon, whose armies were organized around the exploitation of this moral force vis-à-vis 
the more numerous German army, famously claimed that “[m]oral force rather than numbers 
decides victory.  The moral is to the physical as three is to one” (Napoleon quoted in Englund, 
                                                          
7
 ‘Esprit’ Online Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=esprit accessed 26 October 
2011. 
8
 The etymology of the English ‘morale’ has been traced to 1831 and stems from a confusion between le moral 
(temperament), associated with the notion esprit de corps, and la morale (morality).  See ‘Morale’ Online 
Etymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=morale&allowed_in_frame=0 accessed 26 
October 2011. 
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2004: 105).  For Napoleon, success in war rested on the ability to exploit that which exceeded 
calculation and scientific planning on the battlefield by learning to nurture, augment and 
ultimately channel this powerful, natural force towards the commander’s own martial ends.  
In doing so, the Napoleonic armies refigured the very engine of the war machine.  Departing 
from the mechanistic diagram operationalised by Fredrick’s war machine, the Napoleonic 
armies were designed to harness, augment and direct the passions of the soldiers themselves 
as a martial force.   
The profound reorganization of military tactics and training around the concept of 
esprit de corps was rooted in a profound re-evaluation of the military body as the object of 
knowledge and power within the military sciences.  In Discipline and Punish (1977) Foucault 
meticulously documented how the mechanical body “which had for so long haunted those 
who dreamt of disciplinary perfection” (1977: 155) was displaced by the natural body: “the 
bearer of forces and the seat of duration; it is the body susceptible to specified operations, 
which have their order, their stages, their internal conditions, their constituent elements” 
(1977: 155).  The natural body was thus an object whose inherent mechanisms and processes 
functioned as a limit to the exhaustive ordering which had previously motivated disciplinary 
practices.  Discipline had to identify and work in accordance with the natural laws and 
processes of the body if it was to harness their power.  Discipline was thus dependent upon a 
‘political anatomy’ of the natural body—a detailed regime of knowledge of the natural 
mechanisms of the body—to direct disciplinary techniques ‘exercising upon it a subtle 
coercion, or obtaining holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself’ (Foucault, 1977: 137).  
Discipline thus functioned as a technology of power which simultaneously “increases the 
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forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political 
terms of obedience)” (Foucault, 1977: 138). 
Coinciding with their spatial and temporal re-organization of bodies, Foucault identifies an 
interest amongst military scientists in very surface of intersection between the body and the 
weapon, tool or machine.  The concentration upon this surface of contact, Foucault explains, 
gives rise to an ‘instrumental coding of the body’ (1977: 153): a way of viewing the body 
which renders it amenable to techniques of governance aiming at the integration of body and 
tool such that “over the whole surface of contact between body and the object it handles, 
power is introduced, fastening them to one another” (1977: 153).  Disciplinary power, which 
“appears to have the function not so much of deduction as of synthesis, not so much of 
exploitation of the product as of coercive link with the apparatus of production,” is thus 
instrumental in production of what Foucault will term the ‘machine-body complex’ (1977: 
153).  To the extent that the ‘natural’ body of the soldier can be synthesized with the weapon, 
tool or machine, it can also be fastened to other bodies within larger organic-machinic 
collectivities to compose the mass ‘body’ of the military corp.  Fredrick the Great’s clockwork 
armies would thus be displaced by a schema of military order no longer based upon 
mechanistic diagrams, but on the diagram of the natural organism whose martial force was 
synonymous with the very life force which animated it.  In interrogating the military 
genealogy of biopower, Foucault identified a key site from which to investigate the very 
transformations in the human sciences which he documented in the archaeological analysis of 
The Order of Things (2002).  This transformation, Foucault argued, pertained to a discursive 
shift in emphasis from the external, visible form of representation, to the internal, non-visible 
generative forces.  This discursive shift towards the immanent force of production acted as a 
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condition of possibility for the simultaneous emergence of the academic fields of biology, 
political economy and general grammar. 
Morale is not synonymous with life.  Rather, morale is a rough measure of the 
temperament and vitality of life forces which are themselves unquantifiable, non-classifiable, 
yet unmistakably present.  It is the external expression of the interior, non-visible and thus 
directly unknowable forces of ‘life-itself.’  At the collective level, morale is a sign of the 
cohesion of a group; their desire to pull together in order to achieve a common goal.  Morale is 
a barometer of the intangible vital force present within, and animating, the individual and/or 
collective body (corps militaire).  Clausewitz describes moral forces as the “spirit which 
permeates the whole being of war” yet cautions that “they will escape from all book-analysis, 
for they will neither be brought into numbers nor into classes, and require to be both seen and 
felt” (Clausewitz, 1997: 150).    Insofar as it is a sign, morale itself cannot be directly operated 
upon.  Instead, morale is governed through all those things which biologically sustain the body 
and affect its excitability.  High morale is associated, on the one hand, with adequate training, 
rest, food and drink: all those things associated with the biological—that is material—
dimension of the body.  On the other hand, these requirements can be augmented, or 
supplemented, through appeals to the immaterial spiritual or affective dimension of the body. 
Clausewitz, a great admirer of Napoleon, recognized the profundity of the 
transformations occurring within military order and presented within his celebrated military 
treatise On War a novel theorization of modern combat rooted in the irreducible uncertainty of 
the fog of war.  The volatile emotions stirred up in war are the source of tremendous force, but 
also a primary source of uncertainty.  While fear is of greater concern, Clausewitz cautions 
that boldness too can potentially interfere with obedience to military command (1997: 159).  
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Discipline as a moral technology is primarily concerned with reducing the uncertainty inserted 
into war by emotions through the cultivation of courage.  Courage, “the feeling of one’s own 
power” (1997: 87), acts as a counterbalance to the instinct of fear.  It concerns itself with 
moral, as opposed to physical preservation.  According to Clausewitz, courage is a virtue 
naturally present in some but capable of being instilled through habit and custom in others 
(1997: 153).  Discipline is thus also concerned with converting boldness to courage by 
‘submit[ing] itself to demands of a higher kind, to obedience, order, rule, and method” (1997: 
153).  
If, for all the talk of moral forces in On War, the art of discipline receives little 
discussion it is not because it is unimportant.  Rather, Clausewitz’s concern lay primarily with 
the self-discipline of the military commander whose courage stems from responsibility 
(Clausewitz, 1997: 40-60).  Clausewitz recognizes the seduction of certainty and, as such, 
spends little time in demonstrating how it can be bolstered.  No amount of discipline can 
eliminate uncertainty entirely, nor should it insofar as this would amount to marginalizing the 
force of the passions within battle.  Uncertainty must be responded to with the commander’s 
courage to make decisions based on experience and intuition.  Moral forces are both a primary 
source of uncertainty and the means of overcoming the dangers of uncertainty.  Uncertainty 
therefore opens a space for the creativity and the freedom to exert independent influence on 
the war—albeit the commander’s freedom and the commander’s creativity, reinforcing the 
authoritarian structure of the military.  Contingency, for Clausewitz, represents not simply an 
ineradicable condition of operability but also a condition of possibility for heroism. 
Clausewitz’s theory of war emphasized the skilful balancing of the ‘remarkable trinity’ 
of emotion (attributed to the nation), rationality (attributed to state policy) and chance (the 
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domain of the commander).  Unlike Machiavelli’s fortuna, chance here cannot be attributed to 
fate.  Rather, chance is the product of epistemological finitude in relation to the irreducible 
complexity of war.  The will to certainty, though seductive, is premised on a false hope.  
Insistence on certainty can only serve to delay decision or encourage decision based on 
suspect intelligence.  Clausewitz cautions of “the uncertainty of all knowledge” (Clausewitz, 
1997: 52).  Just as significant as his understanding of the irreducible character of uncertainty 
in battle is his advice on how to respond to it.  Like Machiavelli’s Prince, the good 
commander must seize chance and direct it to his own advantage.  This particular acumen, the 
commander’s ‘genius’ (Clausewitz, 1997: Book 3, iii), is composed of a mixture of intuition 
and experience.  It is displayed in courage and creativity required to make decisions within an 
uncertain environment.  War rather than a science, is understood as an art requiring the 
balance of the moral and creative aptitude of the commander (see  Herbig, 1986).  With the 
advent of total war, and the absorption of the nation into the war machine, the morale of the 
nation would become an increasing concern, opening an avenue for broader application of this 
order of governance to civilian populations. 
 
War Becomes Vital: Securing the Essentials of Life in the First World War 
 
By mid-war the mounting success of German submarines in disrupting the circulation of 
Allied mercantile ships was becoming a major concern. Italy was facing an acute shortage of 
food, coal scarcity was jeopardizing French and Italian munitions production, while imports 
of steel from the United States were becoming increasingly precarious.  In January 1917, an 
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Allied Naval Conference was organized to coordinate naval defences.  In the opening speech 
to conference delegates, British Prime Minister Lloyd George emphasized that Allied victory 
was conditional upon control of the seas and the security of essential imports, defined as “raw 
material and other supplies essential to the prosecution of the war and to the existence of the 
population.”9  The consequences were clear: “[t]he Germans, without inflicting a military 
defeat upon us, could win the war by destroying our mercantile marine.”10  
The Italian delegation, in obvious accord with Lloyd George’s outlook, insisted that the 
British and French Cabinets be made aware that “prolongation of this state of things is bound, 
within a brief period of time, to result in curtailing the powers of resistance of such Allies in 
relation to the war.”11  Lloyd George made clear in his conclusion that Allied cooperation to 
secure these vital flows was critical to the war effort:   
Our interest is common, and we ought not to allow comparatively little things to 
interfere with what, after all, is essential to the life of each country-essential to the 
life of Italy, essential to the life of France, essential to the life of Great Britain, 
and essential to something which is more important than any nation, and that is 
the future of the whole of the human race, which, I think, is dependant (sic) upon 
the success of the Allies in this great war.
12
  
 
If, as Lloyd George insisted, the future of ‘life’ rested on Allied success in war, so was an 
Allied victory taken to be dependent upon the morale of the nation.  Indeed, if ‘massacres 
ha[d] become vital’ (Foucault, 1998: 137),  it was not simply because the lives of individual 
soldiers were at stake, nor even that war’s lethality had swelled to the extent of threatening the 
lives of civilian populations.  War had become vital insofar as total war mobilized the life-
                                                          
9
 Report of Allied Naval Conference, 23 and 24 January 1917, CAB/24/6 , pg. 3 
10
 Ibid. pg. 7 
11
 Ibid. pg. 3 
12
 Ibid. pg. 9 
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energy, or biopower, of whole societies as the animating force of a war machine premised on 
the defence of the ‘life of the nation’ (Foucault, 2007, Foucault, 1998, Reid, 2006).  Here, the 
life of the nation was not simply annexed through conscription to be sacrificed in the event of 
war (although it certainly was as well).  Life was a positive force whose productive capacities 
were to be harnessed within burgeoning war industries integral to modern total war in its 
industrialized form. 
Insofar as life was vital to the conduct of total war, the measure of the nation’s vitality 
became an important security consideration for the state and the concept of morale, which had 
formerly been circumscribed to military applications, increasingly applied to considerations of 
the belligerence of civilian populations.  The ‘essentials of life’ would emerge in this respect 
as an important preoccupation of the wartime administration.  The essentials of life were the 
raw materials underpinning the nation’s morale.  To the extent they were both visible and 
quantifiable they could be employed as the referent of security practices whose true objective 
was the maintenance of morale.  The essentials of life were not therefore synonymous with 
the minimum requirements for biological life.  Instead, and like the terms ‘essential imports’, 
‘essential services’ and ‘essential industries’ which ‘the essentials of life’ routinely appear 
alongside in discussion, what is essential is defined in relation to its indispensability to the 
war effort.
13
  The link between morale and the ‘essentials of life’ is made explicit in a note 
regarding the content of a speech Lloyd George was to make in Scotland in 1917.  In 
announcing a government commitment to “cheapening the essentials of life” Lloyd George 
was encouraged to “announce that the Government recognise that, in order to keep up the 
                                                          
13
 See ‘Essential industries’ as listed within Cabinet Memo, “Problem of the Maintenance of Armed Forces” 
November 1917, CAB/24/4; Cabinet Memo “The Man-Power Situation: 1917-1918”,  17 June 1918,  
CAB/24/54 
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moral of the nation, it was necessary, not only to have sufficient food, but ample food at 
reasonable prices.”14 
The meaning of ‘life’ encapsulated within the phrase ‘essentials of life’ was a specific 
enframing of life forged within the logistical requirements for total war (Reid, 2006); an 
understanding of life as potential martial force to be harnessed by a war-machine compelled 
to defend the ‘life’ of nations associated with the Allied Powers.  It is precisely this 
militarized enframing of life contained within the notion of ‘essentials of life’ which would 
form the referent for a biopolitical security apparatus fashioned in the final months of the First 
World War. 
 
A British Machinery of Emergency Governance 
 
The demands of total war required a profound restructuring of the administrative 
apparatus of the British state.  A dirigiste command economy was introduced to direct the 
transition of industry to a war footing and manage the supply and allocation of resources.  
New departments of state were established—firstly, the Ministry of Munitions in 1915, 
followed by shipping, labour, food and national service in 1916—and essential industries 
including coal-mining, railways and munitions production became controlled by the state 
(Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 4).  On the legislative side, emergency powers granted by the 
1914 Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) gave government departments the authority to 
intervene into the normal processes of the economy to commandeer buildings and goods for 
                                                          
14
 War Cabinet Minutes, 27 June 1917, CAB/23/3 
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the war effort.  Industrial disputes within essential industries were effectively made illegal by 
the 1915 Munitions of War Act.  These measures, however, were not entirely effective in 
preventing industrial action.  Wartime strikes including the stoppage of engineers on Red 
Clydeside (1915), the miners’ strike in South Wales (1916), and a wave of disputes in the 
summer of 1918 (which included a strike by the London Metropolitan police) challenged the 
state’s capacity to ensure the provision of essential goods and services ‘essential’ to the 
morale of the population, and thus the war effort (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 4-5). 
In February 1919, in response to the combination of a tube and omnibus strike and a 
potential electricians stoppage in London, the War Cabinet secretly appointed the Industrial 
Unrest Committee (IUC).  The IUC was a special Cabinet Committee chaired by the Home 
Secretary Edward Shortt and including representatives of the War Office and Admiralty 
mandated with making ‘the necessary arrangements for dealing with any situation that might 
arise from industrial unrest both at the present moment and in the future’ (as cited by Jeffery 
and Hennessy, 1983: 10).  Organizationally, the IUC was composed of five sub-committees: 
The first four (public utility services, transport, communications and electric works) were 
each responsible for ensuring the continuity of essential services through the coordination of 
replacement services run by volunteers and naval ratings, while the fifth (protection) was 
responsible for the maintenance of order and the protection of ‘blacklegs’ (Jeffery and 
Hennessy, 1983: 11).  Servicemen, despite their reluctance, were relied upon significantly 
within these plans to maintain order, to escort workers across picket lines, and to act as 
replacement workers themselves (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 13)—duties which servicemen 
had indeed performed for many years predating the First World War (See Geary, 1985, 
Knowles, 1952).  While the transport strike ended shortly thereafter and the electricians strike 
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never materialised, the foundations were set for a civil contingencies organization designed to 
ensure the continued operation of essential services in the face of industrial unrest so that they 
would not compromise the war effort.   
In subsequent months this framework would be elaborated upon.  Contingency plans 
for countering a major industrial dispute were drawn up based upon the construction of a list 
of essential services (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 12).  Food supplies topped the list followed 
by the maintenance of war supplies, household coal, sanitary services, lighting and the 
transport and communication necessary for the provision of government.
15
 A scheme for 
military guard of these essential services was also prepared.  In September 1919, in the face of 
a potential national railway strike, the IUC was replaced with the ‘Strike Committee’: a body 
established on a permanent basis with stronger executive powers than the IUC.  The Strike 
Committee would be headed by Eric Geddes, the Minister of Transport during the war.  Under 
Geddes direction, contingency plans were made for the road transport of essential supplies 
and for the recruitment of volunteers to act as strike breakers.  The Strike Committee proved 
so useful that it was agreed in October that, rather than dissolve the Committee, a nucleus of 
the existing organisation be preserved (Geary, 1985: 56).   
                                                          
15
 In the event of a strike essential services are listed as... 
1. The transport and distribution of essential food supplies 
2. The maintenance of war supplies 
3. The maintenance of essential supplies of household coal 
4. The maintenance of sanitary services 
5. The provision of a minimum of lighting 
6. The maintenance of transport and communication necessary for those purposes and for the working of 
government itself 
7. The protection of all engaged in the above Services (Cabinet Memo, 16 December 1919, CAB/24/95). 
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This nucleus organization would be renamed the Supply and Transport Committee 
(STC)—an intentionally ambiguous title whose purpose was to distract attention from the 
politically sensitive operations of the organization (Geary, 1985: 54).  The STC subdivided 
Britain into eleven regions each to be under the control of a District Commissioner 
responsible for preserving order and ensuring the supply of essential goods and services 
(Coaffee et al., 2009: 61).   The first of these responsibilities required the coordination of 
military, police and volunteer forces, such as the Special Police or Citizen Guard, to maintain 
order and ensure public property was not damaged.  The second involved overseeing the 
recruitment of volunteers through Volunteer Service Committees (VSCs) to act as 
replacement bodies for essential services.  Contingency planning within the STO was thus 
primarily directed towards ensuring that in the event of industrial action, this nucleus 
organization could expand to meet the needs of the situation, including most notably the 
recruitment of sufficient numbers of volunteers required to replace striking workers.   
By the end of the war, a significant contingencies apparatus had therefore been 
constructed to ensure that industrial unrest would not undermine the viability of the war effort.  
However, as the war wound down, statesmen would find this machinery difficult to part with.  
The STC was especially seen as indispensable in light of the continued threat posed by 
industrial unrest.  This concern reflected not only the extent to which industrial unrest 
weighed on the minds of statesmen at this time.  It also displayed the extent to which the 
security of the ‘essentials of life’ had swelled from a priority of military governance to an 
imperative of liberal governance more generally.  No doubt aided by the rhetorical power of 
the phrase itself, the security of the ‘essentials of life’ would appear as so obvious a duty of 
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liberal governance as to deflect attention from the question of the form of ‘life’ being 
protected and promoted.  
 
Essentials of Life in the Emergency Powers Act (1920) 
 
The post-war challenge to Government was clear in the minds of statesmen. Labour 
union membership had nearly doubled over the course of the war, rising from 4,189,000 in 
1913 to 8,081,000 in 1919 (Desmarais, 1971).  This was no doubt in part due to the 
considerable credibility afforded to labour unions by government attempts to nurture friendly 
relations during the war.  Given their newfound responsibility as employers within essential 
industries, the state engaged with labour to ensure their cooperation with the war effort: 
labour leaders were actively consulted on policy questions and Labour Party members were 
introduced to government for the first time (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983).  But with the end of 
the war, the swelling of industrial union membership combined with the recent success of the 
Russian Revolution caused considerable disquiet for Government.  The concern was further 
exacerbated by the influence of the Triple Alliance, a coalition formed in 1914 of the three 
major unions of the time: the Miners Federation of Great Britain, the National Union of 
Railwaymen and the National Transport Workers' Federation.  The potential of the Triple 
Alliance to organize a national general strike was taken to represent a serious challenge to the 
monopoly of power held by central government. 
In a telling interview with the leaders of the Triple Alliance in 1919 Lloyd George 
provided insight into the particular fears that trade unions posed to the state… 
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‘Gentlemen, [said the Prime Minister] you have fashioned, in the Triple Alliance 
of the unions represented by you, a more powerful instrument.  I feel bound to tell 
you that in our opinion we are at your mercy.  The Army is disaffected and cannot 
be relied upon.  Trouble has occurred already in a number of camps.  We have just 
emerged from a great war and the people are eager for the rewards of their 
sacrifices. And we are in no position to satisfy them.  In these circumstances, if 
you carry out your threat and strike, then you will defeat us.’ 
 ‘But if you do so,’ went on Mr. Lloyd George, ‘have you weighted the 
consequences?  The strike will be in defiance of the Government of this country 
and by its very success will precipitate a constitutional crisis of the first 
importance.  For, if a force arises in the State which is stronger than the State itself, 
then it must be ready to take on the functions of the State itself, or withdraw and 
accept the authority of the State,’ asked the Prime Minister quietly, ‘have you 
considered, and if you have, are you ready?’(as cited in Jeffery and Hennessy, 
1983: 6-7) 
 
For Lloyd George, the threat posed by trade unionism was not simply a challenge to the 
functioning of the economy and the terms upon which it operated.  It was a direct challenge to 
the monopoly of power held by the state.  Labour unions were taken to be a rival centre of 
power whose capacity to organize a nation-wide general strike undermined the authority of 
the state.  Strikes were therefore not just disruptive—they were a direct threat to the state’s 
capacity to maintain order and an affront to the legitimacy of the state to govern.  The spatial 
form of the strike—with its amassing of individuals—was itself a symbolic demonstration of 
the power in solidarity of the unions contra the state. As such, they were responded to by 
policing techniques aimed at dispersing this mass through techniques including baton charges, 
cavalry charges, and the ‘flying wedge’.  The preservation of a government strike-breaking 
machinery was, in this context, taken to be essential to ensuring that coordinated strikes 
would not undermine the authority of the state.  Government officials were acutely aware 
however that the declaration of official peace meant the imminent expiry of the wartime 
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powers provided by DORA, and with it, the legislative basis for the civil contingencies 
machinery.  A precedent was placed on drafting peacetime emergency powers legislation to 
ensure the continued functioning of the STO. 
The STC was asked to advise on the emergency powers required by Government to 
address a major industrial dispute, and these would be used to construct the Emergency 
Powers Act (EPA) of 1920 (Geary, 1985: 54).  The act outlined the conditions under which 
Government had the authority to request a state of emergency from the sovereign.  A state of 
emergency was legislatively permitted when the supply and distribution of the “essentials of 
life to the community”—listed as food, water, fuel, light, and the means of locomotion—were 
considered to be threatened by “any persons or body of persons” (as cited in Jeffery and 
Hennessy, 1983: 270).  Emergency legislation would afford the state “such powers and duties 
as His Majesty deems necessary for the preservation of peace, for securing and regulating the 
supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, light and other necessities, for maintaining the 
means of transit or locomotion, and for any other purposes essential to public safety and the 
life of the community.” Military and industrial conscription as well as criminalization of 
striking were prohibited within the legislation. 
The transposition of the phrase ‘essentials of life’ into emergency powers legislation 
provided a specific condition upon which a declaration of a state of emergency could be 
requested.  More importantly it provided Government the means to distinguish their 
interventions into industrial disputes from strike-breaking, as Winston Churchill emphasized 
in an address to the House of Commons in 1919... 
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"To use soldiers or sailors, kept up at the general expense of the taxpayer, to take 
sides with the employer in an ordinary trade dispute . . . would be a monstrous 
invasion of the liberty of the subject, and . . . would be a very unfair, if not an 
illegal, order to give to the soldier. But the case is different where vital services 
affecting the health, life or safety of large cities or great concentrations of people 
are concerned." (quoted in Whelan, 1979: 222) 
 
The legitimacy of the government to intervene in industrial disputes would be preserved in 
recognition of the responsibility of liberal governance to protect ‘life’.  The government could 
claim that its intervention in industrial disputes was based on the necessity of securing the 
‘life of the community’ rather than the support of the interests of the propertied classes.  In 
practice, the distinction between strikebreaking and securing the ‘essentials of life’ was rarely 
so clear.  In recognition of this fact, the government ensured that the STO continued to 
operate in secret, with its budget spread across numerous departments so as to distract 
attention from it and avoid exacerbating existing tensions (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 29). 
The ‘essentials of life to the community’ not only reactivated a military phrase within 
emergency legislation, but directly transposed those essential goods and services identified in 
wartime as essential to ‘the life of the community’ to those deemed essential during peacetime.  
If one compares, for instance, the list of essentials to the life of the community outlined within 
the Emergency Powers Act (1920) to those essential services listed in a 1919 Cabinet Memo a 
clear duplication is evident.
16
  The self-evidence of liberal governments requirement to protect 
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 The 1920 legislation mirrors the 1919 memo with the only exception being that the earlier requirement of 
maintaining ‘war supplies’ had been purged from peacetime legislation. The 1919 memo (Cabinet Memo, 16 
December 1919, CAB/24/95) lists essential services as... 
1. The transport and distribution of essential food supplies 
2.  The maintenance of war supplies 
3.  The maintenance of essential supplies of household coal 
4.  The maintenance of sanitary services 
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life, in turn, discouraged the question of what exactly was meant by life in the context of this 
legislation.  But the notion of life to be protected and promoted by emergency legislation was 
clearly a particular enframing life forged within the requirements of total war.  It persisted 
insofar as it enabled the possibility of a legitimate state of emergency within a liberal regime.   
The STC continued to develop contingency plans right up until it was presented with 
its first major test—the 1926 General Strike.  The General Strike began at midnight on May 
3
rd
 when the Trades Union Congress (TUC) ordered railway and transport workers, printers, 
iron and steel and building operatives to join the miners who had already stopped work after 
talks with the TUC and Government had failed.  A Royal Proclamation was issued 
immediately declaring a state of emergency and schemes already prepared by the STC were 
swiftly put into action.  The country was subdivided into 11 regions each under the control of 
a Civil Commissioner.  To ensure the circulation of food and other essential services 
Volunteer Service Committees (VSOs ) were set up to replace striking workers which were 
quickly filled by the unemployed (O'Brien, 1955: 29).  Police, supported by volunteer 
organizations, would maintain order, with troops held back unless desperately needed, 
although they would be used to escort lorries across picket lines (Geary, 1985: 57).  The swift 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
5. The provision of a minimum of lighting 
6. The maintenance of transport and communication necessary for those purposes and for the working of 
government itself 
7. The protection of all engaged in the above Services 
This list can be compared with the essential services listed in the Emergency Powers Act (1920):  
“(1) If at any time it appears to His Majesty that any action has been taken or is immediately threatened by any 
persons or body of persons of such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be calculated, by interfering with 
the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or light, or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the 
community, or any substantial portion of the community, of the essentials of life, His Majesty may, by 
proclamation (hereinafter referred to as a proclamation of emergency), declare that a state of emergency exists.”  
(as cited in Jeffery & Hennessy, 1983, pp. 270) 
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action by Government was enough to deflate the unions and the General Strike was called off 
a mere 8 days after it had begun (O'Brien, 1955: 29). 
 
Panic and the Origins of British Civil Defence 
 
While the 1926 General Strike proved the first major test of the civil contingencies 
machinery, it was not solely civil contingencies personnel who were to benefit from the 
lessons learned.  The recently established Air Raids Precautions (ARP) Committee took great 
interest in the efficiency with which the Government responded to the 1926 Strike.  The ARP 
was established in 1924 as a committee within the Home Office in light of the devastation 
wrought by German air attacks to London, and surrounding areas, in the latter years of the 
First World War (O'Brien, 1955: 7).  In 1921, service experts were asked by the Committee of 
Imperial Defence to report on the consequences of possible future air attacks in UK (O'Brien, 
1955: 12). The report that followed detailed the rapidly escalating devastation threatened by 
bombs on London and suggested that future wars would be characterised by the superiority of 
rapid offensive strikes over defensive manoeuvres. In response, during a meeting of the 
Committee on the Co-ordination of Departmental Action on the Outbreak of War in 
December 1923, the Air Ministry suggested to the Home Office the development of a scheme 
of air raid precaution. A subcommittee was established shortly thereafter charged with 
calculating the extent of danger threatened by an aerial assault on London and making 
recommendations in response.  The first report of the ARP Committee placed great emphasis 
on London.  It was recognized that London 'might be taken as representing approximately 
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one-third of the belligerent strength of the nation' (O'Brien, 1955: 22). The report was guided 
by two central questions: whether vital activities normally centred in London and its 
periphery could be moved to a less exposed part of Britain, and whether the life of the nation 
could be maintained if these activities in the London area should be stopped or curtailed  
(O'Brien, 1955: 18)?  The report concluded negative on both points.  As such, the idea of 
mass evacuation was quickly sidelined and all efforts were directed towards maintaining its 
vital functions in the midst of an attack.   
The fear was effectively one of panic: a sudden air strike was sure to drive the 
population into a hysterical panic.  Chaos would erupt as city-dwellers fled for the countryside.   
This raised the question of whether the danger associated with informing the public of a 
potential attack outweighed the potential costs attributed to widespread panic and desertion.  
With no clear evidence to base their judgement upon, the Committee recommended 
information only be circulated to police, fire fighters and other specialist bodies until the 
question of public reaction was further investigated.  The report concluded with the following 
reminder: "It has been borne upon us that in the next war it may well be that nation, whose 
people can endure aerial bombardment the longer and with the greater stoicism, will 
ultimately prove victorious" (as cited in O'Brien, 1955: 19). 
In 1926 the ARP Committee reconvened but only to find that it could not proceed 
without first addressing two essential questions: "Would London's essential workers need to 
be prevented from leaving the capital? And if so, what form of control should be adopted for 
this and other purposes?" (O'Brien, 1955: 28)  The experience of the First World War had 
already proven the tendency for air-attacks to cause work stoppages as it was not uncommon 
during this period for workers to refuse to enter factories until they had been given definite 
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promises of early warning of the approach of aircraft.  O’Brien points out how this was 
illuminated by the Government’s response to the General Strike May 1926 which impressed 
the newly appointed Air Raids Commandant Major-General H.L. Pritchard (O'Brien, 1955: 29, 
117).  The appointment of Pritchard reflected the fact that the problem was still being viewed 
in military terms. An attack would transform London into a battlefield, chaos and panic would 
ensue requiring the exercise of discipline and control to maintain order. 
For Major-General Pritchard the problem of keeping people on the job was essentially 
one of morale.  This view was echoed in the Fisher-Hankey proposals to the committee in late 
1937 which suggested that ‘civil defence’, a term which emerged at this time to reflect all the 
civil departments including law and order, food, and transport that would be potentially 
disrupted in the event of an attack, be re-organized according to the regional structure of the 
STO (O'Brien, 1955: 117).  It was proposed that the Minister of the Home Secretary be made 
responsible for both the protection of civilians (what had until then been referred to as 
‘passive defence’) as well as the functioning of all essential services.  At the outbreak of war, 
Britain would be divided into the eleven regions set out by the STO, each under the control of 
a Regional Commissioner responsible for maintaining order and the provision of all essential 
services as outlined in ‘Civil Defence Emergency Scheme “Y”’.   This schema for control 
formed the basis for the Regional Seats of Governance (RSGs)—a scheme for the 
preservation of government, and thus order, in the event of central government no longer 
being able to effectively perform their duties. 
The ARP’s adoption of the organizational framework of the STO, including the 
subdivision of Britain into regional structures of governance, today appears odd.  Indeed why 
would Britain’s first Civil Defence organization model itself upon a strike breaking 
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organization?  However, a common matrix of governmentality was appropriate insofar both 
organizations saw their principle responsibility as the disciplining of erratic and potentially 
dangerous emotions.  The conflation of ‘panic’ and ‘mob mentality’ can be traced back to 
Gustave Le Bon’s study of ‘the popular mind’ entitled, The Crowd (1896), whose influence 
on pioneering sociological studies of panic in the 1930s was formidable (Orr, 2006).  The 
contagion model of mob behaviour outlined by Le Bon would continue to inform scholarship 
on panic as well as the logics of Civil Defence well into the 1950’s (see for example 
Milwuakee Civil Defense and Disaster Committee, 1951, Meerloo, 1950).  It explained the 
spread of irrational and often violent behaviour within ‘mobs’ through the trope of mental 
contagion spread by the power of suggestion. Whereas Le Bon’s emphasis on suggestion 
resonated with popular contemporary psychological studies on hypnotic suggestion and 
hysteria conducted by Freud and Charcot at the turn of the century the idea of moral 
contagion has a much longer history.   
Scholarly accounts trace the idea of moral contagions to the eighteenth century when it 
was thought that minute ‘corpuscles,’ perspired though pores in the skin and contained within 
the atmosphere around bodies, were  capable of transmitting physical and moral qualities 
when absorbed through the skin of another (Forth, 2001, Heath, 2010).  By the late nineteenth 
century, the porous body of the Enlightenment was to be superseded by a more or less sealed 
‘biomedical body’, following the work of Louis Pasteur amongst others (Forth, 2001, Heath, 
2010).  However the trope continued to operate as both metaphor and model in 
understandings of the transmission of psychological states between persons, no doubt assisted 
by the European fascination with epidemics which continued for many years following the 
great cholera epidemic of 1832 (Hacking, 1991, Pelling, 2001).  The tendency to view a wide 
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range of problems, from fairly benign acts such as yawning to criminal acts including 
madness, rioting and murder as the result of ‘moral’ or ‘mental’ contagions was common in 
the nineteenth century and were allied to fears of ‘degeneration’ accompanying 
industrialisation (Forth, 2001).   
The power of panic lies in its ability to awaken the primitive instinct lying dormant 
within the individual, which can powerfully erupt given the catalyst of fear.  Rationality and 
morality give way to an instinctual, pre-social mode of behaviour befitting a child (dependent, 
selfish, emotional) or animal (irrational, competitive, violent).  The individual becomes 
divorced from their sense of self, sinking in a quasi-hypnotic trance into the homogenous 
‘group mind’.  This disassociation from the self, renders the individual incapable of self-
government (in direct opposition to the objectives of the litany of moral reform programmes 
which abounded in the early twentieth century) and vulnerable to the will of a powerful and 
charismatic leader.  Those most susceptible to contagion were those of weak character: the 
mentally ill, colonials, primitives, children and women.  Forth (2001) noted that concern with 
the effeminizing effects of modernization, at the turn of twentieth century in France, 
contributed to a ‘cultural obsession’ with the fortification of the ‘manly will’ through various 
educational programmes and techniques of the self.  O’Malley (2010b) documents similar 
concerns within British military discourses following the First World War which understood 
victims of  shell-shock to be lacking in the militaristic virtue of fortitude which was acquired 
by some early in life.  The concern with fortitude suggests that security against moral 
contagions was strategized through a logic of prophylaxis which required the ‘steeling’ of the 
body.  As Heath noted, “The problem posed by moral contagion was thus one of boundaries – 
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between the mind and the body, the inside and the outside, and the self and the other” (2010: 
36). 
 
Operational Research and the ‘Scientification’ of War 
 
The formation of the ARP reflected a growing recognition of the potential devastation 
of airpower and its implications for the conduct of future wars.  By 1921, the Committee of 
Imperial Defence had recognized that the defensive wars of attrition which characterized the 
First World War were swiftly being replaced by offensive wars led by airpower.  By the 
1930’s this shift in military advantage was actively being strategized by military theorists, 
including Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard and Basil Liddell-Hart within doctrines of strategic 
bombing.  It was recognized that these advances in airpower had significant implications for 
British defence which could no longer rely on naval supremacy alone.   
In 1934 H.E. Wimperis, Director of Scientific Research in the Air Ministry, 
recommended the creation of a Committee for the Scientific Study of Air Defence to 
"consider how recent advances in technical knowledge can be used to strengthen the present 
methods of defence against hostile aircraft" (as quoted in McCloskey, 1987a: 144).  By 1935, 
a scientific advisory panel, led by Henry Tizard, was appealing to the Air Ministry for the 
development of radar system to provide advanced warning of bomber attacks from the 
continent.  Within two years, early-warning ‘Chain Home’ radar stations were being erected 
along the East Coast to collect and process data to be sent to the Royal Air Force (RAF) (Rau, 
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2005: 156).  Engineers operating on these systems would refer to their work as ‘Operational 
Research’ (OR) (Rau, 2005: 156). 
The definition of Operational Research has been a matter of considerable debate, no 
doubt exacerbated by the disparity of practices, techniques and applications encompassed 
under this label (Mirowski, 2002: 177-81).  The journal of the British Operational Research 
Society Operational Research Quarterly has defined Operational Research as 
The application of the method of science to complex problems arising in the 
direction and management of large systems of men, machines, materials, and 
money in industry, business and defence.  The distinctive approach is to develop a 
scientific model of the system incorporating measurements of factors such as 
chance and risk, with which to predict and compare the outcome of alternative 
decisions, strategies or controls.  The purpose is to help management determine its 
policy and actions scientifically (as quoted in Kirby, 2003: 3). 
 
As a practice, Operational Research is thus characterized by the application of quantitative 
methods of analysis to the operations of systems for the purposes of managing uncertainty.  
The extent to which such an approach can be properly understood as ‘scientific’ however 
deserves further discussion.  Scientists recruited primarily from physics and the natural 
sciences were certainly instrumental in their early formation of Operational Research and 
their status as scientists, as well as their claims to a ‘scientific approach’, no doubt garnered 
especial authority to their work.  However, the scientific status afforded to Operational 
Research is by no means obvious.    Indeed, despite the attempts of its proponents to ally OR 
with hard sciences like Physics, the discursive structure of Operational Research 
unmistakably resembles most closely the ‘soft’ social science of Economics (Mirowski, 1989, 
1999, 2002). 
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The scientific status afforded to Operational Research might be better understood in 
relation to concurrent trends in the scientification of economics at this time (for a discussion 
see chapter 3).  A ‘scientific’ approach to economics was embraced by many left-wing 
intellectuals in Britain in the years leading up to the Second World War.  Building on the  
success of Taylorist techniques of ‘scientific management’ in industry and the experience of 
the command economy instituted in the First World War left-wing intellectuals in Britain 
campaigned for the ‘scientific’ rational-planning of the economy.  In 1940, Science in War 
was published by figures instrumental to the development of wartime OR in years to follow, 
including Patrick Blackett, J.D. Bernal and Solly Zuckerman.  The authors were associated 
with the Tots and Quots dining club, organized by Zuckerman, which met to discuss the social 
responsibility of science in the early years of the war (Kirby, 2003: 88). The book criticized 
the overrepresentation of those with a background in the classics and literature amongst the 
ruling classes and demanded a greater proportion of scientists be elevated to high ranking 
positions. The application of scientific method was an underutilized technique, according to 
the authors, which could be used not only to assist in problems of military tactics and strategy 
but also to the administration of the war economy.  The political sensibilities of these 
individuals did not go unnoticed, prompting the formation of the “Society for the Freedom of 
Science” whose members included Arthur Tansley and Fredrich von Hayek (Mirowski, 2002: 
183). 
Military historians have documented the rapid spread of Operational Relations through 
the separate divisions of the military (see Christopherson and Baughan, 1992, Harvey and 
Delfabbro, 2004, Kirby, 2003, McCloskey, 1987a, 1987b, Rau, 2005) colonizing the last of 
the major military commands in September 1941 with the establishment of a bomber 
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command group set up to investigate losses and bombing accuracy (McCloskey, 1987a: 149).  
Operational Research was also applied to Civil Defence considerations.  The Civil Defence 
and Research Committee was established in May 1939 to assist the Home Office Research 
and Experiments Branch in its studies of the effects of high explosives (McCloskey, 1987b: 
466).  J.D. Bernal set up a Design and Development Section within the Research and 
Experiments Branch to begin collecting information on structural damage to buildings in the 
wake of an explosion, initially with an emphasis on industry.  The section, which included 
Baker and Zuckerman, would continue to develop analytical tools designed to predict the 
effects of German bombs on British cities.  It was quickly realized however that the same 
techniques used to analyze the impact of German bombing attacks on UK cities could be used 
to measure the effectiveness of allied bombing campaigns on the continent and the section 
was absorbed into the Air Ministry. (McCloskey, 1987b: 466).   
The growing influence afforded to ‘scientists’ not simply to provide information, but 
to actively influence questions of tactics and strategy was neither unnoticed nor uncontested 
by the existing military command.  A large proportion of the military establishment was quick 
to condemn the 'scientific' approach advanced by practitioners of Operational Research as 
overly technocratic and myopic (Rau, 2005).  This conflict was to come to a head in 1941 
when Churchill's scientific advisor, Fredrick Lindemann, sponsored the highly critical Butt 
Report on the navigational and bombing accuracy of the RAF Bomber Command.  An ORS 
was formed by Chief Air Marshal of Bomber Command Richard Peirse, however this was not 
enough to keep his job, and he was replaced shortly thereafter by Arthur 'Bomber' Harris, an 
advocate of area bombing.  The high casualty rates suffered in 1941 by bombers in air 
campaigns over Germany had encouraged the shift to mostly night time raids which, in turn, 
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led to a significant drop in the bombing accuracy of industrial and military targets.  
Consequently, the Air Staff began to encourage the practice of area bombing as part of a 
strategic bombing campaign in which key population centres and industrial targets were 
targeted with the express purposes of undermining the capacity for the nation to endure war 
(Rau, 2005: 159). 
By January 1944 Zuckerman had been appointed as a second Scientific Advisor to the 
Air Officer Commanding Officer in recognition of his work on the impact of air attacks on 
lines of communication.  Zuckerman’s work suggested a radical reorientation of pre-invasion 
bombing strategy from concentrating on German population centres and industrial capacity, to 
targeting infrastructural supply lines to disrupt the circulation of military and industrial 
products (McCloskey, 1987b: 462)—what would later be termed ‘critical infrastructures’ 
(Collier and Lakoff, 2008a, 2008b).  Operational Research was applied in an effort to 
ascertain the most vulnerable elements of these systems to attack, measured in terms of the 
effect of their loss in disrupting the enemy’s war effort.  Contingency was a calculable feature 
immanent to system design. 
The knowledge of the military command, formed through instinct and experience, was 
being undermined by ‘scientific’ approaches to war, rooted in quantification and statistics.  
Underlying this transition was a transformation in the rendering of contingency itself.  As 
concerns shifted from the unpredictability of irrational human emotions to the architecture of 
critical infrastructure systems, so did the imaginary of the nature of contingency itself.  
Contingency was not longer an irreducible element of the fog of war, but something which 
could be rendered calculable and scientifically managed.
 
The scientification of war was 
premised on the emergence of a new regime of truth in relation to which ‘scientists’ were 
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afforded authority on matters concerning the prosecution of war.  Mirroring this shift in war, 
British contingency planning would soon thereafter re-focus its planning operations from 
calculating the number of bodies required to replace striking workers to quantitatively 
assessing the vulnerability of systems to targeted disruption. 
 
Generalizing Emergency: The Emergencies Committee 
 
Industrial relations over the course of the Second World War were relatively peaceful.  
Though more strikes occurred than during the First World War, those occurring during the 
Second generally involved fewer workers and extended for shorter durations (Jeffery and 
Hennessy, 1983: 145).  Provisions for compulsory arbitration and the incorporation of trade 
unions and employers’ associations into wartime governance ensured that Defence (Armed 
Forces) Regulation 6 of 1939 Emergency Powers (Defence) Act
17
 was rarely used.  By 
contrast, the memory of the difficult transitionary period following the First World War 
encouraged the wartime coalition government headed by Churchill to review civil emergency 
mechanisms immediately upon the end of the war in Europe, which included Home Office 
plans to secretly reconstitute the STO (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 147-9).   
The decision to revive the STO would not be reversed by the election of the first 
majority Labour Government in July 1945.  Whilst vocally committed to the repeal of the 
Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act (1927) which made general strikes illegal the Attlee 
                                                          
17
 The 1939 Emergency Powers (Defence) Act permitted service men to be used to break strikes which risked 'the 
maintenance of the supplies and services essential to the life of the community" (cited in Jeffery and Hennessy, 
1983: 143-4). 
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government decided to extend emergency powers for a further five years in anticipation of 
potential crisis such as those that occurred in 1921, 1924 and 1926.  By October 1945 Cabinet 
authorized troops to break a strike involving dock-workers in Liverpool.  The experience 
provoked the establishment of the ‘Industrial Emergencies Committee’—a Cabinet committee 
chaired by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review existing civil contingencies controls—
whose first meeting would be delayed until January 1947 as a result of the end of the dock-
workers strike.  In the meantime, the secret review of the STO proceeded within the Home 
Office under Home Secretary James Chuter Ede.   
In particular, questions were raised concerning whether the existence of the 
organization should be made public.  It was recognized that the disclosure of the STO by the 
Parliamentary opposition, who were well aware of the existence of the organization, to derail 
Government efforts to repeal the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Acts risked significant 
embarrassment for a Labour Government.  Ede, for one, suggested that an the STO be 
announced and explained as a ‘routine precaution’ whose scope was limited to the 
maintenance of emergency supplies and services, noting that full public disclosure of the 
organization would serve to facilitate the preparation of plans as well as their function during 
an actual emergency (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 163).  Atlee however, remained 
unconvinced, and a decision to disclose the organization was delayed indefinitely.   
This impasse would only be resolved in 1947.  Following the Industrial Emergencies 
Committee’s first meeting in the face of a road haulage strike, Ede proposed that the purview 
of the Committee be widened so as to include not just industrial action, but any threat to the 
disruption of essential services (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 177-8).  The IEC looked 
favourably on Ede’s proposals as a way of combating the perception that the organisation 
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existed as a strike-breaking mechanism.  It decided to act quickly, noting that the memory of 
troop assistance in the delivery of coal to power stations during the fuel shortages which 
exacerbated the previous winter’s exceptional cold was still fresh in public minds.  The IEC 
was strategically reconstituted simply as the ‘Emergencies Committee’ whose function was 
“to supervise the preparation of plans for providing and maintaining in any emergency 
supplies and services essential to the life of the community; and in any emergency to co-
ordinate action for this purpose” (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 179-80).   As such, the STO 
was essentially resurrected under a new name and with the more politically acceptable 
mandate of responding to emergencies in general.    
While the establishment of the Emergencies Organization never was fully disclosed to 
the public, it did provide the impetus to open consultations with essential industries for the 
development of detailed emergency plans which progressed steadily over the next decade.  
Emergency organization was further assisted by the Supplies and Services (Defence Purposes) 
Act 1951 which extended emergency powers due to expire in 1950 including Regulation 6.  
Though presented as a temporary measure, these powers would persist until they made 
permanent in the Emergency Powers Act 1964.  Following the severe winter of 1962-3, the 
government of Sir Alec Douglas-Home amended the 1920 Emergency Powers Act, and made 
permanent Regulation 6, to facilitate the use of troops in dealing with natural disasters.  It did 
so by substituting the condition upon which a government may request a state of emergency 
from a determination that ‘any action has been taken or is immediately threatened by any 
persons or body of persons’ so as to threaten the essentials of life, to the more general 
condition that ‘there have occurred, are about to occur, events of such a nature” which 
threatened the essentials of life (See Appendix I Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 270-273). 
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The reframing of the civil contingencies apparatus as a machinery for dealing with 
general emergencies was thus a political strategy designed to legitimate an organization 
principally resurrected for strike-breaking purposes.  From 1964 when the act first appeared 
until it was replaced in 2004 by the Civil Contingencies Act it has only been invoked to deal 
with industrial disruption.  While the contingency plans of the Emergencies Organization 
would advance markedly from consultation with essential industries during this time, the role 
of the organization changed little from its initial formulation.  As with the inter-war STO, the 
Emergencies Organization was taken to be an essential instrument for dealing with the threat 
of Communist subversion and the threat it posed to order and good governance.   
 
States of Emergency: the Civil Contingencies Unit  
 
By the late 1960s low economic growth paired with rising unemployment and high 
levels of inflation was contributing to a crisis of economic governance.  ‘Stagflation’ was 
difficult to reconcile with predominant Keynesian economic paradigms (Gamble, 2009: 59-64, 
Hay, 2010, Olson, 1982a, 1982b) where inflation and unemployment were understood as 
mutually exclusive and counterpoised against one another: deflation was the solution to high 
inflation, and reflation through policies of demand-management the solution to rising 
unemployment.  Stagflation required solutions which would break this inflationary cycle and 
prevent rises in prices from being transmitted into demands for higher wages (Hay, 2010).  
Incomes policies would, however, pass the responsibility and cost of managing inflationary 
pressures onto labour.  In 1970, Edward Heath’s Conservative government was elected on the 
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promise of enacting strict anti-inflationary policies within the public sector.  In doing so 
Heath was preparing to take on some of the largest trade unions in Britain, including powerful 
energy sector unions. 
In July, only one month after the election, a strike by dockers led Heath to declare a 
state of emergency, swiftly followed by a second declaration in December in response to a 
‘go-slow’ in the electricity sector.  The second incident in particular demonstrated the extent 
to which the plans of the Emergency Organization had become outdated (Jeffery and 
Hennessy, 1983).  Whereas only two states of emergency were called between 1950 and 1970, 
technological advances during this period, within essential industries in particular, made it 
increasingly difficult to substitute troops for highly skilled, specialized labour (Jeffery and 
Hennessy, 1983: 233).  The lack of exercise left the machinery in ill-position to deal with the 
crises which would erupt in swift succession from 1970.  Five ‘states of emergency’ were 
declared between 1970-4 by the Conservative government led by Edward Heath, giving 
salience to media accounts that Britain had become an ungovernable state (Hay, 2010). 
On January 9th 1972, after having rejected a small pay rise from the National Coal 
Board, the National Union of Coal Miner’s encouraged their members to come out on strike—
the first national coal strike since 1926.  The government waited for an entire month to 
declare a state of emergency on 9 February, despite coal already having been run down by the 
overtime ban conducted prior to the strike (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983).  Miners began by 
setting pickets at coal stations, however their strategy quickly escalated to encompass all 
power stations, as well as steelworks, ports, coal depots and coke depots as well.  These key 
points of energy vulnerability—what would later be termed critical infrastructures—were 
targeted using secondary and flying pickets, permitting strikers to effectively disrupt the 
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power supply of the entire nation.  Fuel shortages, especially for power stations, slowed the 
country to a halt as industry was restricted to a two-day week (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983).  
The result was overwhelmingly effective. Even with the declaration of a state of emergency 
and the use of force (Geary, 1985) by 25
th
 of February a deal was reached which significantly 
augmented miner’s wages.   
The rhetoric of war was used by many, including President of the NUM Arthur 
Scargill.  But the tactics of the flying picket, which specifically targeted critical infrastructures 
associated with energy, demonstrated an affiliation with doctrines of strategic bombing: 
"You see, we took the view that we were in a class war.  We were not playing 
cricket on the village green, like they did in '26.  We were out to defeat Heath and 
Heath's policies because we were fighting a government.  Anyone who thinks 
otherwise was living in cloud-cuckoo land.  We had to declare war on them and 
the only way you could declare war was to attack the vulnerable points.  They 
were the points of energy: the power stations, the coke depots, the coal depots, the 
points of supply.  And this is what we did." (Arthur Scargill as quoted in Jeffery 
and Hennessy, 1983: 235-6) 
 
The view in Whitehall was that government response to strike was wholly inadequate and a 
major review of emergency planning protocol, led by Lord Jellicoe and John Hunt, was 
ordered by Heath to investigate the Emergency Organisation's handling of miner's strike 
(Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 236-237).  The review precipitated a significant overhaul of the 
civil contingencies apparatus at the level of both its organization and underlying logics.  The 
Emergency Organization was replaced with the Civil Contingencies Unit, a streamlined 
organization no longer located within the Home Office, but in the Cabinet Office.  The new 
organization was mandated to create contingency plans based on the coordination of the 
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police, military and civil service for a wide range of peacetime emergencies reflected in the 
notion of 'emergency services.'   
The notion of emergency services would dissolve the division between internal and 
external threats which had been preformed within the separate establishment of the STO and 
ARP in the interwar years.  Wartime emergencies, peacetime emergencies and natural 
disasters were, for the first time, to be responded to by the same organization.  The distinction 
between internal and external threats was further distorted within the notion of ‘home defence’ 
promoted in the 1973 Home Defence Planning Assumptions which outlined the state’s 
commitment to the protection of civilians from internal as well as external threats.  The term 
however was quickly abandoned when it was recognized that it might imply a militaristic 
response, or war, on labour unions (Hilliard, 1986).  Still, the militarization of emergency 
management was clearly evident, not least by the appointment of  Brigadier R.J. 'Dick' Bishop 
directly from the Army to Secretary of the CCU in 1972—a position he was to keep until his 
death in 1981.  One of Bishop’s first tasks was to rank in order of vulnerability to industrial 
action the essential services and industries of Britain (Jeffery and Hennessy, 1983: 238).  
Sixteen industries were appraised according to their importance to the functioning of the 
nation and their susceptibility to disruption.  Electricity supply, unsurprisingly, topped the list.  
Contingency plans were revised to ensure the maintenance of essential supplies and services 
in the wake of industrial action and an intelligence unit was established within Scotland Yard 
(Geary, 1985: 95).  If this was war, as Scargill claimed, then it was so as the level of tactics 
employed by both labour and the state.  The targeting of critical infrastructures represented a 
transposition of strategic bombing tactics into the battles unfolding within the domestic sphere. 
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Conclusion: 
 
For Clausewitz, uncertainty was an inexhaustible element of war (Clausewitz, 1997: 
52).  It was that which frustrated any effort to render war a calculative science (see 1997: 86, 
136).  Clausewitz denounced the hubris of contemporaries who, in seeking to reduce war to 
neat mathematical formula, only served to degrade the virtues needed to prosecute war within 
conditions of uncertainty (1997:158-162).  Uncertainty could not be overcome but instead 
demanded the exercise of creativity and heroism on the part of the military commander.  For it 
was only in overcoming his own insecurity and learning to make decisions on the basis of 
incomplete knowledge that the commander could learn to prosecute war within conditions of 
ineradicable uncertainty, and thus turn contingency to his own martial advantage. Operating 
within uncertainty required discipline: a technique of governance which was concerned less 
with taming the dangerous passions which were a primary source of the uncertainty of battle 
than in gaining mastery over these forces by learning to augment, channel and harness them to 
the martial ends determined by the commander.  Importantly, this program of military 
governance was supported by a romantic conception of contingency.  If contingency was an 
opportunity for creativity and heroism for Clausewitz this was because uncertainty was a 
condition of possibility for freedom itself. 
This order of military governance, which was slowly displaced by the ‘scientification’ 
of civil contingencies management, is important not just because of its influence in the design 
of Britain’s first formalised machinery of emergency governance, but because it resonates 
with, and sheds some light on, contemporary resilience discourses. While the legacy of the 
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‘scientific revolution’ to contingency management is still evident within contemporary 
approaches to civil contingencies management in the UK (for example in the widespread use 
of risk registers: a tool used for planning and funding purposes and a legal requirement for 
councils (Cabinet Office, 2008, 2009a, 2010a, for a discussion see Hagmann and Dunn 
Cavelty, 2012)) these ‘scientific’ approaches to the management of uncertainty are currently 
being challenged.  Like the romantic view outlined above, resilience discourses understand 
contingency to be an irreducible element of life which resist, in important ways, strict 
calculative approaches to management.  While the source of contingency has shifted, from the 
irrationality of human emotions to the dynamics of complex systems, resilience discourses 
often portray contingency management within heroic terms, as cultivating the virtues required 
to live with, and even embrace (Baker and Simon, 2002), uncertainty.  In moving ahead it 
may be useful to bear in mind the affiliation of resilience discourses to Clausewitz’s romantic 
account of military governance: extending the obligation to creatively engage with uncertainty 
to all facets of the population (see especially chapter 5). 
This chapter provides a foundation for the genealogical analysis continued in 
subsequent chapters.  Firstly, it shows the biopolitical imperative of British emergency 
governance since its formalized institution.  The biopolitical enframing of British emergency 
governance is traced to concerns regarding the security of the ‘essentials of life’ within the 
context of the forms of total war which characterized the First World War.  This commitment 
to ensuring the continued circulation of the ‘essentials of life’ was carried into the inter-war 
years via Emergency Powers legislation where it operated as a condition legitimizing liberal 
intervention in industrial disputes which had become the primary concern of the state.  
Though secret, this legislation was accompanied by a machinery of emergency governance 
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mandated to plan a response to major industrial disputes.  To the extent that they were 
commonly focused on the problematic of panic, this biopolitical machinery of governance 
would provide an organizational schema adopted by British Civil Defence. 
Secondly, this chapter documented the emergence of a ‘scientific’ order of governance 
within the field of UK civil contingencies management.  It traced the origins of this order to 
the advent Operational Research during the Second World War which challenged the 
authority of military commanders in the strategisation of war.  While the struggle concerned 
itself with the best means for governing uncertainty, it was evident that what was at stake was 
authority over the nature of contingency itself.  Distinct orders of governance operated in 
relation to very different imaginaries of the nature of uncertainty.  With Operational Research 
uncertainty was transformed through the application of statistical devices into risk:  a 
particular way of sculpting uncertainty to make it calculable and actionable (Ewald, 1991, 
Lobo-Guerrero, 2010, O'Malley, 2004).  Contingency, rendered as risk, became a product of 
system design which could be calculated by specialists.  Risk permitted governance to be 
technologized, replacing the freedom to make decisions on experience and intuition enjoyed 
by military commanders with formulas and models determining the optimal course of action.  
The shift in authority was thus premised on the advent of a new regime of truth within which 
contingency was understood as calculable and amenable to scientific management.  But it also 
alluded to a novel problematisation of life.  Governmental concern shifted from disciplining 
the irrational and potentially destabilizing emotions of those of weaker dispositions, to the 
vulnerability of vital systems enabling life.  These rival orders of governance, insofar as they 
operated in relation to different imaginaries of uncertainty, enacted particular speciations of 
life.  
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By establishing the biopolitical imperative of British emergency management and 
elucidating the origins of the scientific order of governance which predominated contingency 
management in the years following the Second World War, this chapter provides a foundation 
for subsequent chapters tracing the constitution of a neoliberal order underpinning 
contemporary resilience strategies.  The following chapter focuses on the problematisation of 
‘scientific’ approaches to contingencies management in the context of Cold War Civil 
Defence and the advent of techniques though which contemporary resilience discourses would 
germinate.
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Chapter 2 
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To a nation still very much steeped in war, the promise of a stable post-war period 
financed through the peace dividend provided comfort, solace and hope.  Less than a month 
after the last major raid of the London Blitz, which had devastatingly displayed modern life’s 
total exposure to modern total war, an interdepartmental committee, chaired by William 
Beveridge, commenced planning for an ambitious scheme for post-war social security.  Social 
Insurance and Allied Services—popularly known as the Beveridge Report—was presented to 
Parliament in 1942.  No doubt strongly influenced by the spectre of the Great Depression, the 
report spoke powerfully to the forms of civil contingency expected to greet post-war 
administrations.  It advocated compulsory social insurance, social housing, public education, a 
national health service and a commitment to full employment, all funded through the ‘peace 
dividend’, as a means of combating the five ‘giant evils’ of want, squalor, ignorance, disease 
and idleness in post-war Britain.  The document would be widely recognized as the 
cornerstone for what would emerge, post-war, as an ambitious state programme for the 
management of civil contingencies: the British welfare state. 
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The Welfare State was itself a quite disparate regime of practices, techniques and 
institutions located across both public and private sectors (Rose, 1993).  However disparate, 
the various mechanisms which comprised this assemblage—which included, but was not 
limited to a programme of compulsory social insurance, demand-led interventionist Keynesian 
economic policies and the maintenance of a ‘national minimum’ of state protection through 
welfare programmes—operated in pursuit of the common aim of social stability.  Social 
stability was to be ensured through twin interventions aimed at the reinforcement of the social 
bonds of the nation and the elimination of threats which might weaken them.  Social insurance 
emerged as the quintessential technology of the welfare state insofar as it addressed both these 
concerns simultaneously.   Operating a policy of risk-socialization extended to every member 
of the nation, technologies of social insurance emerged as a way of promoting social solidarity 
whilst simultaneously acting to mitigate the fear of dangerous futures which posed the greatest 
threat to the integrity of social bonds. 
Yet no sooner had the transition to a stable peace settled-in than the shape of the next 
battle was to begin to take form.  By the 1948 Berlin blockade it was generally recognized that 
the much anticipated peace dividend would instead need to be reinvested into the realm of 
military-defence as the terms of the Cold War emerged.  Though beset by persistent 
underfunding, a machinery of British Civil Defence was resurrected whose design echoed that 
of its wartime predecessor.  A mix of shelters, evacuation schemes, public education 
campaigns and rescue services was depended upon to protect the population from the dangers 
of aerial bombing and ensure Britain’s continued ability to conduct war.  Advances in 
weaponry, including the development of atomic, and later thermonuclear weaponry would, 
however, raise questions as to the sufficiency of these measures.  As the hostilities of the Cold 
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War mounted, the British nation would be exposed to unprecedented levels of danger which 
ultimately risked the continued existence of the nation itself.  
The concurrent operation of these two great machineries of security has been difficult 
to reconcile within a common historical account of the post-war period given the very 
different meanings commonly associated with the historical realisation of each of these 
machineries.  Historical narratives of these two machineries regularly appeal, explicitly or 
implicitly, to diametrically opposed teleologies of the evolution of the modern liberal state.  
On the one hand, the welfare state is taken to represent the culmination of a long project 
associated with the humanization of the State in which logics of raison d’état have been 
marginalized and state interests aligned with those of the nation to which it serves.  Cold War 
Civil Defence, on the other hand, invokes a more sinister narrative of the historical trajectory 
of the modern state: Advances in weaponry paired with a conviction of their necessity, raised 
the stakes of war so as to wager the existence of whole nations while persistently underfunded 
Civil Defence programmes acted as a charade to placate an anxious nation and keep it from 
turning against the official policy of deterrence. 
But what if these projects were not so dissimilar?  Rather than treating the co-existence 
of these two great machineries of governance as either coincidental or ironic, this chapter aims 
to study the logic of these two albeit distinct machineries of security as emergent from a 
common matrix of governmentality. In doing so, this chapter draws inspiration from 
Foucault’s suggestion in The Will to Knowledge (1978) that an indissociable relation exists 
between state biopolitics, aimed at the protection and promotion of the species-life of the 
nation, and the emergence of a thanatopolitical geopolitics wagering the continued existence 
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of the nation as species.
18
  It does so by focusing on a common problematic of anxiety shared 
by Civil Defence and the Welfare State and, more specifically, the dangers it posed if 
permitted to amplify to a state of panic for social stability.  
To do so is not, of course, to reduce these two distinct machineries of governance to 
the same.  Clearly, tensions also existed between these machineries at the level of the 
underlying security rationalities which they performed.  And it is here, in the field of 
resonance and dissonance which existed between the security logics enacted by these allied 
machineries, that this chapter locates the emergence of a novel approach to the government of 
anxiety.  Departing from the overall project of fear-mitigation around which early Civil 
Defence and the Welfare State were commonly organized, a rationality of security governance 
emerged within Civil Defence following its massive reorganization in the wake of the 
development of thermonuclear weaponry which did not seek to quell fears, but to mobilize 
anxieties within a project of preparedness.  Eclipsing a security project rooted in the 
manufacture of a stoic citizenry, governmental techniques would increasingly aim at the 
production of subjects acclimatised to dangerous worlds, confident in their ability to overcome 
the risks they faced—even if those included thermonuclear war. 
This chapter is interested in excavating the conditions of possibility for the emergence 
of new security values.  It demonstrates the emergence of new security values by focusing on 
the correlated transformations taking place between political imaginaries of the ideal subject 
of security and the governmental programmes which seek to elicit these subjects.  The 
transformation is studied by tracing a line of flight (Deleuze, 1992) between these distinct 
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  For Foucault, “what might be called a society's "threshold of modernity" has been reached when the life of the 
species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a 
living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics 
places his existence as a living being in question.” (Foucault, 1978: 143). 
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rationalities of governance via a study of the insurantial logics they mobilized.  The place of 
social insurance schemes with the Welfare state is demonstrated to operate as means of 
quelling anxieties through the reparational form of security it performed (Lobo-Guerrero, 
2011).  By doing so, social insurance operated within a common matrix of governmentality 
underpinning Civil Defence, rooted in a particular problematisation of species-life as 
precarious and panic prone.  The chapter continues by showing how these ‘protectionist logics’ 
of security became problematised with the advent of thermonuclear weaponry. Drawing on 
earlier discussion of the insurantial security, this study shows how Civil Defence logics were 
reconfigured in accordance with the reparational logic of insurance technologies: focusing on 
the security of a ‘way of life’ rather than the material body, and eliciting subjects ‘free’ to 
operate in dangerous and uncertain worlds.   
To the extent that a similar, albeit perhaps more refined project of preparedness is still 
evident within contemporary resilience discourses, the emergence of a governmentality of 
preparedness marks an important event in the genealogy of resilience. 
 
Establishing Stability and Eradicating Fear in the Welfare State: 
 
 The end of the Second World War was greeted with enormous optimism.  While much 
of Britain lay devastated—its major cities in tatters, its economy fragile—an ambitious 
programme designed to ensure freedom from the various evils which plagued British society 
prior to the war was being constructed.  A range of emotions, from post-war optimism to the 
fear of relapse into depression, acted as an adhesive for the combination of a disparate range 
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policies, practices and institutions which would be collectively known as the British welfare 
state.  Of these various programs social insurance has been widely recognized as the principal 
technology of the form of social liberalism enacted by the welfare state (Beck, 1992, Dean, 
1999, Defert, 1991, Ewald, 1986, O'Malley, 2004, Rose, 1996a).  
 Ewald (1991) describes insurance as an abstract technology which operates in relation 
to a calculative rationality of risk.  Importantly, Ewald investigated risk, not as an objective 
condition (Cf. Beck, 1992), but as a particular way of sculpting uncertainty (see Ewald, 1986).  
As Mitchell Dean notes “[i]t is a way of representing events in a certain form so they might be 
made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques and for particular goals” 
(1999: 177).  The spread of insurance is dependent upon the ability of insurers to actualize this 
abstract technology in innovative ways in order to render insurable, and thus profitable, what 
had not been previously thought insurable (Ewald, 1991).  The spread of insurance, as a 
technology, is therefore dependent on the ‘production’ (Dean, 1999) and ‘proliferation’ 
(Defert, 1991) of risks—that is, the rendering of risk(s) through actuarial techniques in new 
fields.  Actuarial data renders risk by recording the regularity of past occurrences of an event 
and then extrapolating these figures into the future in the form of probabilities.  The specific 
temporality upon which insurance technologies operate is therefore a conservative one in 
which the future is posited as an extension of continued past-presents.  History takes on a 
privileged place, as a repository of information which, when allied to the scientific tools of 
statistics and probability, can be drawn upon to tame the potential dangerousness of the future. 
However, as the recent development of catastrophe bonds demonstrate, the profit-motive may 
in practice extend insurance technologies to fields in which little, or insufficient, actuarial data 
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exists (Bougen, 2004).
19
 
 Genealogies of insurance have demonstrated how the development of probability and 
the statistical sciences permitted the extension of technologies of insurance (Daston, 1988, 
Hacking, 1990, 2006, Lobo-Guerrero, 2011).  From the late eighteenth century, the application 
of these sciences to the ‘avalanche’ of information generated from institutions including 
workhouses, prisons and hospitals was instrumental in giving the sense that regularities 
existed in the appearance of events associated with social problems such as reproduction, 
disease and mortality (Foucault, 2003, 2007, Hacking, 1982, 1990, 1991). Statistical 
normalization, represented by the ‘bell-curve’, would be introduced as a means of 
representing, standardizing and regulating future contingencies. By the late nineteenth century, 
contingencies such as accidents, illness, unemployment and even death were increasingly seen 
as properties of statistical distribution rather than negligence (Hacking, 1990). In turn, ‘the 
social’, which in liberal discourses had long been conceptualized as an organic unity operating 
in relation to its own fundamental laws and regularities, became increasingly understood as a 
phenomenon displaying laws of statistical regularity (Foucault, 2003).  Ewald (1986) has 
demonstrated how social insurance arose from the application of the abstract technology of 
insurance to this statistically-informed way of conceptualizing the social.   
 The advent of social insurance was not based in expectations of profit, but in the 
potential insurance had for reinforcing social solidarity.  Insurance, according to Ewald, 
engenders a specific form of mutuality: 
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 This extension renders problematic accounts of a contemporary ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992, 1999) characterised 
by the proliferation of incalculable threats which exceed the actuarial metrics of insurance, and thus the 
boundaries of insurantial security. 
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Insurance provides a form of association which combines a maximum of 
socialization with a maximum of individualization.  It allows people to enjoy the 
advantages of association while still leaving them free to exist as individuals.  It 
seems to reconcile those two antagonists, society-socialization and individual 
liberty (1991: 204).   
 
 
Scholars have identified the advent of accident insurance within industries of Western 
European states at the turn of the nineteenth century as an important event in the genealogy of 
social insurance (Defert, 1991, Ewald, 1986).  Ewald (1986) has noted that the success of 
accident insurance lay in its ability to displace the struggle between employee and employer 
over fault, to a struggle between employee and insurance provider over compensation for an 
accident, thus effectively diffusing a primary source of social and political confrontation. 
Daniel Defert (1991) has argued that the spread of social insurance in France can be attributed 
to its success in demutualizing the workers movement. The gradual takeover of workers 
mutual benefits societies by insurance companies removed a primary mechanism through 
which worker solidarity was engendered and reapplied it to the task of reinforcing the social 
solidarity of the nation.  By the turn of the century, Durkheim (1984) was stressing the 
difference between mechanistic solidarity, forged through common understandings of identity 
in primitive societies, and organic solidarity, which resulted from the growing 
interdependence amongst individuals whose work had become specialized in complex 
societies.  Social insurance was a technology which provided concrete form to the social by 
complimenting the organic bonds which held together advanced societies with bonds forged 
though technologies of mutuality.   
 Social insurance sought to realise a very different idea of security than that normally 
associated with the term.  Security has traditionally been understood as a condition 
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characterized by the absence of threat (McSweeney, 1999: 14-15).  Within the Western 
cannon of political theory this understandings of security has long provided a telos for security 
governance and justification for the existence of the state (Dillon, 1996).  The understanding 
of security which technologies of insurance aim to realise is not defined by the absence of 
threat.   Rather it is a form of security associated with the mitigation of one’s exposure to the 
negative effects of a specified event (Lobo-Guerrero, 2011).  Ewald is clear, that what is 
offered by insurance does not, and cannot, equal the loss suffered—indeed the loss of a limb, 
or a life, would be incalculable (1991: 204-5).  Rather, what is remunerated is an amount 
which has been contractually agreed upon with the insurer to be paid out should a particular 
event materialize.   As such, the ‘reparational form of security’ (Lobo-Guerrero, 2011: 6, 91) 
offered by insurance is not the guaranteed protection of the referent of security from harm, but 
rather a security which compensates for an event, thus mitigating the financial implications 
arising from its occurrence.  The referent to be secured by insurance is not the material body, 
but one’s way of life.  For example, while the cost of an industrial accident to the individual is 
itself incalculable, insurance ensures that one need not worry that the loss of one’s ability to 
earn a wage resulting from such an accident cascades into the bankruptcy of one’s family.   
 In reducing the exposure of an individual to undesirable future events insurance may 
even augments one’s confidence—a sense or feeling of security, rather than an objective 
condition of security—to live in an uncertain, and indeed risky, world.  If the welfare state 
could not protect the individual from the wide spectrum of threats they faced, it could ensure 
that one need not fear the full repercussions of its consequences.  From Keynesian demand-
management, to the regime of welfare programs which instituted a national minimum below 
which no citizen would be permitted to fall, the construction of a stabilizing machinery was 
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being prepared to protect populations not simply from the dangers of the future, but from their 
fears of dangerous futures.  If social insurance was the security mechanism par excellence of 
the welfare state then it was not just in respect of its ability to reinforce social bonds by 
extending the mutualising forces of insurance over the entire body of the nation, but also in its 
ability to mitigate fears which posed the greatest threat to the integrity of those bonds. 
 
Insuring Against Nuclear War: Post-war Civil Defence 
 
The atomic bombs which fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the close of the Second 
World War left an indelible impression in the minds of post-war governors, military planners 
and the public alike.  From the Autumn of 1945 fear and desire fed off one another. A massive 
government machinery for nuclear considerations, both offensive and defensive, was 
constructed to investigate the implications of this weaponry for British defence and advance 
Britain’s own procurement of the weapon  (Grant, 2010: 18).  In January 1946, a report was 
circulated on British vulnerability to nuclear weaponry authored by the Joint Technical 
Warfare Committee (JTWC), a sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which would 
be greatly influential in shaping the official imaginary of nuclear vulnerability.  The Effects of 
Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki concluded that the concentration of the British 
population as well as her industry, transport and shipping made her much more vulnerable to 
attack than the relatively dispersed United States and Soviet Union.  This, paired with 
uncertainties regarding the ability of public morale to withstand an atomic strike (Grant, 
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2010), raised questions concerning Britain’s ability to continue to prosecute a war in the wake 
of a nuclear attack. 
The catastrophic implications of atomic weaponry for UK defence would not, 
however, fundamentally change the general logic of civil defence planning.  Modelled on the 
strike-breaking machinery of the inter-war Supply and Transport Organization (STO), Civil 
Defence would continue to operate under a protectionist logic principally concerned with 
morally disciplining irrational and dangerous behaviour in the midst of an emergency which 
threatened to erode morale.  Over the course of the Second World War, Operational Research 
would be used to ameliorate, but in no significant way modify, this foundational design. 
Operational Research conducted within the Civil Defence and Research Committee sought to 
advance Civil Defence measures through the study of the implications of blast intensities on 
organic bodies and the built environments of the city.  Research was influenced in particular 
by the controlled experiments of primatologist Solly Zuckerman on the direct and indirect 
effects of ‘blast’ on lab animals (Zuckerman, 1978, Zuckerman, 1941, Zuckerman, 1940).  
These studies would be drawn upon in subsequent years to inform Allied strategic bombing 
campaigns.  Adey has argued that these studies “had important consequences for 
understanding the process of aerial bombing, scientifically perpetuating the analogic and 
affective amplifications of morale and panic through the trope of the explosion and the body’s 
susceptibility to indirect environmental effects” (2010: 159).  The understanding of the 
material and affective consequences of blast supported the bunker logic of Civil Defence in 
the Second World War.  The prophylactic securitization of material bodies within bunkers 
served as a means of pursing the broader objective of protecting the collective national psyche 
from fear. 
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The Civil Defence machinery resurrected in the early days of the Cold War maintained 
the design of this earlier model.  Focused on the allied considerations of mitigating the effects 
of an attack on the population and maintaining UK war-fighting capabilities, ‘insurance’ 
against a nuclear strike would be provided through a mix of evacuation plans; shelter 
provision; stockpiles of food, medical and industrial materials; and plans for increased port 
capacity and industrial dispersal.  The resemblance of this new machinery to its predecessor 
was no doubt the product of a certain degree of path-dependency but it also attested to the 
extent to which nuclear weaponry could be understood within existing frameworks of 
intelligibility.  If the advent of nuclear weaponry did not significantly problematise the bunker 
logic of Civil Defence this may be explained by the extent to which the threat posed by this 
weaponry could be conceptualized by operational researchers as ‘simply’ representing an 
amplification in blast-power: something which was already well-understood, and could be 
responded to by ‘scaling-up’ existing metrics (Smith, 2009). 
If Civil Defence operated as an insurance policy it was not simply in providing a 
secondary line of defence. The objective of protecting a population from fear resonated with 
the wider biopolitical project of social stability pursued by the welfare state.  Civil Defence 
was similarly designed for the production of stoic citizens, impervious to the fears solicited by 
campaigns of strategic bombing and thus unsusceptible to behaviours of panic and flight 
which could undermine the ability of the state to mount a retaliatory attack—citizens, in short, 
who could be depended upon to ‘keep calm and carry on’.  This stoicism required the 
presence, if not exercise, of authority.  The front-line of the state would be represented by the 
steeled members of the Civil Defence Corp, comprised of respected members of the 
community who were capable of setting an example to the worried flock in times of crisis and 
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to administer disciplinary control to correct those who succumbed to their fears (see Thomas, 
1942). Authority was necessary to combat the descent into irrationality and violence presumed 
to affect those of ‘weaker’ dispositions, including women, children, and ethnic minorities such 
as the Irish, in the midst of an emergency (O'Brien, 1955).  The British state recognized its 
responsibility to protect and sought to fortify the population prior to the attack, materially as 
well as psychologically, by providing visible forms of authority to quell the population, 
maintain civility, and, if necessary, restore rationality in times of emergency.
20
  The 
fortification programme of Civil Defence resonated with the aims of the welfare state.  The 
political subject to be produced through both programmes was psychologically armoured for 
the event: stoic and, thus, rational. 
However much these policies resonated with each other on the level of their inherent 
logic, they operated as adversaries in the fierce competition for funding which characterized 
the internal politics of the post-war British state.  Reluctance to reinvest the peace divided in 
military defence delayed the resurrection of a Civil Defence machinery despite growing 
international tensions.   Post-war Civil Defence would only begin to take shape after the Berlin 
Crisis in the summer of 1948.  Once established, Civil Defence would continue to be plagued 
by persistent underfunding and routinely overridden by economic considerations.  Plans for 
the industrial dispersal of essential industries recommended within The Effects of Atomic 
Bombs were, for example, were sidelined on account of their economic impracticality (Grant, 
2010).   Economic considerations would be powerful impetus in the redesign of Civil Defence 
machinery from 1955. 
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 The memory of The Blitz would continue to exert a profound influence on the imaginary of war and was also 
drawn upon as evidence of Britain’s hardened disposition (especially vis-a-vis the Americans) in the face of 
bombing raids (see Grant, 2010). 
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Imagining Armageddon: The Strath Report 
 
The Castle series of hydrogen bomb tests, conducted by the United States in the Bikini 
Atoll in March 1954, were intended to be secret.  In the early hours of March 1
st
, the Bravo 
device was detonated.  The 15 megaton blast grossly exceeded predictions of a 5-6 megaton 
yield, emitting a fireball which rose to 45,000 feet, carrying up with it shattered coral and 
debris which formed a cloud reaching 114,000 feet (Arnold, 2001: 18).  Radioactive dust—
fallout—was carried along by the vicissitudes of the winds, which had themselves undergone 
an unaccounted for shift, far beyond the boundaries of the delimited danger zone and towards 
the Marshall Islands.  White flakes of fallout were reported to have snowed down for several 
hours thereafter.  By the 5
th
 of March American servicemen had removed 236 islanders from 
the Rongerik, Rongelap, Ailingae and Utirik atolls suffering from radiation burns, hair loss 
and lowered blood counts, and escorted them to hospital (Arnold, 2001: 19).  Nine days later, 
the Japanese fishing vessel the Lucky Dragon returned to port, its crew suffering from the 
symptoms of radioactive contamination: nausea, vomiting and general fatigue followed by the 
development of lesions, jaundice, swollen livers and discharge emitted from the eyes and ears.  
One crew member, Aikichi Kuboyama died several months later from liver and blood damage.  
The contamination of the crew provoked anti-American protests in Japan and newspaper 
headlines around the world. 
Fears were initially centred on the blast—calculated at some hundreds of times more 
powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima—with newspaper 
headlines around the world focusing on the Atomic Energy Commission chairman Lewis 
Strauss’ claim that the new hydrogen bomb could be built large enough to destroy a city the 
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size of New York.  The first internal Whitehall reviews, conducted as a result of the 
prohibition on the sharing of nuclear intelligence by the 1946 McMahon Act, also 
concentrated almost exclusively on the amplified blast wrought by the hydrogen bomb (Grant, 
2010: 81), scaling-up (once again) work performed by Operational Researchers on blast 
damage caused by atomic bombs (Smith, 2009).  Civil Defence considerations were similarly 
scaled-up: expanding the number of persons to be included in the ‘priority classes’ of 
evacuation plans from 4.6 to 12 million (Grant, 2010: 83).  However, in addition to displaying 
the massive amplification in blast power the Bravo tests announced the arrival of fallout, a 
development which would itself profoundly impact the understanding of nuclear war and what 
‘survivability’ would actually entail. 
Only in the winter of 1954 would the implications of fallout begin to be studied in their 
own right when Norman Brook established the Central War Plans Secretariat (CWPS) in the 
Cabinet Office to examine the effects of fallout for British defence planning.  The CWPS was 
organized to facilitate a holistic approach which considered both the offensive and defensive 
implications of thermonuclear weaponry for Britain simultaneously, rather than as separate 
considerations as had been the tendency in the past (Grant, 2010: 87).  William Strath, from 
the Treasury, was appointed to lead an interdepartmental group to examine ‘the broad 
consequences of fallout on our war plans as a whole and indicate the guidance which 
Departments responsible for detailed planning would require’ (quoted in Grant, 2010: 88-9).  
An initial report, commissioned from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to guide the 
planning assumptions of the Strath Group, immediately recognized the strategic implications 
of this new weaponry.  While suggesting that the introduction of thermonuclear weaponry 
made global war less probable overall, given the stakes involved, it warned that should war 
Protect or Survive 
 
92 
 
erupt Soviet strategy would undoubtedly immediately seek to ‘render [Britain] unusable for a 
very long time’.21 
   
To render the UK useless as a base for any form of military operations the simplest 
and most effective form of attack would be by surface bursts effected in suitable 
meteorological conditions.  These, besides causing local damage, would cause 
considerable areas of the country to be affected by fall-out.  We are advised that 
something like ten “H” Bombs, each of a yield of about 10 megatons, delivered on 
the western seaboard, with the normal prevailing winds, would effectively disrupt 
the life of the country and make normal activity impossible.
22
 
 
 
Despite the massive increase in blast potential offered by thermonuclear weaponry, strategic 
advantage would rely on the tactical manipulation of the flows comprising the atmosphere as a 
way of distributing fallout with lethal effect. 
The final Strath Report, presented to government ministers on 8 March 1955, opened 
by discussing the comparative advantage offered to fallout-maximizing ground-burst devices 
over blast-maximizing air-burst devices.  While a ten-megaton air-burst device would 
maximize immediate devastation, destroying houses up to six miles away and causing fires in 
houses up to 15 miles away; a ten-megaton ground-burst device which maximized fallout, 
would destroy houses only up to five miles but cause ‘considerable sickness’ to those within 
their houses up to 50 miles downwind and to those in the open air up to 140 miles 
downwind.
23
   There could be no doubt that the massive amplification in blast power was an 
important consideration:  “Life and property would be obliterated by blast and fire on a vast 
scale...forty-five times as great as the total tonnage of bombs delivered by all Allies over 
Germany, Italy and occupied France throughout the whole of the last war” with the majority of 
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deaths expected to be attributed to blast and fire rather than radiation, in a ratio of 3:1.
24
  
However, it is clear from a reading of the Strath report that the novel danger of fallout 
presented an altogether new form of threat, one which exceeded existing frameworks of 
intelligibility whose metrics were based on the trajectories of blast.  The uncertainty 
surrounding fallout resonated with the spectacular dangers it was associated with to create an 
apocalyptic vision which would displace previous imaginaries of a post-nuclear world largely 
influenced by memories of the Blitz.
 
 
In contrast to the direct blow to the materiality of the body perpetrated by the blast, 
fallout operated through the poisoning of the environmental milieu in which biological life 
subsists.  It was a threat which integrated with the multiple flows comprising the atmosphere 
to spread its deadly effects over a wide territory—an instance, therefore, of what Peter 
Sloterdijk (2009) would term ‘atmoterrorism’.  The appendix to the report contained a map 
containing a novel visualisation of the post-attack state: a map of the United Kingdom, 
superimposed by a series of concentric rings, layered to represent differential zones of 
contamination.  The risk map operated as a tool for the visualization of risk over space and 
time that would itself be mostly undetectable to the senses. The temporality of this threat was 
not punctuated—an immediate exception imposed upon a previously harmonious order—but 
one which unfolded progressively, integrating with the dynamics of the environment as a 
parasite utilizes its host, harnessing these autonomous flows for its own emergent ‘becoming-
dangerous’ (see Dillon, 2007). 
This emergent temporality, or becoming-dangerous, of fallout was further prolonged 
by its potential to contaminate water and food for lengthy durations after the initial blast which 
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further degraded the prospects for post-attack survivability.  Radioactive contamination would 
‘immobilize considerable areas of the country and force the inhabitants to keep cover for some 
days and in certain areas for a week or more”.25   Contaminated agriculture and livestock 
would be unusable for a minimum of two months.
26
 Like the indirect targeting of ‘moral’ 
bombing, fallout would target the various circulations which enabled and supported life.  
However, rather than attempt to destroy these circulatory infrastructures, fallout would arrest 
these circulations through poisoning the milieu in which life operates.   
No part of the country would be free from the risk of radio-active contamination.  
A single attack with ten 10-megaton bombs could deny us the use for varying 
periods of thousands of square miles of our agricultural land and the standing 
crops from a much greater area.  Open water supplies for sections of the 
population would become undrinkable for weeks.  The risk of starvation in the 
period immediately after the attack would be high.
27
 
 
The scale of destruction paired with the lingering threat of fallout required greater attention be 
paid to the ‘critical period during which the surviving population would be struggling against 
disease, starvation and the unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment.’28The 
prospect of ‘the nation’ reduced to a series of autonomous family units, cowering within their 
homes, dependent upon no one but themselves for their own survival, stood in abject contrast 
to aims of the solidarity promoting and fear-conquering technologies which comprised the 
British welfare state.
29
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Without adequate preparations, Strath warned that 12 million would die and 4 million 
would be injured and 13 million more ‘many of them suffering from radiation sickness—
would be pinned down in their houses for at least a week’ with little prospect for rescue or 
medical aid.
30
  While destruction would undoubtedly take place at an unprecedented scale, the 
report maintained that with adequate investment in preparations it would be possible to ensure 
the survival of the nation.  This report recommended a more serious financial commitment to 
the traditional life-saving measures of Civil Defence including evacuation plans, local 
dispersal of remaining essential workers and the construction of shelters.  However, 
preparations would also be required on the part of the population which required the advent of 
a serious public information campaign. 
Life in contaminated areas would demand a high degree of self-discipline on the 
part of every individual in the observance of elementary precautions to reduce the 
risks from exposure to radiation until it had subsided to an acceptable level.....such 
discipline could not be secured unless the need for it were widely known and the 
basic precautions thoroughly understood by everyone in advance.
31
   
 
The Strath Report recommended a ‘consistent policy of education’ focused on informing the 
public as to the dangers of radiation and what could be done to minimize one’s exposure to 
it.
32
  But it also noted that public education would be required to underpin the policy of 
deterrence, recently outlined in the 1955 Statement on Defence:  “The country’s determination 
to resist aggression even at the risk of having to undergo nuclear bombardment is an essential 
element of the deterrent policy...this determination can be real only if the public understand 
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what is involved”.33  The difficulty, it noted, would be in ensuring that it was “done in such a 
way as to avoid spreading despondency or causing panic demands for unwarranted 
expenditure on protective measures”.34 
The report admitted ‘‘[i]t would still be impossible to forecast how the nation would 
react to nuclear assault.  The effect of this on dense populations would remain beyond the 
imagination until it happened’35. This would not, however, prevent the Strath Group from 
recommending preparations for the very worst.  An attack would ‘place a very severe strain on 
public morale and on the forces of law and order’36 and in areas hardest hit ‘there might be 
complete chaos for a time and civil control would collapse’.37   It advised the construction of a 
‘machinery of control’ whereby military control would replace civilian control to respond to 
the ‘complete chaos’ which would presumably erupt in heavily bombarded areas charged with 
the power to take ‘whatever steps, however drastic,...considered necessary to restore order’.38 
A Working Party on the Machinery of Government in War (whose papers are still classified) 
was promptly established thereafter to begin investigations into a continuity of government 
machinery (Hennessy, 2010: 176).  The nature of post-attack Britain may have exceeded the 
calculative metrics of Civil Defence. However, rather than being beyond the imagination, it 
was imagination itself which was relied upon to ‘fill in the gaps’—dark imaginaries of just 
how bad things could get. 
Imagination was invoked by the Strath Report but it was also being formed. Relying on 
science where it could and on imagination in many places where it could not the report forged 
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a vision of post-attack Britain which would be highly influential for statesmen and bureaucrats. 
The discourse of the Strath report itself oscillated between the calculative language of techno-
science, and the imagery and rhetoric of the mystical. Apocalyptic imagery appears throughout 
the Strath Report. Often, it appears for the sake of rhetorical flourish. But it also emerges in 
those areas of the document which struggled to elucidate the consequences of thermonuclear 
attack for the survival of ‘the nation’.  Western Political theory had long contemplated 
questions concerning the end of empire: the end of a world, as opposed to the world; of an age 
rather than time-itself.  These latter questions were, of course, the domain of the religious—a 
division which stood to conceal the essential relationship between these two regimes of 
government (Dillon, 2011, Schmitt, 2005, Taubes, 2009), even in the ‘secular’ West. The 
devastating potential of thermonuclear weaponry paired with the uniquely concentrated 
geography of the UK served to collapse this distinction by introducing the prospect of the 
potential eradication of the species-life of the nation as a problematic of government. 
The way in which this problematic was approached must further recognize how the 
prospect of national eradication resonated with already existing anxieties amongst the British 
elite concerning the end of the British Empire during this period.  The curious mix of a 
distinctly Christian eschatology of resurrection and concerns regarding the decline of the 
British Empire is evident in the awkwardly reassuring conclusion of the Strath Report. 
The initial phase of attack would be succeeded by a critical period during which 
the surviving population would be struggling against disease, starvation and the 
unimaginable psychological effects of nuclear bombardment.  But provided what 
was left of the nation could get through this period and the survivors were able to 
devote their resources to the needs of reorganizing the country, they should 
eventually be able to produce a wide enough range of goods to meet ordinary 
civilian needs.  The standard of living of the reduced population, although 
substantially lower than at present, would still be well above that of the greater 
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part of the world.  The country would be left with sufficient resources for a slow 
recovery.
39
 
 
Inasmuch as these eschatologies governed the articulation of this problematic they also 
informed the policy of ‘national survival’ which materialized post-Strath.  A machinery of 
national survival was to be consecrated for the re-actualization, and indeed, resurrection of the 
British nation post-attack. 
 
Civil Defence Post-Strath: Preparing for Armageddon 
 
While policy based on the Strath recommendations including the evacuation of target 
areas, dispersal of those remaining and shelter construction was initially formulated (Hennessy, 
2010: 170), it was never fully financed. The advent of hydrogen weaponry was taken to 
actually decrease the likelihood of nuclear war breaking out between the Soviets and the West 
given its devastating potential.  Economic crises from 1955 would further undermine Civil 
Defence considerations and ensure that bunkers were not built and stockpiles remained 
persistently below recommended levels (Grant, 2010: 154).  As an ‘insurance’ against nuclear 
war, life-saving technologies such as bunkers and evacuation procedures were taken to be 
prohibitively expensive, given their questionable integrity, and spending on them was 
subsequently reined in by Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan in early 1956 as 
rising inflation pressured the Government to reduce expenditure (Grant, 2010: 113).  Civil 
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Defence spending would subsequently fall from a projected £70 million in March 1955, to less 
than £22 million in 1957/58 (Grant, 2010: 121).  The reduction in civil defence spending could 
be re-invested in the primary policy of ‘active defence’—the thermonuclear deterrent—of 
which Civil Defence was to play a supplementary, though very necessary role.  What 
remained of Civil Defence can be analytically separated into two separate, but nonetheless 
allied, ‘spheres’ (Grant, 2010): the visible and non-visible. 
 
The Non-Visible: Ensuring National Survival 
 
Faced with the awesome destructive power of thermonuclear weaponry the objective 
of Civil Defence would shift from protecting the population—an expensive and dubious 
project—to ensuring the survivability of those sections of the population which happened to 
survive an attack (Grant, 2010).  The precedent placed on ‘survivability’ reoriented the 
temporal focus of security measures from life-saving measures designed to protect the 
population from immediate dangers such as fire and blast during the event itself to optimizing 
the post-event recovery process.  This coincided with a shift in the object of protection from 
the material bodies which comprised the population to the regenerative infrastructure would 
permit the re-actualization, and indeed resurrection, of the British state.  This was a question 
of a regenerative biopolitics tasked with elucidating and securing the infrastructural 
requirements for the re-actualization of not just life-itself but, as we will see, a specifically 
British way of life. 
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Reflecting changes in the strategic environment as much as in the economic 
environment Civil Defence was to be reduced to a ‘nucleus organization’ (Grant, 2010: 118) 
which could be financed, expanded, and fully actualized in the lead-up to nuclear release.  A 
crucial assumption was made for planning purposes that nuclear release would be preceded by 
six months of rising tensions.  For civil defence planners this permitted more costly plans, 
such as stockpiling, to be delayed, saving costs in the short-term.  This emergent Civil 
Defence machinery was designed to expand alongside international tensions actualizing a 
secret ‘continuity of governance’ machinery in the lead-up to thermonuclear assault.  This 
included TURNSTILE,
40
 the bunker under the Cotswolds which would act as the seat of 
Government in the period of reconstruction as well as an alternative centre for the 
authorization of a retaliatory nuclear strike (Hennessy, 2010: 259), and eleven regional seats 
of government (RSGs),
 41
 distributed across Britain and empowered through emergency 
legislation to enact military control over the regions should communications with Whitehall be 
discontinued.  Planning priorities included ensuring the availability of resources and the 
restoration of order through military control over a population prone to panic, violence and 
subversion. 
Plans for the creation of this germinal state were further refined following the 1960 
Home Defence Review, and again in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis which 
demonstrated that nuclear escalation could proceed at a much faster rate than previously 
imagined.  An Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill would be drafted to speed up the country’s 
transition to a war-footing, which was to be rushed through both Houses of Parliament in the 
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final days of peace.  The Bill would provide Regional Commissioners (the heads of each RSG) 
complete power over life, property, food and finance within their region (Hennessy, 2010: 
202).  Section 4 of the Bill afforded these Regional Commissioners power of the 
administration of justice up to and including the death penalty—although it was recommended 
that such sentences be reviewed by at least three people who had held high judicial office 
(Hennessy, 2010: 203-4).  
No doubt these additions to the continuity of government machinery were informed by 
strategic studies of the late 1950’s which advanced an even bleaker assessment of the 
prospects for civilian survival post-thermonuclear attack.  ‘Breakdown’ had its origins in the 
Admiralty’s Directorate of Operational Research (DOR) which in 1954/55 began utilizing 
techniques of Operational Research to speculate on the nature, course and duration of future 
wars between the great powers.  Utilizing economic techniques to vary parameters such as 
GNP, defence budgets, likely targets and number of deliveries, the group sought to establish a 
range of possible futures, rather than an exact future based on techniques of historical 
extrapolation which could be fitted into operational assumptions and war-gamed (Moore, 
1997).  Service members used this data for war-games which pitted bombers against surface-
to-air guided weaponry, whilst scientists and representatives of civil ministries used it to 
investigate the potential damage and possible recovery rates for infrastructure post-attack 
(Moore, 1997).  A final 1957 report, prepared for delivery to the US in the hopes of initiating 
an intelligence exchange, was to detail a thousand different possible scenarios.
42
 
The concept of breakdown would emerge around 1959—the same year that the Study 
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Group of the Joint Global War Committee was renamed JIGSAW (Joint Interservice Group 
for the Study of All-Out War).  It quickly became a preferred method to analyzing an enemy 
attack, insofar as it provided a measurable objective to nuclear attack which could be used for 
setting budgets and comparing weapons systems (Moore, 1997: 85-6)  Breakdown refers to the 
level of destruction required to ensure a society is no longer be able to function as an 
integrated whole (See Moore, 1997).  More specifically it was the point beyond which the 
population was expected to turn inward, concerned with their own survival (Hennessy, 2010).  
The population at this point would become a liability to the state: industry would collapse, 
government would be ineffectual, and, most importantly, the capacity to continue to prosecute 
war would grind to a halt.  In 1959, national breakdown was estimated at 35-50% damage in 
300 Soviet cities (Moore, 1997) or 30% destruction of any given city to render its population 
‘ineffective’ (Hennessy, 2010).  Breakdown was similarly said to occur when 50% of the 
population has been rendered ‘ineffective’ (Hennessy, 2010). Finally, whereas the number of 
megaton deliveries required to cause ‘breakdown’ in each of the USSR and US was similarly 
estimated at about 450, breakdown in the UK was calculated as little as 25—well within the 
range of what the USSR could achieve within a retaliatory strike (Hennessy, 2010). 
Studies of breakdown reinforced long-held cultural understandings of the de-
generation of the social in the face of fear and violence, and provided a quantitative measure 
useful for planners in both Civil Defence and the military.  Departing from a biopolitics 
focused on guarding a population from a range of normalizable risks which might collectively 
decrease the life-prospects of the mass body of the population, as in social insurance, the 
continuity of government project signalled a novel preoccupation with locating and securing 
the infrastructure upon which national life could be regenerated, post-breakdown.  The 
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resurrection of the state was taken to be essential for the provision of order necessary for this 
form of life to actualise.  Moreover, these plans sought to ensure that this would be a 
specifically British order: they emphasized the need for due process, jurisprudence and the 
rule of law in the maintenance of public order in post-nuclear Britain; they required 
Emergency Powers to be passed through Parliament; and they specified means for the 
protection of the Queen by sending her to Canada aboard the royal yacht Britannia.  Together 
these measures attest to the extent to which a foundational legitimacy for New Britain played 
on the minds of planners.  In addition to the partitioned machinery of central government, 
artefacts considered essential to the regeneration of Britain including the art treasures of some 
London museums were safeguarded in underground bunkers. The idea of Turner’s being 
afforded pride of place in the scarce real-estate of nuclear bunkers, attests to the priority 
placed on the security of a way of life when life-itself could no longer be protected.  More to 
the point, it reflected a shift in the understanding of ‘the nation’ from  the material bodies 
which composed it, to an abstract form, reducible to a range of artefacts containing the 
potential to germinate in a post-apocalyptic world a re-actualized, resurrected, British state.
43
 
 
The Visible: Mobilizing Anxieties 
 
Complementing this continuity of governance machinery for the preservation of order 
was a visible programme of Civil Defence designed for the maintenance of public morale.  
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Considerations of morale were especially pertinent given the adoption of a policy of 
deterrence, signalled even before the final publication of the Strath Report.  In addition to 
announcing the government’s commitment to acquiring an H-bomb itself, the 1955 Statement 
on Defence, published in February, declared the importance of Civil Defence within a policy 
of deterrence by 'demonstrating the country's determination to resist aggression in all its forms, 
[and] buttress the resolution needed to sustain an effective deterrent policy' (quoted in Grant, 
2010: 90).  Civil Defence would be vital for sustaining public support for the policy, 
especially during times of heightened tension, by maintaining the conviction that nuclear war 
would be survivable.  Indeed, a nuclear deterrent was only credible if the enemy were 
convinced the UK was prepared to use it.  The guiding fear was of ‘another Coventry’ (Grant, 
2010: 82): the British city which experienced devastating bombing during the Second World 
War and whose council had sought in repeated instances to vocally express their rejection of 
Civil Defence precautions as a facade.   Especially in a time of escalating tensions, Civil 
Defence would have to act as a bulwark against the gradual descent of the population into 
neutralism in international affairs. 
Strath’s suggestions for increased investment in costly measures of protective Civil 
Defence exacerbated already existing divisions between the Home Office and the Ministry of 
Defence.  Debate would once again turn on the value of sustaining morale.  The Home Office, 
charged with coordinating civil defence, was broadly supportive of Strath’s recommendations 
for further investment in Civil Defence. Within the Cabinet's Ministerial Committee on Home 
Defence, Home Secretary Gwilym Lloyd warned that lack of investment in Civil Defence 
would ultimately undermine morale and the nation’s will to continue the fight (Hennessy, 
2010: 180).  Ministry of Defence officials, who traditionally viewed the Civil Defence budget 
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with suspicion, were weary of the costs associated with these `passive measures` arguing 
instead that the Civil Defence budget would be better re-invested in augmenting Britain’s 
nuclear arsenal in line with a policy of deterrence which could actually prevent war  
(Hennessy, 2010: 180).    For Minister of Defence Selwyn Lloyd, 'the objective should be to 
limit the level of expenditure on home defence to the minimum needed to maintain public 
confidence' (as quoted in Smith, 2009: 10, ft. 42).  Civil Defence spending was to be reduced 
to the limit below which public confidence would deteriorate, estimated at £25 million per 
annum (Grant, 2010: 118).  This argument was supported by the Treasury which was looking 
to save in period of austerity (Grant, 2010: 104). 
Promoting the notion of 'survivability' of thermonuclear war meant mobilizing ‘those 
measures which provided a positive and visible indication of the Government’s support for the 
voluntary civil defence service’ (quoted in Grant, 2010: 129).  While civil defence spending 
was falling, the budget of the Civil Defence Corp, the most visible element of Civil Defence, 
was itself augmented (Grant, 2010: 86).  In acting to buttress the morale of the population, the 
governance associated with Civil Defence began to disassociate itself from the wider aims of 
the welfare state.  Whereas the welfare state was designed to protect populations from the 
fears which could lead, most often through panic, to political instability, civil defence 
literatures increasingly sought to mobilize, rather than close out fear, within a general project 
of ‘preparedness’ (See Collier, 2008).  The notion of security pursued by government in this 
respect would neither be the condition of the absence of threat, nor the mitigation of 
vulnerability to threat, but, importantly, an affective disposition associated with the confidence 
of one’s ability to survive in a dangerous world, full of risks which could not be entirely 
eradicated.  
Protect or Survive 
 
106 
 
The Strath report insisted that an information campaign concentrated on the effects of 
radiation and fallout would be crucial to maximizing survival.  The public needed to be 
instructed as to how to protect themselves from blast, as well as radioactive fallout.  Moreover, 
the population would have to exercise self-discipline: keeping indoors and stockpiling 
adequate food and water.  However, the British government was reluctant to embark on a 
public information campaign, despite its importance for national survival, insofar as they 
suspected that it had the potential of undermining public morale for the deterrent—the primary 
policy of British defence (Grant, 2010: 261-2).  Public education campaigns in Britain paled in 
comparison to those conducted in the United States (Davis, 2007).  To the extent that public 
information campaigns were conducted, they primarily took the form of advice to 
householders.  Based on methods developed in the ‘Rose Cottage Experiments’ designed to 
reduce the risk of fire and radioactivity, pamphlets focused on how to turn the domestic space 
into an inner refuge (Smith, 2009).  Lessons included deciphering raid sirens; sanitation; first-
aid; stockpiling food and water; reinforcing doors and windows; choosing and equipping a 
fall-out room; and the importance of your radio.  Together they formed an instrumental regime 
of practices to occupy the anxious householder—perhaps also keeping them from engaging in 
the sorts of reflective thought which could lead to fear, despondence, or even subversion.  
Anxieties could be mobilized towards productive tasks such as preparing one’s domestic space 
for attack, rather than the disruptive activities associated with fear and panic. 
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Security in the Welfare/Warfare State 
 
The easing of Cold War tensions which followed the Cuban Missile Crisis, paired with 
growing concerns over the British economy, contributed to a steady decline in funding for 
British Civil Defence.  The 1965 Home Defence Review determined the Civil Defence Corps 
to be too costly relative to their benefit in the maintenance of support for deterrence and 
suggested their number be cut substantially.  On the other hand, the function of the system of 
RSGs, whose existence had been made public in the 1963 pamphlet Danger! Official Secret: 
RSG-6 published by Spies for Peace, was placed into question in recognition that they would 
be the Soviets’ first targets in the event of war.  The plethora of public service cuts which 
followed the November 1967 devaluation of the pound reduced British Civil Defence to its 
bare minimum.  Civil Defence was officially placed on a ‘care-and-maintenance basis’ which 
reduced civil defence spending to £7-£8 million a year by 1970.  This entailed the 
abandonment of the Civil Defence Corp, a cessation on the purchase of new assets and the 
reduction of planning and training to that which would be necessary to resume preparations at 
a later date (Grant, 2010: Chapter 8).  British Civil Defence had been effectively folded, 
sustained only by the statutory duty contained in the Civil Defence Act of 1948 of 
Government and local authorities to maintain civil defence plans, which was now interpreted 
as preserving the capacity to develop plans in the event of an imminent attack.  
The post-Strath Civil Defence machinery differed markedly from that which stood 
before it.  Civil Defence had formerly been organized on a security logic principally 
concerned with the protection of the material bodies which comprised the nation through 
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policies of protection and dispersal.  The objective of this machinery was as much to protect 
the material bodies of the nation as to protect them from the fears which, if allowed to 
manifest in the form of panic, could prove highly disruptive to the functions of the state--
especially those associated with war-making.  This logic of protection resonated with the 
social-stabilizing objectives of the wider British welfare state.  Civil Defence and the welfare 
state, though different in many ways, could be said to emerge from a common matrix of 
governmentality in which the state played a primary role in protecting ‘the social’ from all the 
dangerous anxieties which threatened its dissolution.   
The Civil Defence machinery which emerged post-Strath was guided by a very 
different logic from that which preceded it.  Rather than a prophylactic project of protection, 
both ‘spheres’ of the post-Strath Civil Defence machinery operated with the aim of producing 
a particular ‘way of life’ equipped to operate in a dangerous world.  The first sphere consisted 
of a secret continuity of government machinery which was constructed with the aim of 
providing the governmental infrastructure required for ‘national survival’ post-thermonuclear 
attack.  This machinery was concerned not only with the provision of the conditions for ‘life’, 
but sought the re-actualization of a particularly British way of life.  What was identified then 
as conditions of possibility for a British way of life—from the authoritarian machinery for the 
violent re-imposition of order to those artefacts through which a sense of British-ness could be 
distilled—is revealing of how the British establishment reflexively perceived itself and its 
responsibilities at that time.  Performing a similar test today—that is, going into these old Cold 
War bunkers to see if what they hold can tell us anything about who ‘we’ are—one would 
uncover in numerous cases ‘server farms’ containing the data of some of the world’s richest 
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companies.
44
   
The second, ‘visible’ sphere of Civil Defence consisted of governmental measures 
which aimed to foster subjectivities which could thrive in dangerous and uncertain worlds.  
Public information campaigns promoted a discourse of ‘preparedness’ which sought to 
mobilize anxieties within positive projects which would build one’s confidence—the affective 
feeling of security—in the lead-up to nuclear attack.  Such subjectivities were vital to 
maintaining support for the official policy of deterrence.  Fear, rather than being quelled by 
the visual the presence of technologies designed to protect the material body, was to be 
mobilized as a motivating force to enact an instrumental regime of activities which exercised 
anxiety and gave rise to a sense of confidence and self-reliance.  This logic required all the 
skilful balance of immunology: the risks of blast and radiation has to be known well enough to 
engender the requisite levels of anxiety necessary to encourage ‘preparedness’, but they could 
not be permitted to amplify into the counter-productive affect of fear which threatened to 
manifest panic and despondence.  This precarious balance was a constant concern for the 
British state which, over the course of the Cold War, remained reluctant to really engage with 
any form of public information.  To the extent that they did (such as with the infamous Protect 
and Survive campaign), information was not only discredited as useless, but labelled 
propaganda and used to fuel the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) (Grant, 2010). 
 The infrastructural diagram for governance (See Deleuze, 1988) shared by these two 
spheres, in a sense, shifted a considerable portion of the responsibility for the provision of 
security from the state to the citizen.  More specifically, the responsibility of the state was 
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 Yes, even in a post-apocalyptic world VISA will remember you owe them 300 quid! See, for example, Alok 
Jha (2009) “Secrets of the data bunker: A former mine in Wiltshire once equipped as a cold war government 
retreat has become one of the world's greenest server farms”  
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exercised in the form of providing the infrastructure required for householders and Regional 
Commissioners to effectively prepare for the threats which they expected to face with a 
considerable degree of autonomy.  In this sense, this new logic of Civil Defence sat uneasily 
alongside the prerogatives of the British welfare state.  In contrast to the logic of quelling fear, 
preparedness campaigns comprised a shift in governmental objectives from protection to 
enablement.  Emotions, rather than being closed down by disciplinary techniques which aimed 
to 'steel' a population, were to be channelled and manipulated for the sake of building a nation 
of confident, self-reliant individuals affectively predisposed to live with risk and politically 
supportive of a policy of deterrence.  At the same time however, the ‘insurance’ provided in 
the event of the deterrent’s failure increasingly came to resemble a form of security provided 
by insurantial technologies: one which focused on the security of a way of life, rather than the 
material body as such, and which elicited subjects confident in their ability to thrive in 
dangerous and uncertain worlds.   
This shift in governmentality within the realm of Civil Defence would serve as an 
important antecedent for the emergence of discourses of resilience and neoliberal 
governmentalities from the 1970s.  These new techniques of governance resonated in 
important ways with neoliberal critiques of the dependence cultivated by the welfare state.  
The next chapter details how this technique became situated within an emergent epistemology 
underpinning both resilience strategies and neoliberal governmentalities.
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Chapter 3 
  The Nature of Neoliberal Governance 
 
 
 
 
 From the 1950s, substantial American military funding was being provided to 
researchers at The University of Chicago, the University of Maryland and the University of 
Oklahoma to investigate population behavior in civilian emergencies.
45
  The military was 
interested in extrapolating the conclusions of these studies to understand how civilians react to 
crisis both to inform the design of domestic social controls and direct offensive strategies 
(Quarantelli, 1987, 1990, 2004).  The empirical research collected corroborated the evidence 
of earlier studies, including those of Mintz (1951) and Strauss (1953), which had argued that 
the behaviour of populations in emergency was better characterized as rational action, rather 
than irrational hysteria, based on an individual’s perception of their situation.  This proposition 
was assisted by E.L. Quarantelli’s popular redefinition of panic as “actual (or attempted) 
physical flight” (1957: 188) which, though more empirically verifiable, was quite obviously a 
radical departure from an understanding of panic in terms of irrational social hysteria.  Panic, 
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 Detailed histories of this field of research are now provided by a number of sources (see Dynes and Drabek, 
1994, Quarantelli, 1987, 1990, 1994, 2004). 
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Quarantelli concluded, is ‘a relatively uncommon phenomenon’ which is ‘over-exaggerated’ 
in disaster literature (1954: 275).  To the extent that it does manifest,  
panic flight does not involve irrational thought if by that is meant anything in the 
way of faulty deductions from certain premises. From the position of an outside 
observer this may appear to be the case but, from a participant's viewpoint, given 
his limited perspective of only certain portions of the total situation, no such 
interpretation or irrationality can be made. For the fleeing of person, his action 
appears to him quite appropriate to the situation as he perceives it at that time 
(Quarantelli, 1954: 272). 
 
Significantly, Quarantelli warns that “[o]ne of the most important contributory conditions [to 
the onset of panic] is the existence of a social or group predefinition of a crisis as one that is 
likely to eventuate in panic flight” (Quarantelli, 1954: 275).   
While reminiscent of earlier studies which had investigating panic as a contagion (see 
chapter two), Quarantelli’s conception of panic displayed an important qualification.  Panic’s 
transmission mechanism would no longer be perceived in energetic terms as a contagious 
affect which by exciting the body served to undermine rationality, and by extension sociality, 
but in terms of an adaptive, rational response to information within a situation of perceived 
entrapment.  This shift in the understanding of panic aligned with a broader trend in 
sociological research of the late 1950s in which notions of ‘suggestibility’ and ‘contagion’ 
were displaced by an emphasis on emergent norms and adaptive tendencies as explanations of 
collective behavior (Orr, 2006: 128-134).  This shift was indicative of the creeping influence 
of cybernetics and information theory within American sociology which would come to 
understand the maintenance of a stable social order as a function of information exchange (Orr, 
2006). 
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By the turn of the twenty-first century Disaster Researchers were able to confidently 
assert, based on rigorously empirical case-studies and in-depth participant interviews, that 
panic was, in fact, a ‘myth’ (Clarke, 2002, Cocking et al., 2009, Johnson, 1985, Keating, 1982, 
Sheppard et al., 2006, Tierney, 2003, Wessely, 2005b).  In stark contrast to the competitive, 
self-interested behaviour assumed to accompany disasters, experts documented the widespread 
cooperation—even altruism—which often manifest during an emergence event. Social norms, 
far from breaking down, not only continued to govern behaviour (Cocking et al., 2009, Sime, 
1983, Drury et al., 2009a, 2009b) but proved remarkably resilient with incidences of violence 
and crime often subsiding significantly (Auf der Heide, 2004, Tierney, 2003).  To the extent 
that ‘irrational behaviour’, or panic, was witnessed, experts, in retrospect, argued that these 
were in fact rational decisions based on imperfect knowledge within a rapidly unfolding event, 
which only appeared to onlookers as irrational (Tierney, 2003).  Panic was nothing more than 
a fallacious, culturally ingrained belief, perpetuated through its ubiquitous appearance in 
media portrayals of emergencies, but having no basis in reality (Clarke, 2002, Tierney, 2003).   
Researchers also noted the implications of this research on the organization, direction 
and conduct of emergency responses (Cocking et al., 2009, Dynes and Drabek, 1994, 
Manyena, 2006).  From the traditional emphasis on top-down, disciplinary control of 
populations-in-emergency emergency management should instead be based on facilitating and 
optimizing the natural, self-organizational capacities, or ‘resilience’, of populations-in-
emergency.  Instead of withholding information, for fear of inciting panic, populations in 
emergency should be provided with all the information they required to self-organize an 
evacuation or response (Proulx and Sime, 1991).  Government, within an unfolding 
emergency, should not look to direct, but to supplement and encourage the natural tendencies 
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of those in emergency events to help themselves.  People are to be encouraged, not directed; 
managed, not controlled.   
The reorganization of UK Civil Contingencies around the value of resilience has been 
legitimized by the insistence that it builds on the insights of this research.  Disaster Research 
continues to be cited within research commissioned by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat 
(Challenger et al., 2010a, 2010b) not least due to the persistence of assumptions of panic—
even amongst emergency responders.  As will be discussed in depth in chapter 4, resilience 
strategies aim to optimize the self-organizational capacities of populations in emergency to 
collectively organize responses to crisis.  But disaster research also serves to legitimise 
resilience strategies by premising the introduction of these policies on an empirically validated 
re-evaluation of collective human behaviour within emergency events.  This chapter seeks to 
advance an alternative to this positivist explanation: that the appearance of ‘resilient 
populations’ is an effect, rather the cause, of a broader restructuring of rationalities and 
practices comprising liberal governance. ‘Resilient populations’, in other words, are the 
correlate of a specific order of governance—namely, neoliberalism. 
Resilience is here understood to be a particular speciation of life enacted by neoliberal 
order of governance.  This approach places a priority on the constitutive effect of practices in 
shaping our understanding of the world around us.  Paul Veyne suggests that “[o]bjects seem 
to determine our behaviour, but our practice determines its own objects in the first place.  Let 
us start, then, with that practice itself, so that the object to which it applies is what is only in 
relation to that practice” (Veyne, 1997: 155).  ‘Resilient populations’ are not a socio-historical 
constant whose essence can be determined and communicated by science.  They represent a 
speciation, or specific enframing, of life forged and sustained through the practices of 
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neoliberal governance.  This chapter seeks to identify the conditions of possibility for such an 
enframing to emerge by focusing on changes in the order of order of power/knowledge 
underpinning liberal security governance. 
Mirowski and Plehwe (2009) have commented on the notoriously difficult task of 
defining neoliberalism.  Tracing the intellectual development of neoliberalism within the Mont 
Pèlerin Society—the “central thought collective that has conscientiously developed the 
neoliberal identity for more than sixty years now” (Plehwe, 2009: 4)—they draw attention to 
both the political affinities and profound divergences of opinion which existed within this 
influential institution (see especialy Mirowski, 2009).  This chapter focuses specifically on the 
formulation of neoliberalism promoted by the Hayekian ‘wing’ of the Mont Pèlerin Society.  
Hayek’s later work, which drew heavily on concepts adopted from the complexity sciences to 
posit the market as an instance of a ‘complex self-maintaining order’ (Hayek, 1988: 9) 
characterized by emergent, non-linear processes of evolution, advanced a formulation of 
neoliberalism distinct from its classical predecessor.  Consistent with classical liberalism, 
Hayek interpreted the ‘natural’ status of the market to confer limits on the degree to which 
government could regulate and control its processes.  Where Hayek’s project increasingly 
diverged from classical articulations of liberalism over the course of his career was on the 
nature of this ‘nature’. 
Hayek’s opportunistic pillaging of the discourses of cybernetics and complexity theory 
to buttress his own political project has been the subject of some recent studies (Cooper and 
Walker, 2011, Mirowski, 1997, Mirowski, 2007).  However, it is possible to contextualize 
Hayek’s appropriation of the discourses of the natural sciences by drawing attention to the 
symbiotic relationship which has existed between ecology and economics as privileged sites 
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from which to interrogate ‘the natural’. Tracing a genealogy of the co-constitution and co-
evolution of these fields, this chapter aims to show that the simultaneous rearticulation of 
ecology and economics within the framework of the complexity sciences marks a radical 
departure from the equilibrium-based models which carried from the classical formulations of 
these fields through to the cybernetically-inflected models dominant in the period following 
the Second World War.  This shift in the archaeological structure of knowledges pertaining to 
the natural is simultaneously affirmed by, and supportive of, neoliberalism.   
In pursuing this line of inquiry, this chapter looks to make explicit the epistemological 
order supportive of resilience strategies.  It takes as its empirical referent influential theoretical 
discourses where the emergence of this order may be investigated.  Methodologically, this 
chapter is somewhat distinct from the others in which the civil contingencies machinery is the 
direct referent of investigation.  However, it serves an important genealogical purpose: 
demonstrating how governmental techniques established in the previous chapter became 
synthesized into more general governmental discourses through the influence of a novel 
understanding of nature, constitutive of an emergent regime of truth.  Once made explicit, the 
epistemological order detailed here will support empirical analyses of subsequent chapters. 
 
The nature of Nature 
 
Before the term oecology was coined by German Darwinist Ernst Haeckel in 1866, 
references to the study of ‘nature’s economy’ abounded.  The phrase derived from Linnaeus’ 
1749 The Oeconomy of Nature: a study of the divine order visible within nature’s design.  In 
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the late eighteenth century the term oeconomy still carried a connotation with household 
management—the original sense of the term from which it derives the prefix oikos, Greek for 
home or habitation.  Thus, the title of Linnaeus’ highly influential 1749 The Oeconomy of 
Nature referred to the transcendent Creator’s orderly design of nature rather than an allusion to 
‘political economy’ in the contemporary sense.  Early studies of nature’s economy marvelled 
at the balance and harmony achieved by this divine design which paired ends with means 
down to the infinitely small detail (Worster, 1994).  Yet, while God’s infinite attention to 
detail was a source of marvel, it provided a problem for translating nature into a model for 
human governance.  While man could aspire to this level of management, it was only God, 
with his infinite wisdom, who could achieve such perfection in design.   
Ecology,
46
 which emerged as a field of study at the threshold of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, was to purge the idea of a transcendent ordering of nature by a 
divine Creator and replace it with a model of immanent self-ordering through competition. As 
is well known, Darwin credited Thomas Malthus for insights leading him to the theory of 
natural selection, which echoed economic notions of the invisible hand as a mechanism 
responsible for the immanent self-ordering of the market.  However, the success of classical 
economic liberalism was similarly based on its success in articulating market mechanisms as 
‘natural’.  In his lecture series The Birth of Biopolitics Foucault discusses how from the middle 
of the eighteenth century the market transitions from a site of jurisdiction against fraud—a 
significant risk between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—to a site of veridiction: ‘a 
site and a mechanism for the formation of truth’ (2008: 30).   Integral to this shift, Foucault 
argues, was the ‘discovery’ of the market’s ability, when left to its own devices, to generate a 
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 In 1893 it was decided by the International Botanical Congress to change the name of the field to our modern 
spelling ‘ecology’ (Worster, 1994) 
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‘natural price’: one which accurately represents the relation between costs of production and 
demand.  The ‘natural’ status of the market was used to argue for the displacement of 
government intervention from ensuring justice within the market to limiting interference (and 
especially political interference) with these ‘natural’ mechanisms. 
While references to ordered harmony faded as both fields became similarly 
conceptualized as sites of competition for scarce resources, the emphasis on balance would be 
preserved and given ‘scientific’ rigour within studies of market equilibrium.  In his 1874 
Elements of a Pure Economics (1954) Léon Walras provided the foundations for general 
equilibrium theory by outlining the basic equations for a general equilibrium model and 
advanced a proof for the existence of a solution (Walras, 1954: 169).  Moreover, Walras 
sought to specify how this solution would be arrived at through the ‘natural’ adjustment 
mechanisms which exist within a competitive market.  Competitive markets arrived at 
equilibrium prices—those which perfectly coordinate aggregate demand with supply so as to 
clear the market—through a process of tâtonnement (‘groping towards’) (Walras, 1954: 170).  
If prices were set under equilibrium levels, so as to render supply insufficient for demand, then 
prices would slowly climb as markets ‘groped towards’ equilibrium level, and vice versa.  
Through a process of ‘sequential’ tâtonnement markets would clear, one at a time, until prices 
converged at a general equilibrium.  Likewise, destabilization of prices following an economic 
shock would be expected to adjust through tâtonnement back to equilibrium over time. 
The natural tendency towards equilibrium was echoed at this time within ecological 
treatments of succession.  By the turn of the twentieth century, ecology had become a 
prominent field, in large part due to its perceived insight into the integration of political and 
economic units which were used to inform strategies of social, and especially colonial, 
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administration (Anker, 2001).  It is not unsurprising then, that a primary area of study was 
ecological succession: the colonization of plant and animal communities within a given region 
over time.  Succession was premised on the widespread assumption of progressive 
development of a biotic community, consisting of both animal and vegetal species.  Of 
particular influence to the field were Fredric Clements’ theories of succession—widely 
suspected of having been derived from his reading of sociologist, and social Darwinist, 
Herbert Spencer (Worster, 1994, Anker, 2001, Kwa, 2002).  Biotic communities were thought 
to progress from a relatively homogenous and undifferentiated community (in human terms: a 
hunter-gatherer society) to more heterogeneous ‘complex’ communities in which functions 
were harmonized into a functioning whole (modern European societies)—which for Clements, 
as for Spencer, functioned as a ‘super-organism’.  Increased harmonization of the whole 
would absolve the need for further adaptation, thus halting evolution at what Clements would 
term a climax community.  A climax community refers to the ecological composition of this 
biotic (or human) community within the final stage in its development.   The type of 
vegetation composing the climax stage—be it a forest, desert, marsh, grassland, or 
otherwise—was said to be predefined by regional climatic variables such as temperature, 
rainfall and wind. While external shocks to an ecological community could disrupt this 
progression, nature would always rebound to continue its march through intermediary stages, 
known as seres, towards its climatically defined climax.   
  In 1935 Arthur Tansley outlined an inventory of systems based on the value of 
‘stability’ (1935).  Stability was measured by the ability of a system to maintain its composure 
over time: Tansley used the example of atoms of chemical elements with low atomic number, 
which have existed for millennia, versus radioactive elements, with much quicker rates of 
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decomposition.  The ‘ecosystem’, a term appearing for the first time in this paper in distinction 
to the ‘biotic communities’ and ‘complex organisms’ found in the holistic theories of 
Clements and Smuts, was a relatively unstable system given the range of factors both internal 
and external which could disrupt equilibrium.  Yet the natural return of the system to 
equilibrium was assumed almost without question.  “The universal tendency to the evolution 
of dynamic equilibria has long been recognized” (Tansley, 1935) and thus was provided no 
further explanation within the paper.  Kwa (2002: 33) has suggested that this self-evidence 
may be related to the widespread reference in explanations of life processes at the turn of the 
century to Le Chatelier's late nineteenth century experiments which demonstrated that 
endogenous shocks to a chemical equilibrium would be responded to by other factors so as to 
restore equilibrium. 
The scientification of ecology at this time was mirrored within the fields of economics.  
From the 1930’s, Walrasian microeconomics would become more rigorously mathematicized 
as part of an overall trend in economics (Mirowski, 2002: 7, Weintraub, 1991).  Weintraub 
(1991: 125) argues that in the process core concepts such as equilibrium, stability and the 
process of tâtonnement would be fundamentally reinterpreted.  Hands (2009)  argues that 
processes of tâtonnement would be rearticulated during this time to make them amenable to 
the neoclassical synthesis of Walrasian (microeconomic) theory and Keynesian 
(macroeconomic) theory, whose ascendency during this period would effectively displace a 
number of rival theories including Institutionalist, Marxist, and Austrian perspectives.  
Walrasian sequential tâtonnement would be replaced within the literature by Samuelson’s 
version of tâtonnement which foregrounded speed of adjustment which more adequately 
accommodated Keynesian concerns regarding the ‘stickiness’ of some markets in adjusting to 
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equilibrium including especially, labour markets.  Keynesian demand-management could thus 
be justified in assisting processes of tâtonnement to restore equilibrium in a more efficient and 
timely manner. 
The common archaeological structure of the fields of ecology and economics from the 
time of their co-constitution was premised on a ‘natural’ telos towards a unique equilibrium 
following a systemic perturbation.  The stability of systems to withstand shock—to move only 
incrementally away from equilibrium and return to it quickly thereafter—was recognized as a 
value with which to assess these systems and inform programmes of governance.    The 
diagram of governance operating in relation to this ontologization of nature would operate a 
security logic of protection (see previous chapter) designed to protect systems from shocks in 
the first place, and speed their return to equilibrium following a perturbation.  This is what 
Holling (1996) would call ‘engineering resilience’, the security programme advocated by 
systems ecologists concerned with speedily restoring a presumed ‘natural’ equilibrium.  It was 
in opposition to both this logic of security that Holling would advance the notion of 
‘ecological resilience’: a programme of governance which not reinterpreted the telos of 
security, but offered a radical re-ontologization of nature rooted within the discourses of the 
complexity sciences. 
  
The Nature of Neoliberal Governance 
 
122 
 
Nature isn’t Normal: The Birth of Resilience 
 
In the 1950’s Clements’ theory of a climax community would be refigured, but 
essentially preserved, as functional homeostasis when ecology was translated into the 
discourse of cybernetics.  The ecosystem, understood as a cybernetic system, responded to 
destabilizing exogenous shocks through feedback mechanisms which would return the system 
to a pre-defined equilibrium state.  Written in response to these models C.S. Hollings’ highly 
influential Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems (1973) would challenge the notion 
that nature was itself organized around a unique ‘natural’ equilibrium and, with it, challenge 
the long established belief in nature’s telos.  In doing so, Holling would draw on developments 
in third-wave cybernetics associated with chaos, complexity and self-organizing autopoietic 
systems in order to advance a security programme for ecosystemic sustainability which he 
would term ‘resilience.’  
Specifically, Holling took issue with the cybernetically-informed ‘systems ecology’ of 
brothers Eugene and Howard (Tom) Odum.  Inspired by the writings of Alfred Lotka on the 
energetics of evolution, the brothers’ work used systems analysis to study the function of 
energy flows within a system (See Odum, 1953, Patten and Odum, 1981, Odum, 1983).  In the 
process, Tansley’s notion of ecosystem would be reconceptualised as a cybernetic system 
progressively developing towards a climax-state of ‘functional homeostasis’.  In The Strategy 
of Ecosystem Development  (1969) the idea of functional homeostasis is presented as both 
nature’s telos and a security project: “In a word, the “strategy” of sucession as a short-term 
process is basically the same as the “strategy” of long-term evolutionary development of the 
The Nature of Neoliberal Governance 
 
123 
 
biosphere—namely, increased control of, or homeostasis with, the physical environment in the 
sense of achieving maximum protection from its perturbations” (Odum, 1969: 262).   
Achieving “maximum protection”, it is noted, may however conflict with man’s emphasis on 
“maximum production” (Odum, 1969)—an idea that is given further development by 
Eugene’s brother Howard in Environment, Power and Society (1971).  Here, H. T. Odum 
reflected on the implications of industrial-led growth for the sustainability of Western eco-
systems, arguing that the depletion of fossil-based resources would demand a fundamental 
restructuring of economies along sustainable lines.  Achieving such a programme would 
require a massive effort in the control engineering of economies with an eye to the natural 
limits of ecosystems (Cooper and Walker, 2011: 6).   
Holling’s work would challenge the command and control approaches to ecosystem 
management advocated by systems ecologists, in favour of what he would term a resilience 
approach.  Earliest mention of the concept appeared within Resilience and stability of 
ecological systems (Holling, 1973).  The paper immediately takes aim at quantitative 
approaches to ecosystem management, stating that the application of systems analysis to the 
study of ecosystems places an excessive emphasis on equilibrium which “may simply reflect 
an analytic approach developed in one area because it was useful and then transferred to 
another where it may not be” (1973: 1).  Instead, questions of sustainability require a shift in 
“emphasis from the equilibrium states to the conditions for persistence” (1973: 2).47 
Over the course of the article, Holling progressively outlines a new ontology of 
ecosystems rooted in the discourse of complex adaptive systems which will be further 
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 In later years the distinction between stability and resilience will be re-termed ‘engineering resilience’ and 
‘ecological resilience’ (Holling, 1996) 
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developed in subsequent work (Holling, 1986, 1996, Gunderson and Holling, 2002).  
Critically, Holling dismisses the idea that ecosystems organize around a single equilibrium 
point to which a system will automatically return following systemic shock.  Rather, the 
particular attractor around which a system is organized represents only one of a multitude of 
possible states, which emerge and disappear over time.  A system will continue to organize 
around a particular attractor given the presence of feedback mechanisms related to levels of 
biodiversity.  The range in which a system can operate whilst organizing around the same 
attractor is referred to as a stability domain.  Stability domains themselves evolve over time, 
expanding or contracting based on the size and number of these feedback loops operating 
around an attractor.  The gradual weakening of the feedback loops operating around an 
attractor, for example through the loss of biodiversity within an ecosystem, can make a system 
more fragile and susceptible to shocks that will transfer it out of its current stability domain, 
towards an attractor organised around different processes.  Depending on the nature of the 
feedback cycles within a regime, a transition may either be gradual or sudden—which 
accounts for the non-linear phase shifts of a system across time. 
Holling was eager to emphasize the implications of this new ontology of nature for 
ecosystem management.  He criticized efforts to protect vulnerable populations through 
system stabilizing approaches focused on maintaining the system in an equilibrium state.  
Programmes based on maintaining an optimal level of a population, such as those of 
Maximum Sustained Yield or protectionist policies designed to eliminate competitors and 
predators, have had, in some documented cases, the unintended consequences of reducing the 
overall resilience of a system: “a measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to 
absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations 
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or state variables” (1973: 14).  Eroding the resilience of a system would leave it more 
susceptible to even minor external perturbations—random events such as climactic change, 
fire or pollution—which could flip the system into another stability domain and potentially 
increase the risk of wholesale species extinction (1973: 9).  According to Holling, for 
ecosystem management “the important point is not so much how stable they are within the 
domain, but how likely it is for the system to move from one domain into another and so 
persist in a changed configuration” (1973: 10). Going further, Holling suggested that in many 
cases what appears to be an instability within a system, such as widely fluctuating population 
levels of a particular species, can in fact contribute to systemic resilience (1973: 16-17).  
Again, an overemphasis on stability within equilibrium-centred approaches should in fact be 
reconsidered and replaced by an approach which aimed to increase the resilience of a system 
through a study of the dynamics underlying its domain of attraction.  In his concluding 
paragraph Holling characterized a resilience approach in terms of epistemological modesty, an 
acknowledgment of the limits of human understanding. 
A management approach based on resilience…would emphasize the need to keep 
options open, the need to view events in a regional rather than a local context, and 
the need to emphasize heterogeneity.  Flowing from this would be not the 
presumption of sufficient knowledge, but the recognition of our ignorance; not the 
assumption that future events are expected, but that they will be unexpected.  The 
resilience framework can accommodate this shift in perspective, for it does not 
require a precise capacity to predict the future, but only a qualitative capacity to 
devise systems that can absorb and accommodate future events in whatever 
unexpected form they may take (Holling, 1973: 21). 
 
Over the course of his career, Holling would develop and elaborate an approach to 
ecosystem management focused on optimizing the conditions for persistence of a species or 
ecosystem by increasing its resilience.  Enhancing a system’s resilience can be achieved in 
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two ways (Holling, 1973).  Firstly, one can attempt to move the system further away from a 
critical threshold that would send it towards an alternate attractor.  However, positioning a 
system away from an attractor could come at the cost of systemic efficiency.  Alternatively, 
resilience can be enhanced by expanding the stability domain around an attractor.  As 
Gunderson and Holling (2002) have noted, this second solution—which seeks to engender 
resilience into a system—not only increases the capacity of a system to withstand the impact 
of potentially destabilizing shocks, but also permits the system to quickly and efficiently 
reorganise so as to capitalize on emerging opportunities.  As such, resilience is not necessarily 
a goal itself.  Rather, the goal is control over the conditions of adaptability of a system so as to 
heighten its adaptive, evolutionary capacity and direct its trajectory between alternate stable 
regimes.  “Sustainability is the capacity to create, test and maintain adaptive capability. 
Development is the process of creating, testing and maintaining opportunity” (Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002).  Resilience is therefore not simply a conservative exercise, but an opportunity 
to evolve. 
More recently, researchers at the Resilience Alliance have sought to apply these ideas 
anthropologically to assess the comparative resilience of different cultures and societies in 
terms of their susceptibility to collapse and are now assessing the comparative resilience of 
contemporary urban centres (Resilience Alliance, 2007). Urban resilience is defined as “the 
degree to which cities are able to tolerate alteration before reorganising around a new set of 
structures and processes” (Resilience Alliance, 2007: 8).  As these authors note, as resilience 
declines, rigid systems move closer to criticality and even smaller shocks could send them into 
crisis or chaos. Examining the resilience of cities as “the quintessential examples of a complex 
adaptive system” (Resilience Alliance, 2007: 9)  consists primarily in trying to locate and 
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secure the conditions that enhance the evolutionary capacity, or fitness, of the system, thus 
securing it from potentially destabilizing shocks.  As these authors note, engendering 
resilience into a system not only increases the capacity of a system to withstand the impact of 
potentially destabilizing shocks, but also permits the system to quickly and efficiently 
reorganise so as to capitalize on emerging opportunities (Resilience Alliance, 2007: 8). 
 
Neoliberalism and Catastrophe-led Growth 
 
A year after Holling’s groundbreaking paper, Friedrich von Hayek was awarded the 
1974 Nobel Prize in economics.  In his acceptance speech, subsequently published under the 
title The Pretence of Knowledge (1974), Hayek railed against the hubris of Keynesian 
‘scientistism’ in the context of the ongoing international stagflation crisis.  Echoing Holling, 
Hayek charged economists with committing the ‘scientistic error’ of naively appropriating the 
mathematically rigorous models of the physical sciences without sufficient regard to the 
differences between the fields.  The market, Hayek maintained citing prominent cyberneticist 
Warren Weaver to lend credibility to his assertion, displayed an ‘essential complexity’ which 
precluded mathematical modelling. 
For Hayek, in such a complex field as the market, that which is important for study is 
rarely quantifiable.  Yet, the scientific status afforded prima facie to quantitative studies had 
encouraged analysis of those factors which can be measured, regardless of their overall 
importance to the dynamics of the market.  Even the positive correlation between aggregate 
demand and total employment may only be approximate, Hayek suggested.  However, insofar 
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as it is the only cause for which we have quantitative data it has been taken as a scientific truth 
despite the fact that it may only be partial explanation of more complex processes.  What may, 
in fact, contribute more substantially to unemployment—namely, discrepancies between 
distribution of demand for goods and services and the allocation of labour and other resources 
mandated for production—cannot be demonstrated in relation to quantitative evidence and, as 
a result, had been ignored by policy-makers.
48
 
Just as policies of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) had eroded the resilience of 
complex ecosystems over time, Hayek purported that Keynesian demand-management 
approaches have had a debilitating effect on the ability of the underlying economic system to 
adjust to misallocations in labour and capital—the real cause of high unemployment, 
according to Hayek.  By pumping money into sectors of the economy which only yield 
temporary demand, policies of Keynesian demand-management only delay necessary 
structural adjustment and breed dependency on a continual flow of state-finance—both of 
which only serve to increase inflation.  What was required was instead a qualitative approach 
focused on optimizing the conditions for self-organization, adaptability and growth.  Hayek 
would characterize this approach as environmental:  
“if man is to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve social order, he will 
have to learn that in this and in other fields where essential complexity of an 
organized kind prevails, he cannot acquire full knowledge which would make 
mastery of the events possible.  He will therefore have to use what knowledge he 
can achieve, not to shape the results as the craftsman shapes his handiwork, but 
rather to cultivate growth by providing the appropriate environment, in the manner 
in which the gardener does this for his plants” (1989: 7). 
                                                          
48
 It is also important to note that Hayek displayed a discomfort with notions of ‘equilibrium’ in this speech, 
preferring to speak of the general conditions under which one can expect “the market to establish prices and 
wages at which demand will equal supply”.  He does not however, dismiss the idea that equilibrium exists at 
this point, or whether they are unique.   
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From his earliest writing Hayek had demonstrated a deep political animosity towards 
rational-planning approaches to economic management.  In his 1945 The Road to Serfdom 
(2001 [1945]), arguably his most famous book, Hayek argued that the rational-planning of 
economies would swiftly give rise to exactly the sorts of totalitarianism which the allies had 
just defeated in the last war.  It was through the paradigm of his own anti-socialist sentiments 
that Hayek would construct his own intellectual project (see Mirowski, 2007).  Given the 
strong commitment to positivistic ‘scientific methods’ amongst those with socialist leanings 
(including the ‘Tots and Quots” dining club with which Hayek would have been familiar in his 
time at LSE), Hayek was compelled to frame his own critique as a rejection of ‘scientism’.   
Hayek’s rejection would draw on neo-Kantian considerations of the limits of 
knowledge and stress the difference between the referents of study between the social and 
natural sciences.  The roots of this critique have been traced to Hayek’s entry into a debate 
amongst Viennese economists in the 1920s sparked by Otto Neurath’s claim that wartime 
experience had demonstrated the success of centralised price calculations (See Caldwell, 1997, 
Mirowski, 2002).   In counter-response to von Mises’ 1920 paper, which argued that rational 
planning would be impossible without market valuations, Lange would claim in Economics 
Theory of Socialism that prices could indeed be found by a central planner substituted for the 
mythical Walrasian auctioneer.  For many critics at the time, this was impossible due to the 
immensity of calculations which would be required—a critique which incidentally would 
become increasingly less persuasive with the development of computers in subsequent years.  
For Hayek, however, the problem was not the immensity of the calculations required but the 
impossibility of locating all the variables upon which these calculations could be based.  In 
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Individualism and Economic Order, for example, Hayek states that “the mere assembly of 
these data is a task beyond human capacity” (1948: 156).  This idea may have been put best in 
the opening of The Use of Knowledge in Society:  
‘What is the problem which we try to solve when we try to construct a rational 
economic order? On certain familiar assumptions the answer is simple enough. If 
we possess all the relevant information, if we can start out from a given system of 
preferences, and if we command complete knowledge of available means, the 
problem which remains is purely one of logic. . . . This, however, is emphatically 
not the economic problem which society faces. . . . The peculiar character of the 
problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the 
knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form but solely as dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. 
The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate 
"given" resources . . . it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not 
given to anyone in its totality. (Hayek as quoted in Mirowski, 1997: 236-237) 
 
Determinations of prices and wages within a competitive market are ordered through the 
complex interactions of numerous market participants, each behaving in accordance with their 
own unique knowledge and expectations.  It was the fragmented and dispersed nature of the 
knowledge upon which price determinations were constructed—inaccessible to observation 
and unquantifiable—which precluded any scientific efforts to establish equilibrium 
mathematically.  Instead, the superiority of the market was affirmed in its ability to order 
prices through a process of distributed computation which could quickly and efficiently 
balance supply with demand and respond more rapidly to their fluctuations.  The distributed 
self-organization of the market would be drawn upon within Hayek’s foray into 
neuropsychology, The Sensory Order (1952b).  Here, Hayek would outline his theory of the 
distributed cognition of the mind in which consciousness was an emergent product of the 
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complex interaction of neurons.  As a result of this complexity, “the capacity of any 
explaining agent must be limited to objects with a structure possessing a degree of complexity 
lower than its own precluding the ability of the human brain to understand its own operations, 
as well as phenomenon displaying higher degrees of complexity such as the market” (Hayek, 
1952b: 185). 
 The significance of the ‘socialist calculation controversy’ goes well beyond the merits 
of central-planning.  For, as Mirowski points out (2002: 235), it was in the context of this 
debate that the market becomes, for the first time, conceptualized as an information-processor, 
rather than its more traditional treatment, still evident within microeconomics textbooks, as a 
vehicle for the distribution of scarce goods and services.  In reframing the market around 
information flows, rather than the more material flows of goods, services, labour and capital, 
the door was opened to the application of the insights of cybernetics into the field of 
economics.  Despite his earlier criticism of “slavish imitation of the method and language of 
science" (1952a: 15) by economists, Hayek would begin to actively draw upon the discourses 
of cybernetics to refine his own model of the market, and give it intellectual credibility.   
Hayek would increasingly turn to theories of evolution and biologistic metaphors to 
account for the emergence and ineffability of the market (Hayek, 1994 [1964], Hayek, 1988).  
In the latter years of his career, Hayek would further entrench his own project within the 
discourse of the complexity sciences, turning away from notions of market equilibrium in 
order to describe the production process in terms of a series of flows beset by perpetual 
turbulence “constantly adjusting the production process to the complexity of the capital 
structure, with streams of value coursing down an ever-changing river bed"(Hayek quoted in 
Cooper and Walker, 2011).  By  The Fatal Conceit (1988) Hayek would be openly mobilizing 
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the discourse of the complexity sciences. Here Hayek discussed how studies of “autopoesis, 
cybernetics, homeostasis, spontaneous order, synergetics, and systems theory” (Hayek, 1988: 
9) on ‘complex self-maintaining orders’ have helped to articulate his conception of the market 
and highlight the ”demonstrably false premises”  upon which socialism was based (Hayek, 
1988: 9). 
 Characterizing this diagram of governance as ‘environmental’, Hayek would invoke 
the nature of the market, in classical liberal fashion, to discourage interventionist state policies 
which might interfere with inherent processes of self-organization.  However, in 
conceptualizing the market in terms of an open, complex adaptive system Hayek would draw 
upon a fundamentally different understanding of nature than that which had been classically 
conceived in both the fields of Political Economy and Ecology.  For Hayek, the complexity of 
the market required a displacement of government efforts from intervening upon the processes 
of the economy itself to optimizing the conditions for self-organization and adaptive evolution.  
As an open, complex system the economy evolved most effectively in far from equilibrium 
conditions and productively when liberated from the stagnating control of the interventionist 
state.  As open systems, local economies, rather than being shielded from the wider economic 
environment through state finance, would need to be opened to it, in order to allow processes 
of adaptation and co-evolution to operate.  Scholarship, in turn, would need to be conducted 
with requisite epistemological modesty, identifying the qualitative conditions in which the 
self-organization of the market is optimized. 
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Environmentality and the Government of ‘Natural’ Systems 
 
In his Nobel Prize speech, Hayek targeted the Club of Rome’s report on The Limits to 
Growth (Meadows et al., 1972) as demonstrative of the status afforded to dubious science 
which transgressed the limits of what it could rightfully determine (Hayek, 1989: 6).  The 
report had received significant attention in light of its provocative thesis that the sustainability 
of exponential economic growth was untenable, with the limits to this trajectory likely to be 
reached within the century.  The MIT research group behind the report applied systems 
analysis to computer models to extrapolate the interaction between population growth, 
industrialization, pollution, food production and resource depletion over time.  Altering these 
variables across a range of possible future scenarios the MIT team concluded that the rate of 
depletion of the finite resources upon which industrial economies were based raised significant 
concerns about the limits to economic growth.  Echoing the prescription of Howard Odum, the 
report suggested that “it is possible to alter these growth trends and to establish a condition of 
ecological and economic stability that is sustainable far into the future” (Meadows et al., 1972: 
24) if economic growth was engineered along sustainable lines within a steady-state economy 
which respected ecological and biotic equilibria.
49
 
While the report received ample criticism based on its data, methods and conclusion, 
perhaps the most interesting of criticisms would capitalize on Hayek’s rearticulation of the 
economy as an open complex system.  Daniel Bell, in his book The Coming of the Post-
Industrial Society (1974), criticised the studies quantitative methodology premised on the 
                                                          
49
 For a discussion of the Report see (Cooper, 2008, Cooper and Walker, 2011) 
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model of a ‘closed system’ which failed to appreciate the potential for qualitative systemic 
change which marked the evolution of economic systems.   As a complex open system, 
multiple possibilities for the organization of an economy are possible.  While currently 
organized as an industrially-based system dependent upon finite energy resources, the 
economy could be reorganized around a different attractor where resources are increasingly 
abundant. For Bell, what was required was a transition from an industrial economy organized 
on the consumption of finite natural resources, to a post-industrial knowledge economy 
grounded in the bottomless resource of the creativity of the human mind.  An information 
society, premised not only on advances in science and technology for the innovation required 
to transition between successive phases of capitalist order, but one in which information is the 
primary product.  Problems of scarcity besetting industrial economies would be terminated 
given information’s special status as a resource which is non-consumable, non-rivalrous and 
with zero marginal cost of production.   From its roots in ecological sustainability discourses, 
a figure of nature as complex open system would be mobilized to undermine the claims of 
environmentalists as to the pressing need to adjust our patterns of production and consumption 
in line with the limits of the biosphere. 
In The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault would recognize the singularity of the 
‘environmental technology’ operationalised within a neoliberal governmentality (2008: 259).  
These techniques, he would stress, were not the equilibrium-based mechanisms of disciplinary 
society based on a “standardizing, identificatory, hierarchical individualization. (Foucault, 
2008: 261).”  Rather, this is the 
“image, idea, or theme-program of a society in which there is an optimization of 
systems of difference, in which the field is left open to fluctuating processes, in 
which minority individuals and practices are tolerated, in which action is brought 
The Nature of Neoliberal Governance 
 
135 
 
to bear on the rules of the game rather than on the players, and finally in which 
there is an environmental type of intervention instead of the internal subjugation of 
individuals. (2008: 259-60)” 
 
The advent of environmental technologies coincided with the “massive withdrawal [of] the 
normative-disciplinary system” (Foucault, 2008: 260). This is not a programme of 
standardization utilizing disciplinary technologies to structure the mentality of individuals in 
accordance with an ideal normality.  Nor is it a programme of biopolitical regulation operating 
on the ‘generality’ of aleatory events which, though unpredictable in their individual 
occurrence, display a constancy at the mass-level of the population in relation to which 
regulatory mechanisms could be introduced to “to establish an equilibrium, maintain an 
average, establish a homeostasis, and compensate for variations within this general population 
and its aleatory field” (Foucault, 2003: 246).  The idea of fixed norms and ‘natural’ equilibria, 
at the level of the individual and the population, are dispensed with entirely for an 
“environmentalism open to unknowns and transversal phenomena” (Foucault, 2008: 261).  
Foucault’s lecture notes conclude with a provocative question: “But does this mean that we are 
dealing with natural subjects? [end of manuscript]” (Foucault, 2008: 261).   
If environmental technologies operated in relation to a ‘natural’ subject this was not to 
suggest either that they proceeded from a more objective rendering of the political subject or 
that they are involved with emancipating the subject from processes of political 
subjectification.   Rather, it was recognizing that population was itself now understood within 
the same ‘natural’ figure of the environment—characterized by non-linear emergent self-
organization. This re-conceptualization would have implications for liberal governance. 
Ensuring the subject is capable of co-evolution with their environment cannot be achieved by 
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structuring the mentality of the subject, but was to proceed by acting on the subject’s 
environment, understood as an incentive structure and thus a condition of possibility for 
emergent norms and behaviours.  Security could thus no longer attempt to protect the subject 
from threat if this meant closing them off from their milieu.  Instead, security would have to 
proceed by exposing the subject more fully to their environment so as to optimise its 
governmental effects in encouraging innovation and, crucially, adaptation. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Jackie Orr identified that by the 1970s sociological studies of panic appeared far less 
frequently and were being displaced by mounting psychological research on ‘panic disorder’: 
a condition characterised by recurrent panic attacks (a sudden, uncontrollable onset of intense 
fear often accompanied by hyperventilation, perspiration, nausea, dizziness and heart 
palpitations) triggered by no observable cause (2006: 172-175).  Assisted by Quarantelli’s 
rigorous, but ultimately far narrower, definition of panic in terms of flight (Quarantelli, 1954, 
Quarantelli, 1957),  the very idea of panic was itself being transformed alongside the general 
trend towards cybernetic thinking taking place within American sociology.  No longer 
understood in terms of irrational hysteria, panic was now taken to be an adaptive response 
exhibited by a minority of individuals within a position of perceived entrapment (Quarantelli, 
1954).  Combating this behavior required opening communication channels and assisting 
participants by providing them with information upon which to base their decisions,  
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At the turn of the twenty-first century, even stronger assertions that panic is a ‘myth’ 
(Clarke, 2002, Cocking et al., 2009, Johnson, 1985, Keating, 1982, Sheppard et al., 2006, 
Tierney, 2003, Wessely, 2005b) have been drawn on to advance, and legitimize, a significant 
restructuring of emergency planning and response logics (Challenger et al., 2010a, 2010b).  
The resilience strategies of the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat, which will be discussed in 
detail in the following chapter, have been advanced, and legitimized, on the basis of this 
reappraisal of the referents of governance.  Departing from ‘command and control’ approaches 
to emergency response (Dynes, 1983), resilience strategies seek to optimize the ‘natural’ self-
organizational capacities of populations in emergency to collectively organize responses to 
crisis.  In broadening the scope of investigation this chapter has sought to problematise the 
idea that resilience was a simple discovery by disaster researchers of a natural phenomenon. It 
does so by situtating the emergence of the conceptual object of resilient populations within 
wider transformations in the order of power/knowledge underpinning liberal goverannce.   
Rather than an object whose true essence was suddenly discovered by science, resilient 
populations might instead be understood as the correlative of a neoliberal governmentality.  
This genealogy of resilient populations has sought to locate the conditions under which such a 
conceptual object could emerge.  It suggests that this shift in the understanding of social 
behaviour during emergencies is better understood as the effect, rather the cause, of a broader 
restructuring of rationalities and practices comprising liberal governance. Investigating 
correlated developments within the fields of Political Economy and Ecology this genealogy 
showed how the emergence of resilient population coincided with a profound shift in the 
understanding of the nature of Nature away from the classical equilibrium models dominant 
since the co-constitution of these academic fields.  In adopting the discursive framework of the 
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complexity sciences, both Political Economy and Ecology would adopt an understanding of 
Nature composed of multiple, emergent equilibria which exceeded science’s capacity both to 
represent them in models and predict the trajectory of their evolution.  Moreover, indissociable 
from this emergent ontology, a programme of governance would be constructed displaying 
both continuities and discontinuities with a liberal governmentality historically concerned with 
the problematic of ‘governing too little, or too much’ (Foucault, 2007) the immanent self-
organizing processes of natural fields including, most importantly, the market.  The emergence 
of this regime of truth therefore facilitated the synthesis of techniques of governance, explored 
in the previous chapter, into a more general governmental discourse. 
‘Resilient populations’ are not a natural phenomenon.  They are the product of 
culturally and historically specific processes of speciation.  Resilience discourses gained 
validity to the extent that they resonated with neoliberal attempts to problematise social 
liberalism on the basis of its cultivation of dependence.  Protection, insofar as it reduces one’s 
exposure to these events, breeds dependence and fragility. As a programme of governance, 
neoliberalism enacts a novel speciation of life in which life is valued in relation to its capacity 
to adaptively self-organize in the face of crisis.  Crises are not to be protected from because 
they are reconceptualised as opportunities for growth and transformation.  Crises become 
necessary, as opportunities to develop and exercise those faculties associated with resilience.  
It is not that crises cannot be prevented, it is that they should not be entirely prevented.  In the 
process, security is newly understood in terms of the capacity to adapt to environmental 
conditions so as to live with, and profit from, turbulent worlds.  Security becomes a project of 
perpetual atelic adaptation, and self-transformation within an ever-evolving milieu. 
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This genealogy has sought to identify the conditions of emergence for such a 
conceptual object not in the advance of science, but in the ascendance of neoliberalism as a 
regime of governance.  In doing so, it has sought to provide a positive basis for a theorization 
of neoliberalism as a regime of governance, constituting a particular actualization of an 
emergent epistemological order.  While neoliberalism demonstrates certain similarities with 
classical liberalism, including the emphasis on the ‘natural’ status of the market, this chapter 
has stressed that it is more than simply a reassertion of this governmentality or an extension of 
this programme to the public sphere.  What differentiates neoliberalism from classical 
liberalism is its affiliation to an account of ‘the order of things’ (Foucault, 2002) characterized 
by non-linear processes of emergence.  In the following chapter we will see how this order of 
governance and its attendant account of the ‘order of things’ was adopted and refined in the 
context of liberal security initiatives. 
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Chapter 4 
Securing Emergence 
 
 
 
 
It may be that war as strategy is a continuation of politics.  But it must not be forgotten that ‘politics’ 
has been conceived as a continuation, if not exactly and directly of war, at least of the military model as 
a fundamental means for preventing civil disorder. 
(Foucault, 1977: 168) 
 
In early 2001 a major civil contingencies review was ordered by the Blair government. 
The immediate impetus for the review came from of a number of high profile domestic crises, 
including the fuel protests, an outbreak of foot and mouth disease and a series of flooding 
incidents.  However, the review also reflected an acknowledgement that broader changes to 
the security environment needed to be reflected in the civil contingencies machinery.  Most 
notably, the collapse of the Soviet Union had removed the threat of attack by conventional or 
nuclear weapons which had been an increasingly central preoccupation for emergency 
planning over the course of the Cold War (see Chapter Two).  While limited reforms were 
introduced by Conservative governments in 1989 and 1991 to begin to address shifts in the 
strategic environment (Smith, 2003: 410) the political impetus for a substantial restructuring 
of the organizational and legislative basis of UK civil contingencies would only be afforded in 
the wake of these domestic crises and the questions they raised regarding the capacity of 
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Central government to coordinate multi-agency responses to the ‘complex emergencies’ and 
‘new security challenges’ of a post-Cold War world (Smith, 2003: 414).   
The Emergency Planning Review was initiated in February 2001 and would be 
completed in October of that year.  In particular, the review sought to define the statutory 
framework for national, regional and local responsibilities with regard to crisis management 
and update the legislative basis for emergency planning, which continued to be based upon 
essentially war-time Civil Defence considerations of the Cold War (Smith, 2003: 414).  
Coinciding with the review, in July 2001, responsibility for civil contingency planning was 
transferred from the Home Office Emergency Planning Department to the Cabinet Office’s 
Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in a move designed to streamline channels of 
responsibility and control during an emergency.  It was therefore prior to the final completion 
of the Emergency Planning Review and whilst the Civil Contingencies Secretariat was still 
very much in its formative phases, when the events of September 11
th
 2001 occurred.  The 
newly constituted Civil Contingencies Secretariat was quickly absorbed into the UK’s anti-
terrorism strategy as terrorism emerged as the dominant focal point of international security 
discourses (Coaffee, 2003, Coaffee et al., 2009). 
However much 9/11 served to consolidate security discourses around the threat of 
international terrorism it did not precipitate a radical break in the discursive structure of 
(in)security imaginaries.  Indeed, the impetus given to both the Emergency Planning Review 
and the concurrent Ministry of Defence Strategic Defence Review (Ministry of Defence, 2002) 
signal the extent to which the post-Cold War security environment was already being 
problematised in terms of its specific dangers and uncertainties.  While the graphic terrorist 
attacks on New York and Washington certainly gave political urgency to the transformation of 
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the United Kingdom’s security institutions, these events served only to consolidate an already 
emergent security discourse rooted in the problematic of the radical uncertainty of 
contemporary threat.  9/11 was not wholly exceptional (Lundborg, 2012) because it was itself 
interpreted through a grid of intelligibility which was already cohering.  These dramatic events 
would nevertheless serve to consolidate and extend this template as a means of problematising 
the post-Cold War security environment in terms of its radical contingency. 
This chapter investigates the operationalisation of resilience strategies within UK Civil 
Contingencies management in relation to this security discourse and, in particular, the 
problematic of the radical contingency of contemporary threat.  It begins by outlining how this 
problematic emerges in concert with transformations in the biopolitical imaginary of ‘the 
social’.  The introduction and widespread adoption of concepts such as the ‘network society’ 
was testament to the widespread sentiment that profound changes were occurring in the social 
order of liberal states.  The ‘network society’ was one mode of a more general ontopolitical 
rendering of liberal populations as complex open systems. It is in the context of these 
transformations, and in particular specific problematisation of liberal life which issued from 
this speciation, that a machinery of governance, still rooted in the logic of protection, was 
itself problematised.  This problematisation is investigated in detail below as the condition 
under which strategies based on the concept of resilience could be trialled, refined and applied 
to the field of emergency governance. 
Resilience strategies did not suddenly materialize as a response to this problematic 
however.  They too have a history.  This chapter seeks to trace the development of these 
techniques to show how the diagram of governance outlined in the previous chapter was 
actualized within the security field.  It is argued that resilience strategies have a genealogy that 
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can be traced to innovations in warfare associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA).  Building on developments already underway in the organization of American 
business enterprises and infusing them with models and concepts drawn from the complexity 
sciences, the RMA initiated a transformation in military organization and strategy which 
championed communications infrastructure as a condition of possibility for militaries 
organized on the idea of rapid and perpetual transformation (Blank, 1997, Cebrowski and 
Gartska, 1998).  Rapid adaptability, enabled by networked communication infrastructures 
which exacerbated information exchange, was a means of responding the problematic of 
radical contingency of twenty-first century warfare (Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998, Wesensten 
et al., 2005).  The RMA acted as the principle site for the assembly of governmental 
rationalities and practices later transferred to the civil contingencies operations for the purpose 
of responding to civil emergencies which was enabled by the sharing of a common 
problematic of radical contingency.   
Identifying the military genealogy of resilience strategies is not undertaken for the 
purpose of setting up an easy denouncement of these strategies based on the ‘militarization’ of 
the civilian sphere (Coaffee, 2003, 2009, Coaffee et al., 2009, Davis, 1992, Nunn, 2001, 
Wæver, 1995).  The limitation of such approaches is that they imply an expansive military 
essence which constantly threatens to colonize the civilian sphere.  As will be elaborated upon 
below, the RMA was itself inspired by developments in liberal economies problematising any 
linear claim of influence.  The transformations in military and social order are better analysed 
as symbiotic rather than unidirectional. Secondly, given the long historical influence of 
military models, concepts, strategies and logics on governance and the design of urban spaces 
(Chapter 1, Foucault, 1977, 2007, Scott, 1998: 59-63, Graham, 2004) the charge that the 
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civilian sphere is becoming ‘militarized’ lacks much analytical purchase. In recognition of the 
‘revolutions’ to which the organization and strategy of war is periodically subject (Bousquet, 
2009) the more critical question may be: “What is the nature of the contemporary security 
discourse informing military and social transformations alike?”  
Rather than a blanket denouncement then, this chapter seeks to elucidate through 
historical analysis the discursive structure informing transformations in both military and 
security operations.  As such, this chapter is interested in tracing not simply how resilience 
was operationalised as a programme of governance, but the conditions of possibility for it to 
emerge as a security value.  This chapter is concerned with how the epistemological order 
outlined in the previous chapter was extended to the domain of security through the migration 
of practices and associated governmentalities.  Investigating the martial origins of resilience 
strategies operating in UK civil contingencies provides a framework upon which the politics 
of resilience can be subject to further theorization and criticism in chapter 5. 
 
The Contemporary Threat Environment: 
 
The advent of the Cold War was met with substantial changes in the underlying 
discursive structure of the (Anglo-American) disciple of International Relations.  Whereas the 
advice provided to statesmen had traditionally been rooted in the anecdotal wisdom of History, 
by the 1960’s History was being actively displaced by positivist analytical frameworks drawn 
from the Natural Sciences and Economics which were claimed to be more scientifically 
rigorous (see Waltz, 1959, 1979).  The application of behavioural science, systems analysis 
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and games theory not only within the increasingly dominant discourse of scientific realism, 
but to doctrines of deterrence, breakdown and mutually assured destruction (MAD) alluded to 
the common investment shared by scholars and statesmen alike in the ability of scientific 
methodology to enhance predictive capacity (Waltz, 1979). The abrupt and unexpected end of 
the Cold War called into question the continued suitability of the dominant paradigm through 
which global politics had come to be understood and conducted for the previous half century 
(Kegley, 1993).  It also precipitated a crisis of confidence amongst those whose positivist 
theories of global politics were unable to foresee the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Gaddis, 1992, Lebow, 1994, Wohlforth, 1994). 
The radical transformation of the international political landscape paired with the 
problematisation of the very paradigm though which international politics was understood and 
conducted for a half-century opened a space for theorization and debate over how to 
understand the nature of global politics within a post-Cold War international system.  One 
prominent line of thought centred on the significance of ‘globalization’ in determining the 
shape of the emergent global order (see Clark, 1999, Held, 1999, McGrew and Lewis, 1992, 
Rosenau, 1997, Weiss, 1998).  Though notoriously difficult to define, globalization generally 
referred to the exponential increase in the circulation of people, money, ideas, goods, services, 
diseases and information enabled by advances in technology and the spread of neoliberal 
economic and political doctrines, as well as the new forms of connectivity and exclusion 
engendered by these processes.  The acute sense that the very organizational structure of ‘the 
social’ was mutating under the assemblage of forces associated with globalization was given 
academic form within influential sociological literatures declaring the advent of the 
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‘information’ (Webster, 1995) or ‘network society’ (Berkowitz and Wellman, 1988, Castells, 
1991, 1994, 1996).   
The idea of the network society is related to, but goes beyond, the notion of the 
information society which stresses the growing size and importance of information flows to 
contemporary societies (Webster, 2006).  For Castells “[n]etworks constitute the new social 
morphology of our societies” (Castells, 2010: 500).  The network society refers not just to the 
growing reliance upon infrastructural networks which support modern forms of liberal life, but 
to the complex of interlinked and interdependent networked structures through which ‘the 
social’ is increasingly organized.  Castells notes that “[w]hile the networking form of social 
organization has existed in other times and spaces, the new information technology paradigm 
provides the material basis for its pervasive expansion throughout the entire social structure” 
(Castells, 2010: 500).  Drawing on the work of post-industrialists including Daniel Bell and 
Alain Touraine, Castells explains that the network society emerged as a result of structural 
transformations in the order of global capitalism proceeding from the international economic 
crises of the 1970’s which, enabled by the emergence of new information technologies, had by 
the 1980’s given rise to a ‘techno-economic system’ which he labels ‘informational capitalism’ 
(Castells, 2010: from 18).    Castells argues that the marrying of informational networks and 
networked forms of organization provides returns on speed, flexibility and adaptability: 
“Networks are appropriate instruments for a capitalist economy based on 
innovation, globalization, and decentralized concentration; for work, workers, and 
firms based on flexibility and adaptability; for a culture of endless deconstruction 
and reconstruction; for a polity geared toward the instant processing of new values 
and public moods; and for a social organization aiming at the supersession of 
space and the annihilation of time” (Castells, 2010: 502). 
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In the revised preface to the 2010 edition of The Rise of the Network Society explains the 
impetus behind this new form of social organization in terms of the management of 
contingency: 
…while networks are an old form of organization in the human experience, digital 
networking technologies, characteristic of the Information Age, powered social and 
organizational networks in ways that allowed their endless expansion and 
reconfiguration, overcoming the traditional limitations of networking forms of 
organization to manage complexity beyond a certain size of the network. (Castells, 
2010: xviii) 
 
Castells recognized that these transformations would impact not just the way in which 
societies organized, but how life was itself experienced.  Echoing many within globalization 
literatures, Castells spoke of these developments in terms of spatial contraction and temporal 
acceleration (Castells, 2010: xxxi-xliii).   
The idea of the network society represents a profound reimagining of the social order 
premised not just on a novel understanding of ‘the social’ but on the idea that social ontology 
was itself mutating under the correlated forces of communications technology and 
informational capitalism.  Here, as elsewhere (Barabasi, 2002, Latour, 2005, Galloway and 
Thacker, 2007), the network emerged as a dominant trope for speaking about a form of order 
which had emerged to cope with, manage and, when possible, harness complexity. Complexity 
here is understood as a function of heterogeneous circulations and connections such as those 
circumscribed within transnational processes of globalization which give rise to non-linear and 
unpredictable systemic behaviours.  The social order particular to the ‘network society’ is one 
discursively rooted in the sciences of complex emergence: an order which recognizes 
contingency not simply as an irreducible condition of operability, but also a condition of 
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possibility (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 122).  Form is understood here as a temporary, contingent 
actualization of heterogeneous relations due to be continually re-ordered within an atelic 
project of perpetual becoming.  In this sense it is clear that the significance of this particular 
ontologization of ‘the social’ cannot simply be attributed to its networked forms: the growing 
importance of material networks such as those critical infrastructures said to be ‘essential to 
life’ or even to the proliferation of networked organizational forms.  Rather it is the adaptive 
mutability of organizational form enabled by these infrastructural and organizational networks. 
Clearly the very idea of order expressed here is distinct from a Christian onto-
theological understanding of a universal, stable form divined by God to secure against evil.  It 
can also be distinguished from a modern understanding of order which, in a clear mutation of 
the Christian onto-theological understanding of order to which it was indebted, sought to 
establish a stable edifice (Reason, the State) to guard against danger in the absence of God 
(Bauman, 1992, see also Caygill, 1993).  The order particular to the network society is a 
dynamic one.  It is characterized by the precedence placed on adaptive mutability to 
environmental conditions: a particular actualization of the epistemological order outlined in 
the previous chapter.   As such, the network society might better be treated as a popular 
shorthand for a specific speciation of life understood in terms of its capacity for complex 
emergence (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009).
50
  The contemporary liberal imaginary of 
species-life is distinguished by its fascination with the morphological order animating species-
being. As clearly evidenced in formulations of the network society, species-being is 
                                                          
50
 Other studies would more explicitly deploy the discourse of the complexity sciences for sociological purposes.  
See for example (Byrne, 1998, Chorafas, 1994, De Landa, 2006, Marion, 1999, Urry, 2003)  
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understood, and evaluated, in terms of its capacity to thrive within conditions of radical 
contingency through constant, rapid adaptation to environmental conditions. 
Just as any imaginary of danger is an expression of a particular understanding of order 
(Campbell and Dillon, 1993: 4), the advent of the network society has likewise been 
understood to herald new dangers. Coinciding with the benefits which international 
telecommunications networks and just-in-time transportation networks are said to deliver is an 
acute recognition of their vulnerability to disruption by accident or attack (Adey et al., 2011). 
Bonditti (2008) shows how in the early 1990’s a concern with the threat of cyber-attacks on 
information and communication networks increasingly relied upon by the US government 
reprioritized critical infrastructure protection in the context of threats which targeted not just 
the material dimensions of networked infrastructures but their virtual dimensions as well.  It 
has been here noted that the status afforded to critical infrastructures as key enablers for liberal 
life (Lobo-Guerrero, 2009) has made them particularly vulnerable as symbolic targets for 
attack (Burgess, 2007, Reid, 2008a).  These vital circulations were not just vulnerable to 
disruption by threats acting upon the virtual or material dimensions of these infrastructures 
however.  They could also be exploited by other networked communities from viruses 
(electronic and biological) to international terrorists (relying, for example, on financial, 
telecommunications and transport infrastructures) as a means of radically amplifying their 
own processes of emergent development and adaptation.  As such, the very same circulations 
understood to accelerate the evolutionary adaptability of liberal forms of life could also be 
harnessed to radically empower an assortment of forces deemed inimical to liberal life.  In 
addition then to the physical security of these networks and a continual surveillance to 
distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’ circulations (Foucault, 2003: lecture 11, Lobo-Guerrero, 2008) 
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so as to promote the former and discourage, if not eliminate, the latter, contemporary security 
initiatives must keep a close watch over the differential forms of life enabled by the 
exacerbation of these circulations in respect of the threat of their ‘becoming-dangerous’ 
(Dillon, 2007). 
To make matters worse, the complex interactions of networked systems are understood 
to further exacerbate the dangers inherent to the network society.  Drawing on systems theory 
and organizational analysis, Charles Perrow’s Normal Accidents (1999) investigated the forms 
of systems failure responsible for large-scale industrial catastrophes including the 1979 Three 
Mile Island nuclear meltdown.  In contrast to Perrow’s ill-chosen title, the study focused 
primarily upon low-probability, high-impact events which Perrow labels ‘system accidents’.51  
System accidents deviate from the two modes in which industrial accidents have historically 
been conceived and managed: either as a result of negligence (mobilizing processes of 
adjudication to ascribe ‘fault’) or as a result of statistical regularity (enabling technologies of 
workplace insurance) (See Ewald, 1986: Introduction).  Instead, a system accident is a 
function of the ‘interactive complexity’ of tightly-coupled complex systems rather than 
operator error or component malfunction.  In other words, system accidents are inherent to the 
complex interdependence of components within a system.  Within tightly coupled systems, 
discrete failures located within one sub-system can rapidly cascade within and across sub-
systems.  The complex interaction of multiple, distributed failures may, in turn, give rise to the 
non-linear emergence of a catastrophic system accident.  The accident cannot be 
geographically localised to enable a denunciation of ‘responsibility’ or ‘fault’.  Rather, the 
accident is itself distributed: a function of complex interdependence of components in relation.  
                                                          
51
 Perrow refers to ‘systems accidents’ and ‘normal accidents’ interchangeably throughout this text.  To avoid 
confusion, I will refer to these only as ‘systems accidents’. 
Securing Emergence 
 
151 
 
Within these systems, too rigid a focus on systemic stability may in fact exacerbate processes 
associated with the complex emergence of danger, generating even greater insecurity (Law, 
2000).  Wildavsky (1988), for example, has suggested that too many safety measures can be 
counter-productive—stifling opportunities for innovation and creativity within a crisis.  By 
contrast, an approach rooted in resilience would concentrate on enhancing the ability to 
respond to unexpected dangers.  The radical contingency of contemporary threat thus does not 
only refer to the fact, as we are continually reminded, that it is a question of when, not if, the 
next emergency will occur.  It is a matter of the non-linear, and thus unpredictable, evolution 
of danger’s emergence. 
Bruce Mann, Director of the Civil Contingencies at the Cabinet Office, explained the 
2001 constitution of the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) as a response to the forms 
of threat particular to a ‘network society’: 
“There has, since 2001, been a fundamental shift in the purpose and 
organisation of civil protection in the UK. The Cold War model of civil 
defence – focused on a single, monolithic threat, managed top-down by central 
government in secret and restricted to a small community – has gone. In its 
place has come a model better suited to a modern network society with its 
increased connections and interdependencies bringing with them greater 
vulnerability to external shock. The new model addresses a wide range of 
security risks, from terrorism through accidents to natural disasters. It involves 
a broad range of organisations, in the public sector and beyond. Work at local 
level is the building block of preparedness. And there is a premium on 
inclusiveness and transparency.” (Mann, 2007) 
 
The very openness and connectivity which is the source of dynamism in the network society 
thus radically endangers it.  Moreover, these attributes problematise security logics of 
protection which look to seal off the outside given that the openness of these systems is a 
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condition of their adaption to environmental transformations.  Resilience has thus emerged as 
a response to this problematic premised on the security of open complex systems including 
contemporary ‘network societies’.  The military genealogy of resilience strategies will be 
explored in the following section. 
 
Transformation: The Revolution in Military Affairs 
 
From the mid-1990’s the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has served as the 
guiding strategic vision for the re-organization of liberal militaries to better respond to the 
forms of threats anticipated within a post-Cold War strategic environment.  Premised on a 
shift from the weapons platform to the information network as the central organizing principle 
for all levels of military command and control, the RMA elevated the real-time, circulation of 
information through  communications infrastructures to a condition of possibility for inciting 
flexible, adaptive and more closely integrated forms of organization across the armed forces 
(Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998). Inspired by doctrines of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) 
which sought to apply developments associated with the ‘information revolution’ to the battle 
field, the RMA sought to extend concepts of informationally-driven self-synchronization and 
bottom-up self-organization to all aspects of military organization.  In contrast to the top-down, 
hierarchical forms of control traditionally associated with the military, the RMA reflected an 
idea of military order rooted in bottom-up self-organization enabled by real-time information 
sharing.  The RMA, as Dillon and Reid have noted, would not simply exploit developments in 
communications technology, but would mobilize information itself as “the generative 
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principle of formation for all aspects of military organization” (2009: 112).  Openly indebted 
to ideas of transformational organization already operationalised within American business 
enterprises, but infusing them with insights drawn from the complexity sciences, the RMA 
would be instrumental in translating the emergent order informing the transformation of liberal 
capitalism into security discourses. 
While the roots of the RMA have been traced to Soviet military research on 
information-based warfare in the 1970’s and 1980’s (Fitzgerald, 1994, Pantelogiannis, 2006), 
by the 1990’s American military universities and private research institutions were busy 
researching how developments associated with the ‘information revolution’ might be 
harnessed to respond to changes in the international strategic environment (Dillon and Reid, 
2009: 112-113).  At the forefront of this research was the RAND Corporation, an American 
think-tank which since the 1950’s had exerted a significant influence over US military strategy 
and which was instrumental in formulating the American doctrine of Network-Centric 
Warfare (NCW).  In 1997, the RAND Corporation published the collection In Athena’s Camp 
(1997) which brought together a group of authors to discuss how the ‘information revolution’ 
was actively reshaping the nature of conflict—including warfare, terrorism and crime—and 
how these developments might be harnessed by the American military into the future.   
Particularly inspired by transformations already well underway within the organization 
of liberal economies, strategists sought to incorporate the core organizational models and 
strategies adopted by commercial enterprises to enhance their competitive advantage within 
highly competitive and dynamic business environments.  Stephen Blank (1997) argued that 
state militaries would need to learn to adopt highly adaptive networked organizational forms 
invented and increasingly utilized by transnational corporations which operationalised 
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Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to enable constant adaptive 
organizational transformation to optimize the ability to mitigate risks and capitalize on 
emergent opportunities within rapidly evolving economic ecosystems.  Editors Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt (1997), echoed these sentiments insisting that these shifts in organizational form 
towards more dispersed, networked forms of organization would be necessary for state 
militaries to engage in irregular forms of conflict such as guerrilla warfare and terrorism with 
adversaries who in many ways had already begun to adopt, and begun to perfect, strategies of 
‘netwar’.  While preserving the hierarchical forms of organization ‘at their core’ states would 
need to become increasingly adept at ‘combin[ing] hierarchical and networked designs to 
increase their agility and flexibility for field operations” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997: 5)  
In later work, Arquilla and Ronfeldt would continue to exploit advances in networked 
forms of organization to theorize new  military doctrines including ‘BattleSwarm’ (Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt, 2001).  Drawing on the study of swarming tactics performed by ants, bees, and 
antibodies (2001: 25-27), but noting that highly sophisticating swarming techniques were 
already being utilized by ‘social swarmers’ including hackers and WTO activists (2001: 50), 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt theorized the doctrine of swarming: a particular instantiation of 
network-centric warfare based on the “systematic pulsing of force and/or fire, by dispersed 
interneted units, so as to strike the adversary from all directions simultaneously” (2001: 8).  
Swarming, it is noted, is premised upon “radical changes in current military organizational 
structures” (2001: vii) with command and control authority considerably devolved to units 
themselves.  Swarming tactics are optimized when operationalised by small bands of troops fit 
with sensors so as to generate information and networked so as to share this information 
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instantaneously with each other and local assets.  When performed successfully, swarming 
induces the effects associated with shock and awe:  
 
“The ultimate aim of a swarm may be less the physical destruction of an enemy— 
although much damage can be done—and more the disruption of its cohesion. 
Once deeply disrupted, the enemy will lose his ability to maneuver or fire 
effectively, and the military aims of the “swarm force” will come readily to hand.” 
(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001: 23) 
 
Given the dependence of swarming upon communications infrastructures, ensuring the 
robustness and resilience of these infrastructure is recognized as a significant security 
imperative especially given the increased likelihood of attacks on these infrastructures into the 
future (2001: 45-46).  
Doctrines of Network-Centric Warfare functioned as sites for the generation of 
concepts, tactics, practices, and diagrams of governance which would inspire broader 
developments in the restructuring of military institutional organization collectively referred to 
as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  The Revolution in Military Affairs was 
announced as the operational framework upon which  post-Cold War American military would 
be reorganized in Joint Vision 2010 (United States Department of Defense, 1996).
52
 The report 
identified information and communications technologies as a means of enhancing integration 
and cohesion of various segments of the US military in a post-Cold War strategic environment 
which lacked a central strategic focus since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  In a time of 
                                                          
52
 The report was commissioned for the Secretary of Defense by the Roles and Missions Commission as 
mandated within the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence Reorganization Act which required such a 
report every three years. 
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decreasing defence budgets, advocates of the RMA benefited from the claim that savings 
could be made through the substitution of manpower with technology as informational 
superiority would be the key to military success into the future, rather than masses of 
personnel, equipment, and weaponry. However, they also noted that a true commitment to the 
doctrines of the RMA would necessitate changes in military structure, equipment, training and 
organization, provoking significant controversy within the military establishment (Barnett, 
1999, Blaker, 2007). 
In a paper co-written with John Gartska entitled Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin 
and Future (1998) the principal architect of the RMA C. Arthur Cebrowski outlined the 
schema upon which the RMA was to be based.  The authors stressed the importance of social 
and technological changes which prefigured the RMA. They singled out as particularly 
significant the structural reorganization of American businesses coincident with the 
exponential growth of the information technology sector: 
Here at the end of a millennium we are driven to a new era in warfare. Society has 
changed. The underlying economics and technologies have changed. American 
business has changed. We should be surprised and shocked if America's military 
did not. (1998: 1) 
 
Citing Clausewitz, the authors made clear the co-evolution strategies aimed at generating 
profit with those tasked with providing security: “nations make war the same way they make 
wealth” (1998: 2).  Inspired by socio-economic developments already well under way, military 
theorists would look to further refine this model by applying the insights of the complexity 
sciences: the science behind self-organizing evolutionary systems (Cebrowski and Gartska, 
1998, Moffat, 2003). 
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“Network-centric operations deliver to the U.S. military the same powerful dynamics 
as they produced in American business” (Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998).  The competitive 
advantage yielded to network-centric operations is primarily afforded to enhanced speed of 
command. Speed of command is premised on informational superiority translating into 
decisional superiority.  Informational superiority refers to the enhanced understanding of the 
battlespace achieved through the use of a range of sensors, displays and modeling software.  A 
resilient telecommunications is relied upon to circulate this information and facilitate 
communication leading to shared situational awareness amongst all contributing parties.  
Shared situational awareness facilitates bottom-up organization, or ‘self-synchronization’, and 
accelerates the completion of complex tasks, which can be achieved concurrently rather than 
sequentially.  Within a rapidly evolving battle ‘ecosystem’ characterized in complex, emergent 
terms, informational superiority is recognized as the key to inciting the continual adaptation 
necessary to defend oneself from emergent risks, and capitalize on emergent opportunities. 
“Military operations are enormously complex, and complexity theory tells us that such 
enterprises organize best from the bottom-up” (Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998).  Rather than a 
battle of attrition, the schema of network-centric warfare is designed to overwhelm the enemy 
by quickly and decisively foreclosing, or ‘locking-out’, enemy courses of action, shocking 
them into capitulation. 
Cebrowski and Gartska recognize that self-synchronization represents a significant 
departure from traditional command structures in which “military commanders work to obtain 
top-down command-directed synchronization to achieve the required level of mass and fires at 
the point of contact with the enemy” (1998).  But the RMA also signifies a fundamental 
reimagining of military order.  Static hierarchical command and control structures were to be 
Securing Emergence 
 
158 
 
replaced by evolving organizational structures designed to rapidly respond and adapt to an 
ever-changing battle-ecosystem.  Enacting perpetual processes of ordering within an atelic 
project of continual ‘transformation’ would optimize the capacity to exploit emergent 
opportunities and mitigate risks.  When Dillon and Reid insist that contingency has become 
not simply as a condition of operability, but a condition of possibility for contemporary 
military and security discourses (2009: 122), they are alluding to the ways in which 
contemporary biopolitical governance is increasingly concerned not only with the government 
of contingency within an ineradicable ‘fog of war’, but how to govern through contingency 
(Dillon, 2006) by learning how to manipulate and control the conditions of adaptive 
emergence for species-life.    
The adoption of network-centric operations demanded a significant reorganization of 
military governance away from disciplinary models focused on enhancing the robustness of 
static organizational forms to ensure predictability on the battle field.  The extent of these 
changes was stressed by Donald Rumsfeld, a strong advocate of the RMA, in a speech to the 
National Defence University.  The advent of high-tech weaponry, he argued, “will not 
transform the US Armed Forces unless we transform the way we think, the way we train, the 
way we exercise and the way we fight” (as quoted in Dillon and Reid, 2009: 110).  As 
Cebrowski and Gartska recognize, they would also require a revaluation of military values: 
To choose a sporting example, although the objective of the game, the number 
of plays, and the operating environment are essentially the same, football is 
fundamentally different from soccer because its underlying rule set is different. 
Accordingly, the competitive attributes of mass, continuity of play, self-
synchronization, sustained speed, and others are revalued. There are important 
differences between the ways a soccer coach and a football coach would recruit, 
train, and organize their teams. (Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998) 
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This revaluation of military values would be characterized by a shift from those virtues 
associated with robustness of structure, such as fortitude, to virtues such as adaptation, 
regeneration and resilience.  This would have significant implications for training, 
organization and the allocation of resources (see also O'Malley, 2010a). 
 
Optimizing Network-Centric Warriors 
 
It has been said that war has long provided a grid of intelligibility for liberal 
governance (Foucault, 2003).   To the extent that radical uncertainty is said to similarly 
characterize contemporary civil emergency and military applications (Dillon and Reid, 2009, 
Dillon and Reid, 2001), an avenue has opened for the transfer of military solutions to address 
this security problematic in civil applications.  The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in 
particular, has sought to confront the radical contingency of the battle environment by 
encouraging the development of emergent and adaptive military structures, and has thus been 
influential in informing emergency preparedness and response plans.  The transition to a more 
highly adaptive military structure was premised on a shift from the weapons platform to the 
information network, as the central organizational principle for all levels of military 
organization (Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998), while at the unit level, the information network 
became the source for new tactical approaches within a doctrine of network-centric warfare 
(Alberts et al., 1999a, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997).  The 
communications network is utilized to exacerbate communication between small bands of 
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highly networked troops contributing to shared situational awareness amongst members of the 
unit.  Shared situational awareness accelerates the completion of complex tasks and facilitates 
bottom-up organization, or ‘self-synchronization (Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998) of the unit 
permitting an emergent response to constantly evolving battle space. 
According to the doctrine’s architects, the principal benefit to be gained from the 
transitional to network-centric style of warfare is to be found in the competitive advantage 
gained within the speed of command (Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998).  The competitive 
advantage in speed, whereby threats can be responded to and opportunities capitalized on 
more quickly than the opponent, permits small bands of troops to overwhelm more numerous 
adversaries and decisively arrive at victory.  The most important factor in generating speed of 
command is a highly robust communications infrastructure, which can be more or less 
addressed through advances in technology and systems design.  The more problematic factor, 
it is recognized, relates to the human capacity to process information in order to come to a 
decision: 
Information superiority provides the joint force a competitive advantage only when 
it is effectively translated into superior knowledge and decisions. The joint force 
must be able to take advantage of superior information converted to superior 
knowledge to achieve “decision superiority” – better decisions arrived at and 
implemented faster than an opponent can react, or in a noncombat situation, at a 
tempo that allows the force to shape the situation or react to changes and 
accomplish its mission. Decision superiority does not automatically result from 
information superiority. Organizational and doctrinal adaptation, relevant training 
and experience, and the proper command and control mechanisms and tools are 
equally necessary. (Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, 2000, emphasis 
added :8) 
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Within this framework, the capacity of soldiers to quickly process information and arrive at 
decisions so as to instantiate and optimize processes of self-synchronization has emerged as a 
guiding problematic for strategies of network-centric warfare. 
USAF Colonel John Boyd’s OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) is commonly 
used as a model for the decision-making processes of a soldier within literatures pertaining to 
self-synchronization (Alberts et al., 1999b, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, Barnett, 1999, 
Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998, Wesensten et al., 2005).
53
  The OODA loop represents, in short, 
a cybernetic feedback loop in which environmental conditions are assessed, then used as the 
basis for a decision, the outcome of which impacts the environment, starting the whole 
processes again ad-infinitum (Osinga, 2007: 74-85).  Speed of command is accelerated by 
tightening the revolutions of the OODA loop of individual soldiers in a networked unit thus 
accelerating the unit’s ability to make organizational adjustments within a rapidly evolving 
battle environment.  Ideally, according to Vice-Admiral Cebrowski, self-synchronization 
would operate such that OODA loop coils so tightly as to disappear—denying the enemy any 
operational pause (Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998). The ideal response time thus tends towards 
reflex: an immediate link between observation and action.  Gains made both to accelerated 
speed of command and amplified combat power permit control over the rate of evolutionary 
change in the battle-environment and ‘lock-out’ of the enemies ability to do the same 
(Cebrowski and Gartska, 1998).   
According to Boyd, efforts to contract the OODA loop must ultimately be directed at 
the problematic orientation phase, which “as the repository of our genetic heritage, cultural 
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 OODA loops are also frequently discussed within civil contingencies exercises (See, for example, Lindgren 
and Bandhold, 2003: 6-8). 
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tradition, and previous experiences – is the most important part of the OODA loop since it 
shapes the way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act” (Boyd, 1987). The 
Orientation phase links the intake of information, to the output of a decision and thus refers to 
the processes through which information is analyzed and synthesized in order to proceed to a 
decision.  Strategies aimed at accelerating the OODA loop thus far operate not by seeking to 
order the cognitive processes themselves, but by optimizing the conditions of operability of 
these processes, in order to boost their speed and efficiency. 
In particular, the prefrontal cortex has been targeted as a key component in accelerating 
the orientation phase of the OODA loop: the brain region where it is said emotion, anticipation 
and situational awareness culminate (Wesensten et al., 2005).  The prefrontal cortex is 
understood to affect the capacity of the individual to form relations with technology, with the 
environment and with other bodies.  This capacity to form relations is influenced by the ways 
in which expectation is structured within the preconscious register of the subject.  Varying the 
excitability of the prefrontal cortex gives control over the speed in which decisions are made.  
Factors known to depress the functions of the prefrontal cortex, such as extreme temperature 
conditions, dehydration, high operational tempo and sleep deprivation, were found to slow 
subject’s ability to complete even simple psychomotor tasks (Wesensten et al., 2005).  The 
complex cognitive tasks required by the soldier within the field, including the ability to 
maintain shared situational awareness, has thus made the constant monitor of the prefrontal 
cortex, through sensors and software applied to the soldier, a necessary component of 
network-centric operations (Wesensten et al., 2005, see also Peters et al., 2007).  Alternative 
efforts have also been made to stimulate the functioning of prefrontal cortex including the 
provision of caffeinated chewing gum (Kamimori et al., 2004).   
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What military psychologists are ultimately interested in optimizing are the conditions 
in which complex decision-making processes reach maximal efficiency and speed.  The 
strategies developed to achieve this task are directed at the prefrontal cortex insofar as it is 
perceived to be the location in which anticipation, as well as other affective states, translate 
into higher levels of awareness of one’s environment.   The decision-making processes of the 
subject are black-boxed as a complexly constituted field in which decisions are emergent.  
Governance operates not by attempting to order these complex processes of cognition, but by 
optimizing their conditions of operability.  Power, here, is not concerned with the specific 
coordination of actions, but in learning to modulate the anticipatory levels to induce reflexive, 
as opposed to reflective, decision-making (Massumi, 2005a: 33, Cf. Foucault, 2008: 259-60). 
The power applied to the subject thus does not seek to determine actions but “assists in the 
germination of potentials for action, whose outcome could not be determined in advance” 
(Massumi, 2005a: 32-33). 
 
Emergent Security  
 
A follow-up report to Joint Vision 2010 entitled Joint Vision 2020 (United States 
Department of Defense, 2000) would look to update the argument advanced in the original in 
light of advances in the information revolution, and extend this organizational template both to 
allies including NATO and temporally into the future.  No doubt compelled by the desire to 
continue to integrate with American forces, the UK Ministry of Defence would signal the 
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intention to more fully develop ‘network-enabled capabilities’54  within the 2002 Strategic 
Defence Review (Ministry of Defence, 2002: 14-18).  That the review conducted by the 
Ministry of Defence coincided with the Cabinet Office’s Emergency Management Review is 
far from coincidental.  Indeed, the very concepts, strategies and practices associated with 
network-centric military operation to be adopted by the British Armed forces can also be 
found guiding the reorganization of UK Civil Contingencies Management. 
The 2001 Emergency Planning Review sought a thorough reorganization of the UK 
Civil Contingencies machinery to permit it to better address the complex civil emergencies 
which had become the focus of post-Cold War emergency planning.  To the extent that 
military and security operations shared a common problematic—namely the radical 
contingency of threat environments—the newly organized civil contingencies apparatus would 
borrow heavily from the concepts, strategies and organizational principles forged within the 
Revolution in Military Affairs.  An emphasis was placed on information-sharing and 
communications at all levels of the emergency management architecture as key enablers for 
adaptive and emergent emergency responses.  Rooted in the ethos of Integrated Emergency 
Management (IEM), emergency responses would prioritize communications as a means of 
better integrating the array of specialist agencies required to intervene in a complex 
emergency, and ensure that plans were flexible enough to respond to unique events and adapt 
alongside the non-linear and thus unpredictable evolution of the emergency itself.  The 
organization and strategy of UK emergency response was to be directed in accordance with 
the key concept of resilience. 
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 Within the 2002 Strategic Defence Review these are referred to as ‘network-centric capabilities’.  ‘Network-
enabled capabilites’ has become the predominant phrase now used by the Ministry of Defence. 
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Resilience has been defined by the Home Office as the ability “at every relevant level 
to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to handle and recover from disruptive challenges” (Home 
Office, 1997: 1).  Elaborating somewhat upon this definition Bruce Mann, Head of the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat, describes resilience as “the ability to respond to an emergency, 
minimise and absorb any damage, and recover” (Mann, 2007).   Resilience is not 
circumscribed to a particular set of practices or programme of governance.  Rather, it refers to 
a quality exhibited by a diverse array of security referents, including populations, economies, 
and critical infrastructures.  Since 2001, the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat has been 
mandated with enhancing UK resilience to a wide spectrum of threats including natural 
disasters, pandemics, industrial accidents and terrorist attacks. As a security strategy, 
enhancing UK resilience depends upon the exercise of a heterogeneous assemblage of 
techniques, technologies and knowledges which comprise a security assemblage aimed at 
enhancing the adaptive capacities of these systems to rapidly adapt to, and evolve through, 
crises.   
Lentzos and Rose have noted that this entails “a systematic, widespread, organizational, 
structural and personal strengthening of subjective and material arrangements so as to be 
better able to anticipate and tolerate disturbances in complex worlds without collapse, to 
withstand shocks, and to rebuild as necessary”  (Lentzos and Rose, 2009: 243).  To this end, 
the Civil Contingencies Secretariat coordinates a complex machinery of governance 
comprised of both private and public agencies.  These actors draw on expert knowledges and 
utilize specialist skills in reference to enhance the resilience of privileged systems.  Taken 
together, the collective resilience of these systems comprises the stated aim of ensuring UK 
resilience.  UK Resilience refers to the performative adaptability of a range of complex 
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systems to withstand, reorganize and regenerate quickly and efficiently in the wake of a 
potentially catastrophic event in order to minimize disruption to British life. 
Resilience is thus circumscribed to a risk-based understanding of security understood 
in terms of mitigating vulnerabilities to a threat, rather than eliminating threat itself 
(Zebrowski, 2009).  Resilience strategies have emerged alongside what scholars have noted 
has been a proliferation of anticipatory strategies within liberal security initiatives including 
precaution (Aradau and Munster, 2007, Ewald, 2002, Massumi, 2005b), preparedness (Aradau, 
2010, Collier, 2008, Lakoff, 2007, Collier and Lakoff, 2008a) and pre-emption (Cooper, 
2006a, de Goede, 2008b, de Goede and Randalls, 2009).  Scholars have likewise noted that the 
growing reliance on these anticipatory techniques has coincided with the enframing of the 
contemporary security environment in terms of the radical uncertainty of threats (see Aradau 
et al., 2008, Dillon, 2006, 2007, Lobo-Guerrero, 2010).  The uncertainty of terrorist strikes, 
epidemics, financial crises and natural disasters which haunt contemporary liberal security 
imaginaries is not exhausted by their unpredictable materializations, but also refers to the ways 
in which these dangers may rapidly escalated within and across systems in non-linear 
processes of emergence.  As such, the contemporary security discourse is characterised by a 
new ontology of the emergency event depicted less in legal-theological terms as the 
punctuated arrival of a Schmittian ‘exception’ to a pre-existing order, but now in terms of an 
emergence (Dillon, 2007).   
Resilience strategies can thus be situated within a larger assemblage of governance 
engaged with the problematic of securing against the radical contingency of contemporary 
threat.  However it engages with the temporal dimension of danger’s emergence in a way 
which distinguishes it from the anticipatory logics listed above.  Enhancing resilience involves 
Securing Emergence 
 
167 
 
mitigating vulnerability and optimizing the capacity to not only endure crisis but to ‘bounce-
back’ from a potentially catastrophic event. Insofar as resilience therefore implies processes of 
recovery and regeneration absent within strictly vulnerability-mitigation understandings of 
security then resilience discourses are imbued with a specifically temporal element.  
Resilience may be understood as an ‘emergent security’ (Lobo-Guerrero, 2007) as it operates 
to secure life understood in terms its capacity for creative emergence, rather than its static 
being, or ‘nature’. 
What is so radically threatening about the emergent ontology of the contemporary 
emergency event is the speed—and, in particular, the acceleration—of its becoming-dangerous.  
Resilience, mimicking in many ways the emergence of contemporary threats, is a project 
aiming to enhance ‘our’ capacity for adaptive, self-emergence. It aims to optimize the capacity 
of systems that ‘we’ depend upon, or belong to, to rapidly co-evolve alongside the becoming-
dangerous of threats.  Resilience therefore operates according to a related, albeit inverted, 
logic to that of pre-emption: whereas pre-emption seeks to detect and terminate potential 
threats before they become dangerous, resilience looks to optimize the conditions of 
emergence, or evolve-ability, of an individual, collective or system to rapidly adapt to, and 
evolve through, crises. While logics of pre-emption employ the sciences of life to better 
perform the sovereign function of killing, resilience employs this very same knowledge to 
potential-ize life processes so it can really live. Strategies of resilience thus engage with 
threats at the dangerous level of beating them at their own game: by entering a race to out-
perform, out-adapt, and evolve quicker than threat-itself. 
In contrast to geopolitical security strategies which aim to secure a space from threat 
(ex. the fortress or bunker), resilience strategies secure against the emergency event by 
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ensuring a crisis does not escalate to an emergency.  Speed is as integral in this regard as 
mitigating exposure to threats through risk-based techniques: coordinating agencies so as to 
quickly close-down the crisis and re-establish ‘normality’.  As a biopolitical security strategy, 
resilience operates not by protecting a referent from threat through prophylactic measures, but 
by enhancing the conditions of adaptive evolution so as to optimize the capacity to thrive 
within a dangerous and uncertain world. 
 
Harnessing Emergence: Resilience and UK Civil Contingencies Planning 
 
The key legislation for UK emergency management is the 2004 Civil Contingencies 
Act (CCA) (HM Government, 2004).  Part One of the Act provides a framework for the 
delineation of responsibilities at the national, regional and local levels.  It places legal 
obligations on local authorities and Category 1 emergency responders
55
 to perform regular risk 
assessments, develop and regularly exercise contingency plans, and assist businesses with the 
development of continuity plans.  Legal requirement also focus on enhancing information 
exchange with Category One responders having a legal obligation to cooperate and share 
information with Category Two responders as well as to provide information to the public 
regarding risks and emergencies.  Part Two of the Act repeals outdated emergency powers 
legislation including the 1920 Emergency which had been drawn-up primarily for 
                                                          
55
 Category 1 Responders are defined within the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) as “those organisations at the 
core of the response to most emergencies (e.g. emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies).”  Category 2 
responders are, by contrast, understood to be ‘co-operating bodies’ which “are less likely to be involved in the 
heart of planning work but will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their sector. Category 2 responders 
have a lesser set of duties - co-operating and sharing relevant information with other Category 1 and 2 
responders” (HM Government, 2004). 
Securing Emergence 
 
169 
 
strikebreaking and civil defence purposes.  Significantly, the act replaces the condition upon 
which emergency powers can be invoked from a threat to the supply and distribution of the 
‘essentials of life’ to the more general condition that “an ‘emergency has occurred, is 
occurring or is about to occur” (HM Government, 2004: 14).   
Contingency planning within the United Kingdom is distributed across the 
administrative system and requires the coordination of bodies including central government 
departments and committees, the devolved administrations, local authorities, partnership 
groups, the front-line emergency services (police, fire, ambulance, coastguard) and, on 
occasion, the military (Smith, 2003).  Organization is based on the principle that decisions are 
taken at the lowest appropriate level while co-ordination and strategic direction is provided at 
the highest necessary level.  Localized incidents are to be handled exclusively by local 
responders, while events of progressive severity and geographic scope would increasingly 
involve regional and central government bodies (UK Resilience Guidance, 2005).  Military 
involvement in civil contingencies operations, as set out in the Strategic Defence Review 
(Ministry of Defence, 2002), is made conditional upon the request of civil authorities when 
additional manpower and technical expertise is required.
56
  The military is not therefore 
formerly incorporated into contingency plans as it is seen as a reserve force of last resort.  That 
said, the Strategic Defence Review did recommended the creation of a Rapid Reaction 
Force—later renamed the Civil Contingencies Reaction Force—consisting of 6000 military 
personnel distributed across the country who could provide immediate support in the case of 
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 In events which pose a threat to life, military services are offered at no charge, whilst if there is no threat to life 
then the civil authority will incur a charge for their involvement. 
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an emergency, guaranteeing for the first time a minimum level of support for civil 
emergencies regardless of international commitments. (Smith, 2003: 416). 
The highest body involved with UK emergency management is the Civil 
Contingencies Committee (CCC), a dedicated Cabinet Committee chaired by the Home 
Secretary with final responsibility for emergency preparation and response.  The CCC has 
three subcommittees: UK Resilience (UKR), chaired by the Minister for the Cabinet Office; 
London Resilience (LR), chaired by the Minister of State for Local Government and the 
Regions; and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Consequence Management 
(CBRN), chaired by the Minister of State for Community Safety.  While the CCC meets 
regularly to review and discuss contingency preparations, it will also convene in the event of a 
major national or multi-regional crisis with ministers and senior officials from other Whitehall 
committees within Cabinet Office Briefing Room A, or as it is commonly known COBRA.  A 
regional tier has been also been introduced to act as ‘a mechanism for improving co-ordination 
and communication into and out from the centre of government’ (Cabinet Office, 2005: 168, 
as quoted in Coaffee et al., 2009: 170). 
The Civil Contingencies Committee is supported by the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat (CCS) based in the Cabinet Office.  The Civil Contingencies Secretariat is the 
government department responsible for emergency planning in the UK.  Since 2001, the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat has been mandated with enhancing UK resilience to a wide range of 
threats, including natural disaster, pandemics and terrorist attack.  The unit offers guidance 
and support to government departments, agencies and other actors involved in crisis response 
with an emphasis on the generation of emergency plans and facilitating coordination amongst 
the myriad of actors involved in emergency response.  The coherency of policy across the 
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regions is assisted by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat’s detailed publications of best 
practice.  The Civil Contingencies Secretariat is not directly involved with the direction of an 
emergency response, but instead seeks to optimise the conditions through which self-emergent 
organization may evolve through the interaction of multiple agencies involved in a crisis 
response.  As Bruce Mann, the Head of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat has put it, “[o]ur 
approach is to enable and to encourage (Mann, 2007)”.  Coordination of emergency responses 
is principally left to local authorities, who are supported by the CCS through guidance and 
strategic advice. In practice, increasingly complex emergencies of a multi-regional or national 
scale may require the creation of a Lead Government Department (LGD) from Whitehall 
dedicated to coordinating crisis response. 
 Smith (2003) identifies five principle responsibilities of the CCS: 
1. Assessment - Identifying potential future threats through Horizon Scanning and 
periodic UK Risk Assessments 
2. Capability Management - Advising departments on crisis management with the 
aim of developing generic capabilities across Departments 
3. Communication and Learning - Consisting of both the News Coordination 
Centre which disseminates information to the public during an emergency 
event and the Emergency Planning College which offers courses in 
contingency management 
4. National Resilience Framework - Coordinates contingency partnerships 
including local authorities, volunteer groups and the private sector 
5. Programme Coordination - Responsible for liaising with the CCC and running 
the Secretariats emergency operations centre 
 
These responsibilities are distributed across 22 ‘workstreams’, each led by a Government 
Department, comprising the Secretariat’s Capabilities Programme: “the core framework 
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through which the Government is seeking to build resilience across all parts of the United 
Kingdom”.57 These workstreams are categorized according to three themes.   
1. ‘Structural’ workstreams focus on national, regional and local response capabilities 
and as well as resilient telecommunications ‘an enabler of structural response 
capabilities’58 
 
2. ‘Essential services’ workstreams include food and water; transport; health services; 
financial services; energy; and telecommunications and postal services. 
 
3. Finally, twelve ‘functional’ workstreams focused on chemical, biological, radiological 
and nuclear (CBRN) resilience; infectious diseases (human); infectious diseases 
(animal and plant); mass casualties; evacuation and shelter; warning and informing the 
public; mass fatalities; humanitarian assistance; flooding; recovery; site clearance; and 
community resilience. 
  
The Capabilities Programme is premised on ensuring “a robust infrastructure of response is in 
place to deal rapidly, effectively and flexibly with the consequences of civil devastation and 
widespread disaster inflicted as a result of conventional or non-conventional disruptive 
activity.” 59    The emphasis within the Capabilities programme reflects a commitment to 
enhancing the conditions of operability for the rapid convergence and self-organization of 
multiple agencies responding to complex emergencies.  Rather than top-down control over 
emergency responses, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat promote self-sufficiency amongst 
emergency response units. 
This new template has not been actualized without difficulty.  Striking the proper 
balance between the use of pre-scripted planning protocols and improvised adaptive self-
organization has led, in many cases, to the fragmentation of emergency plans into a series of 
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 “Capabilities Programme” Cabinet Office website http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/capabilities-
programme accessed 3 November 2011. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Ibid. 
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micro-plans which can be activated by the appropriate Gold or Silver level coordinating 
groups
60
 in the midst of a crisis.  These might include alerting various agencies, cordoning off 
emergency sites or reserving beds in shelters and hospitals.  Even more problematic in the 
operationalisation of these templates however has been working with the very different 
organizational structures and operational cultures that exist between the different agencies 
involved in UK emergency response.  Whereas relatively horizontally structured organizations 
such as the Ambulance Services have been quick to take up, and incorporate, these plans into 
existing protocols, other agencies such as Fire-fighters, whose organization is more 
hierarchical, have found it more difficult.  This has been further exacerbated by issues 
surrounding the superiority of rank between and within agencies which have obstructed 
integration and information-sharing, rendered and encouraged `silo-thinking` and rigidly 
hierarchical management.  Like in the Revolution in Military Affairs, the adoption of 
principles of IEM are still in the processes of contestation and actualization with older, 
ingrained traditions of emergency response. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Resilience strategies adopted for dealing with UK Civil Contingencies actualized a 
template for operating in conditions of uncertainty forged within network-centric operations 
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 In a response to an emergency Bronze, Silver and Gold managerial tiers may be successively set up, depending 
on the size and scope of the event.  Bronze refers to the ‘operational level’ (concerned with front-line operations), 
Silver refers to the tactical level (“Determine priorities in obtaining and allocating resources; plan and co-ordinate 
overall response”) and Gold the ‘strategic level’ (“Establish strategic objectives and overall management 
framework”) (Cabinet Office, 2003: 18-21)  
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being adopted at that time by the UK military.  Here, communications are paramount.  
Information circulation is used to facilitate the ‘joined-up thinking’ and ‘shared situational 
awareness’ required for holistic, multi-agency responses to complex emergencies.  Like the 
RMA, the complexity sciences appeared to provide a vocabulary for understanding, and 
engaging with, the problems encountered within these environments: “The problem of 
effective coordination of disaster preparedness and response under conditions of uncertainty is 
similar to the problems addressed in organizational analyses of complex systems” 
(Pommerening, 2007: 10). The complex and emergent nature of the contemporary emergency 
presents the same problematics of operating within conditions of rapidly evolving, and thus 
radically uncertain, environments encountered in contemporary military operations.   On the 
basis of this shared problematic, UK Civil Contingencies was amenable to strategies forged 
within the military seeking to elicit a similarly complex and emergent response.   
The uniqueness of the emergency event—characterized by the nature of its non-linear 
temporal unfolding, geographic extension, and potential to cascade within and across 
systems—itself requires a similarly unique and emergent multi-agency response.  The CCS 
has not enacted rigid protocols for emergency response but has instead sought to optimize the 
conditions of operability for the rapid convergence and self-organization of multiple agencies 
responding to complex emergencies through the development of the Capabilities Programme.  
Rather than top-down control over emergency responses, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat 
promotes self-sufficiency amongst emergency response units. Information sharing and 
communications technologies have been prioritized as a means of enhancing the integration 
and flexibility of multi-agency responses to complex emergencies.  To this end the Civil 
Contingencies secretariat has sought to optimize the conditions of operability for such 
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operations through its Capabilities Programme.  The aim however is not simply to optimize 
emergency responses, but to enhance the conditions of adaptive emergence for liberal life 
more broadly understood.  Critical infrastructure protection has emerged as a key security 
consideration in this regard: ensuring that circulations essential for the vitality of liberal life 
continues uninterrupted. 
Resilience is here understood as an ‘emergent security’ (Lobo-Guerrero, 2007).  As an 
emergent security, resilience operates in relation to a particular speciation of life focused on its 
capacity for adaptive emergence.  Coinciding with the advent of this new era of ‘informational 
capitalism’ has been the re-conceptualization of species-life in terms of a complex adaptive 
system, or ‘network society’.  By operating in relation to life understood as a perpetual process 
of becoming, rather than in terms of a static being, or ‘nature’, the security programmes 
associated with resilience operate in relation to a different telos.  The stability of the social 
order was of paramount concern within security programmes guided by the logics of 
protection, which employed technique of discipline and socialized risk spreading to subdue 
dangerous emotions which, if left unchecked, threatened to dissolve the psychosocial bonds 
upholding this order.  Resilience discourses, advance a very different account of the nature of 
social order, subjectivity and the emergency.  Resilience logics not only presume the capacity 
for mutability in the form of social order, but take this transformative potential as a 
prerequisite for security.  Rather than reinforcing a particular social form, security initiative 
aim to optimize the conditions of adaptive emergence for valued forms of life operating within 
a chaotic environmental milieu. 
Correlative to these shifts in the ontopolitical account of species-being is a 
reconfiguration of imaginaries of emergency.  The complex and emergent nature of the 
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emergency precludes the capacity to prevent all threats.  But if resilience is enhanced through 
‘real’ disasters, then experience with these events is not entirely undesirable.  Crises should 
not be eliminated because they are opportunities to exercise the morphogenetic properties of 
life and enhance resilience.  Liberal governance, far from retreating, is re-oriented.  Mastery 
over the conditions of emergence for life-itself thus offers a new threshold for biopolitical 
governance (Cooper, 2006b, 2008, Dillon, 2006, 2008, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008).  On 
the other hand, a knowledge of the functions which are known to optimize emergence, when 
inverted, articulates a new science of thanatopolitical killing at the species-level by ‘pre-
empting emergence’ (Cooper, 2006a) of those forms of life deemed inimical to valued liberal 
lives.  This raises difficult questions with regard to the unqualified desirability of the advance 
of these sciences.  The next chapter will elaborate upon the political and ethical implications 
of resilience strategies. 
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Chapter 5 
The Chronopolitics of Resilience 
 
 
 
 
The Government's aim is to reduce the risk from emergencies so that people can go about their business 
freely and with confidence  
(UK Resilience Homepage)
61
 
 
There is no liberalism without a culture of danger  
(Foucault, 2008: 67) 
 
In early 2007 the United Kingdom’s Civil Contingencies Committee conducted a full 
national preparedness exercise to test the local, regional and national response to a pandemic 
flu.  Winter Willow was delivered in two stages: the first comprising a national table-top 
exercise on 30
th
 January, followed by a full national exercise which was conducted between 
the 16
th
 and 21
st
 of February.   Incorporating over 5000 participants from government, industry 
and the volunteer sector it was the largest exercise of its kind to be performed within the UK.  
Winter Willow simulated up to a UK alert level of 4 (widespread cases within the UK) in order 
to exercise decision-making processes within governmental agencies and test the capacity for 
a wide range of governmental and non-governmental organizations to coordinate an effective 
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 “UK Resilience” Cabinet Office website http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience accessed 13 March 
2012.  
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and speedy response to an emergency.  Stated objectives of Winter Willow included "test[ing] 
information flows, real-time modelling and access to timely expert advice during a pandemic" 
(Government Office for the South East, 2007) and the follow-up report stressed amongst the 
‘lessons learned’ the need to streamline communication channels and consistency in reporting 
templates (UK Resilience, 2007).  These ‘lessons learned’ reflect the concerns of previous 
exercises aimed not only at improving inter-agency communication but also the ability of “all 
organizations to assimilate information quickly enough to inform the necessary decisions” 
(Environment Agency, 2005).   
Ensuring that the informational superiority afforded by information and 
communications technologies (ICT) translates into decisional superiority has emerged as a key 
governmental problematic within the time-sensitive arena of emergency preparedness and 
response planning.  Here, it is recognized that in order for the benefits of information and 
communications technologies to be fully realised, a correlated effort to manage the capacity of 
actors and agencies to quickly sort and process the influx of information to arrive at decisions 
is required.  While technological and system-design solutions continue to dominate the 
literature on Critical Infrastructure Protection (See for example Allenby and Fink, 2005, 
Arsenault and Sood, 2007, Gorman, 2005), the ‘lesson learned’ from these exercises point to 
an equally critical need to optimize the capacity of those working within Civil Contingencies 
to rapidly process this data.  Resilience, in short, cannot depend on technological solutions 
alone, but requires corresponding efforts in the governance of individuals to ensure that the 
benefits afforded by these technologies of these technologies are realised. 
 The chapter analyses the governmental rationalities employed within UK Civil 
Contingencies with regards to how they strategize building resilience.  It extends the analysis 
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of resilience performed in the last chapter to study the role of governance in accelerating the 
speed and improving the effectiveness of Integrated Emergency Response (IEM) operations 
conducted by UK Civil Contingencies.  These questions are empirically investigated though a 
concerted study of UK preparedness exercises as a technique of governance.  Preparedness 
exercises are used to train personnel and to test, develop and refine emergency response plans 
within UK Civil Contingencies operations.
62
  They function as a prominent technique, 
mandated by the Civil Contingencies Act (HM Government, 2004), for building resilience to 
an unknowable future event (Adey and Anderson, 2012, Anderson and Adey, 2011a, 2011b).  
This chapter contributes to these studies by specifically investigating how preparedness 
exercises operate to promote subjectivities recognized as ‘resilient’ in the context of Integrated 
Emergency Response (IEM).   An analysis of these exercises as a technique of governance 
reveals how the value of resilience is enacted within governmental programmes and can be 
used to make explicit the rationalities of governance informing resilience operations. 
Foucault defined government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 2000: 341).  In 
doing so, he was careful to show how government shapes, but does not eliminate the freedom 
of the subject to act and think.  Government, in other words, does not determine specific forms 
of subjectivity but acts to “structure the possible field of action of others” (2000: 341).  
“Regimes of government” Mitchell Dean explains “elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and 
attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents.  They are successful to 
the extent that these agents come to experience themselves through such capacities (e.g. of 
rational decision-making), qualities (e.g. having a sexuality) and statuses (e.g. as being an 
active citizen)” (Dean, 1999: 32).  Government is an activity which influences the ways in 
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 ‘Exercises’ Cabinet Office Website, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises.aspx 
accessed: 13 March 2012. 
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which a subject understands and freely comports themselves.  Government is successful to the 
extent that the subject adopts such rationalities as way of structuring their own sense of self 
and world.  This chapter investigates how the resilient subject is ‘made-up’ (Hacking, 1999) in 
the context of resilience discourses and the governmental programmes which seek their 
realisation.  A study of preparedness exercises is used to investigate the ways in which 
subjectivity is understood, valued and problematised in the context of emergency response.  
By analysing how preparedness exercises seek to manufacture and promote resilient 
subjectivities this chapter aims to interrogate the systems of valuation which are enacted 
within the governmental rationalities informing contemporary UK Civil Contingencies. 
 Insofar as preparedness exercises are a principle technology for testing, training and 
optimizing emergency responses in the United Kingdom they deserve attention in their own 
right.  However, I would like to suggest that preparedness exercises may also operate as 
‘laboratories of governmentality’ (Miller and Rose, 2008: 8) where, in addition to their stated 
aims, new governmental techniques are manufactured, tested and refined and governmental 
rationalities constructed.  In this sense, preparedness exercises are not simply sites of training 
and testing of emergency responders, but sites of experimentation in which programmes of 
governance associated with ‘resilience’ are developed, before their generalization to wider 
applications associated with improving ‘UK resilience’. 63   An analysis of the 
governmentalities displayed in the context of preparedness exercises might therefore offer a 
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 In this sense, these sites may function as ‘laboratories of governmentality’ in the same way in which the 
military functioned to develop disciplinary techniques and their associated governmentalities which then spread 
to more general social applications (Foucault, 1977) or the way in which the colonies were formerly utilized 
(Rigouste, 2009, Ryan, 2011), as locations in which techniques of governance may be trailed and refined, and 
governmentalities forged, before being applied to the governance of domestic populations. 
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paradigm from which to critically interrogate the rationalities and technologies of governance 
seeking to inculcate resilience more broadly. 
The final section of this chapter will draw on the analysis performed here to advance a 
critique of resilience.  This critique proceeds from highlighting the political and ethical 
implications of the ‘chronopolitics’ (Virilio, 1997, 1999, 2005) of resilience strategies ‘need 
for speed’.  Resilience is theorized as a security strategy which aims to optimize liberal life’s 
conditions of emergence to quickly and efficiently adapt to, and rapidly close down, the 
duration of the crisis event and restore the linear, historical time of standard political processes.  
The political and ethical implications of such strategies are explored through an analysis of the 
role of sovereign power within Shakespeare’s Hamlet and an engagement with the writings of 
Deleuze and Derrida with respect to living in a ‘time out of joint’.  The ability of resilience 
strategies to truly promote new forms of life is compromised by the sovereign insistence on 
controlling processes of emergent becoming.  As such, resilience strategies rely on a 
precarious balance of optimizing processes of adaptive emergence whilst inhibiting the 
capacity of events to incite true self-overcoming and transformation. 
 
Resilient by Design  
 
 Communications have long figured as a problematic within the organization of 
emergency responses.  As demonstrated in previous chapters this problematic traditionally 
revolved around the democratic duty to inform populations of an imminent emergency when 
such information was assumed to pose a threat of inducing public panic (See also Oakes, 
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1994, O'Brien, 1955, Orr, 2006).   In the context of this problematic questions regarding 
access to information were crucial: Who was to be granted access? What kinds of information 
were they to be given access to? And, when were they to be provided this information?  
Resilience discourses, on the other hand, engage with an almost diametrically opposed 
problematic.  Resilience strategies are premised on the belief that self-organizational 
behaviour can be induced by exacerbating information flows amongst populations in 
emergency.  This holds true whether these populations are professional (category 1 or 2 
responders) or otherwise.  Within this framework, communications technologies are seen to 
optimize and extend the ‘natural’ ability of social collectivities to self-organize in a response 
to crisis.  Information security, in this context, is less concerned with limiting access as it is 
with protecting and promoting information flows through a robust, and ideally resilient, 
information and communications infrastructure. 
  Telecommunications infrastructure has been recognized as part of the United 
Kingdom’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) (Electronic Communications Resilience & 
Response Group, 2007, National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre, 2004) “the loss 
or compromise of which would have a major, detrimental impact on the availability or 
integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of 
life.”64   In fact, telecommunications might justifiably be regarded as the most critical of 
critical infrastructures.  Of the eight essential services identified by the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat, telecommunications infrastructures are afforded special priority as a “fundamental 
                                                          
64
 ‘The National Infrastructure’ Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure website 
http://www.cpni.gov.uk/about/cni/ accessed 13 March 2012 
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enabler underpinning the effective response to any emergency”.65   Communications are a 
precondition for effectively responding to disruptions of other critical infrastructures (HM 
Government, 2009).   The security of telecommunications infrastructures has emerged as a 
priority for liberal governance insofar as the circulation of information now operates as a 
precondition for the security of those circulations deemed essential for liberal life. 
 A primary mode through which the security of telecommunications infrastructures is 
now being strategized is through system-design.  Drawing on the insights of emergent 
academic fields concerned with network connectivity including graph theory, network science 
and the complexity sciences (See Arsenault and Sood, 2007, Barabási, 2007, Garbin and 
Shortle, 2007, Gorman, 2005) resilience has been defined as a quantifiable function of the 
robustness of different network topologies to targeted failures.  It is measured by the removal, 
one-by-one, of nodes and links within a network.  As nodes are removed, networks splinter 
into smaller, disconnected islands and the integrity of the system to maintain circulation will 
be compromised (Cohen et al., 2006).  Resilience is thus measured in terms of the critical 
fraction of nodes which can be removed over total nodes comprising a network before the 
ability of the system to continue its function is fully compromised. 
Resilience and circulation are both functions of the patterns of connectivity found 
within a network.  Yet they are not necessarily mutually reinforcing.  It has been recognized 
that critical infrastructures are often organized as ‘scale free-networks’ (Gorman, 2005).  
Scale-free networks are common, and appear often within naturally occurring structures 
including capillary structures, neural networks and the internet (Barabasi, 2002, 2007).  
Gorman explains that critical infrastructures, rather than being static vessels for the circulation 
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 ‘Introduction to Resilient Communications’ Cabinet Office Website, 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/resilient_telecommunications.aspx accessed 13 
March 2012 
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of items, are the product of evolution over long time frames (Gorman, 2005).  Scale-free 
networks are characterized by having a few nodes with extremely high connectivity and an 
abundance of nodes with relatively low connectivity.  This occurs as the result of the 
preferential connectivity given by new nodes to nodes demonstrating already high 
connectivity within evolving networks (Barabási, 2007).  While scale-free networks optimize 
network traffic, this efficiency comes at the cost of increased vulnerability.  The loss of critical, 
highly-connected nodes will have a disastrous effect on the survivability of the system.  Scale-
free networks are shown to have lower resilience, measured in terms of the fraction of nodes 
that can be removed from a system without jeopardizing its integrity, even when nodes are 
removed at random.  
The resilience of critical infrastructures has been defined as “the ability of a system to 
recover from adversity, either back to its original state or an adjusted state based on new 
requirements” (McCarthy, 2007: 2)  Within Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), these 
mathematical models have been used to locate network vulnerabilities and allocate resources 
accordingly (Arsenault and Sood, 2007, Gorman, 2005, Garbin and Shortle, 2007, Ottens et al., 
2006). Yet, if understanding the vulnerability of networks requires knowledge of their 
architecture then the application of these mathematical models is frustrated by the lack of 
knowledge on the complex interrelations within and between networked infrastructures.  It is 
often noted, for instance, that the social and material relationships embedded within 
infrastructures tend only to manifest themselves during periods of suspended service, 
breakdown or emergency (Graham and Marvin, 1996: 50-53, see also Graham, 2010: 3, 
Graham and Marvin, 2001).  Interdependencies which exist between layered networks have 
proven particularly elusive, appearing only when failures cascade across them.  Efforts to map 
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critical infrastructures so as to operationalise systems-design solutions are further complicated 
by the high degree of private ownership of essential infrastructures (Graham and Marvin, 1996: 
135-138).  This has encouraged the development of public-private partnerships and 
information-sharing initiatives which distribute responsibility for the protection of essential 
infrastructures.
66
   
Cascading failures need not be the result of physical damage.  The clogging of 
important network channels with non-priority information during an emergency, for example, 
highlights an equally important imperative to distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’ circulations.  This 
was the case in the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 which demonstrated the inability of 
existing telecommunications infrastructures to handle the exponential increase in network 
demand that accompany such events—a significant problem for emergency services personnel 
that rely on these networks for communication and coordination.
67
  With economic constraints 
precluding an expansion of the network far beyond the twenty per cent overhead that currently 
exists within it, strategies have mainly focused encouraging Category 1 and 2 Responders
68
 to 
reduce reliance on GSM communications (the standard mobile network) (Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat, 2007).  This has been reinforced by the recognition that mobile phone networks 
                                                          
66
 These include the National Emergency Plan for the UK Telecommunications Industry which details emergency 
contact points and emergency plans which are regularly exercised and The Memorandum of Understanding for 
cooperation in emergency Situations which ensures the sharing of human and material resources amongst 
providers when required in an emergency.  See “Role of the Telecommunications Industry in Emergency 
Planning” Cabinet Office Website http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/role-telecommunications-
industry-emergency-planning accessed 13 March 2012. 
67
 “Resilient Telecommunications” Cabinet Office Website 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/response/resilient-
telecommunications.aspx accessed 13 March 2012. 
68
 Category 1 responders are classified within the Civil Contingencies Act as those organizations at the core of 
the response to most emergencies (e.g. emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies).  Category 2 
organisations (e.g. Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies) are "co-operating bodies" that 
are less likely to be involved in the heart of planning work but will be heavily involved in incidents that affect 
their sector (See HM Government, 2004). 
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are a remarkably un-resilient communication medium insofar as they are dependent on both 
the core communications network (responsible for land-line services) and the availability of 
grid distributed electricity (Electronic Communications Resilience & Response Group, 2007). 
 A resilient telecommunications infrastructure, according to the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat, is one “able to absorb or mitigate the effects of a disruptive challenge”.69  This is 
being pursued through locating, developing and communicating to all interested parties a 
series of ‘fall-back solutions’ 70  in the event of network overload or physical disruption.  
Initiatives to create resilient communications infrastructure for emergency responders and 
government include the development of the High Integrity Telecommunications System 
(HITS),
71
 the Mobile Telecoms Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS), and the National 
Resilience Extranet (NRE)
72
 which, when taken together, comprise a layered communications 
infrastructure providing built-in redundancy in the event of disruption.  The CCS has also 
sought to facilitate information sharing and emergency coordination between government and 
members of the telecommunications industry through the development of the National 
Emergency Alert for Telecommunications (NEAT) protocol, which was tested in Exercise 
White Noise (2009) led by the Department of Business Innovation and Skills with assistance 
                                                          
69
 “Resilient Telecommunications” Cabinet Office Website 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/response/resilient-
telecommunications.aspx accessed 13 March 2012 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 HITS provides a highly resilient telecommunications network, composed of a hybrid of terrestrial and satellite 
bearers, between Strategic Co-ordination Centres, Regional Operations Centres and the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat.  This service will also be provided to businesses and individuals on a subscription basis.  See 
“Resilient Communications” Cabinet Office Website,  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/resilie
nt_telecommunications/hits.aspx accessed 13 March 2012. 
72
The NRE is being developed by the Department of Communications and Local Government and is funded by 
the Cabinet Office.  It will provide a resilient, browser-based tool with restricted access to emergency service 
personnel to facilitate information exchange as well as access to centrally stored information such as best 
practice guidelines and situational reports (SitReps). “Resilient Telecommunications: The Government’s 
Strategy for enhancing the resilience of telecommunications” Cabinet Office Website, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/resilie
nt_telecommunications/govt_strategy/strand4.aspx accessed 13 March 2012. 
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from the CCS (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2009).  Furthermore, UK 
Resilience
73
, the official website of the CCS, provides a platform for the dissemination of a 
broad range of materials for emergency planners, industry and the public on preparing for 
emergencies.  Regional Resilience offices likewise maintain preparedness websites, 
supplemented by mailing lists, which keep the public informed as to potentially disruptive 
challenges in the region, as well as the ongoing efforts of their regional offices to combat 
them. 
 According to David Godschalk (2003)  
“Resilient cities are constructed to be strong and flexible rather than brittle and 
fragile . . . their lifeline systems of roads, utilities and other support facilities are 
designed to continue functioning in the face of rising water, high winds, shaking 
ground and terrorist attacks.” (as quoted in Coaffee, 2006: 129). 
 
Lewis Perelman goes even further.  He has argued that “[i]n a resilient society, ‘critical 
infrastructure’ is not better protected. Rather, in a resilient society there is less (ideally no) 
‘critical infrastructure’ to protect” (Perelman, 2007: 40).  A truly resilient critical 
infrastructure is secure not because of the absence of threat, but insofar as its vulnerability to 
attack has been eliminated.  It is an ideal a projection of the liberal security imaginary: a 
diffuse, self-repairing, complex adaptive system which is self-governed and requires no 
outside intervention.  The most ambitious of design solutions have already begun to research 
how infrastructures might be imbued with the properties of self-healing regeneration 
characteristic of vital tissues (See Amin, 2000, Perelman, 2007).  Such efforts seek the 
realisation of a long-standing discursive trope which applies organic metaphors such as 
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 “UK Resilience” Cabinet Office Website http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience accessed 13 March 
2012. 
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lifelines, capillaries, nervous system, backbone, essential arteries, and organic essentials to 
describe these infrastructures (Dunn Cavelty and Søby Kristensen, 2008: 2).  
Yet until systems design or technological solutions to critical infrastructure protection 
can function alone, the speed and effectiveness of emergency-response teams will be a 
necessary component of resilience strategies.  The predominance of system-design solutions to 
resilience efforts has marginalized discussion concerning the importance of the governance of 
the ‘human element’ of these operations.  No doubt this imbalance reflects the priority placed 
on techno-scientific solutions within contemporary security operations.  But it is also the 
product of popular assumptions regarding the relationship between human subjects and 
technology in which technologies are understood as simple prosthetics which extend and 
enhance pre-given ‘human’ functions.  Such assumptions have been integral to accounts in 
which resilience is portrayed as a ‘natural’ phenomenon which may be extended 
geographically and enhanced through the provision of communications technologies (See 
Gorman, 2005, Allenby and Fink, 2005, Arsenault and Sood, 2007).  The relationship between 
human subjects and technology may be far more complicated than this however.  The 
discussion which follows explores the implications for resilience when technologies are 
understood to play a more active role in determining what the human is.  
 
The Subject of Technology 
 
In a chapter entitled ‘Docile Bodies’ within Discipline and Punish, Foucault 
discussed the development of techniques within the military sciences of the late 18
th
 and early 
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19
th
 centuries that sought to operate with and optimize the ‘natural’ capacities of the body.  In 
addition to, but also profoundly related to, the spatial and temporal considerations associated 
with the organization of bodies, Foucault identified an interest in the very interface between 
the body and the weapon, tool or machine.  The meticulous detail used to outline the body’s 
optimal integration with the firearm was evidence of what he referred to as ‘the instrumental 
coding of the body’ (Foucault, 1977: 153). This coding provided a schema for understanding 
the body which enabled techniques of governance which operated such that “over the whole 
surface of contact between body and the object it handles, power is introduced, fastening them 
to one another” (Foucault, 1977: 153). Disciplinary power, which “appears to have the 
function not so much of deduction as of synthesis, not so much of exploitation of the product 
as of coercive link with the apparatus of production,” is implicated in the production of what 
Foucault terms the ‘machine-body complex’ (Foucault, 1977: 153). 
The instrumental coding of the body represents a particular enframing or ‘functional 
reduction of the body’ (Foucault, 1977: 164).  The body is not just understood, but valued and 
governed in relation to its capacity to integrate with tools.  As the ‘natural’ body of the soldier 
became understood in terms of its capacity to be synthesized with the weapon, tool or machine, 
so too can it be fastened to other bodies creating even larger organic-machinic assemblages in 
which “[t]he body is constituted as part of a multi-segmentary machine” (Foucault, 1977: 164).    
This is given its most ambitious articulation within Servan’s ideal war-machine. 
Thus Servan dreamt of a military machine that would cover the whole territory of 
the nation and in which each individual would be occupied without interruption 
but in a different way according to the evolutive segment, the genetic sequence in 
which he finds himself (Foucault, 1977: 165). 
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The ‘machine-body complex’ appears to serve as an important precursor to conceiving 
populations as species-bodies (Reid, 2008b: 72). As techniques of discipline migrated outside 
the military field, so too did this enframing of the body and the model of a multi-segmentary 
machine (Foucault, 1977: 168).  
Enter your benches.  At the word enter, the children bring their right hands down 
on the table with a resounding thud and at the same time put one leg into the bench; 
at the words your benches they put the other leg in and sit down opposite their 
slates…Take your slates.  At the word take, the children with their right hands, 
take hold of the string by which the slate is suspended from the nail before them, 
and, with their left hands, they grasp the slate in the middle; at the word slates, 
they unhook it and place it on the table (Foucault, 1977: 167). 
 
 Echoing this early preoccupation with the ‘machine-body complex’, the interface 
between ICT and emergency responders has emerged as an important site of governmental 
intervention within resilience discourses (Bharosa et al., 2010, Carver and Turoff, 2007, Chen 
et al., 2007, Comfort, 2007, Comfort and Kapucu, 2006).  Socio-technical systems approaches 
have proved particularly influential in conceptualizing this problematic and advocating 
responses to it, as is evident within the Home Office’s commissioning of a recent report series 
from the Socio-Technical Centre at Leeds Business School (Challenger et al., 2010a, 2010b).  
A ‘socio-technical systems’ perspective operates by analyzing humans and technologies as an 
integrated system in which “people, processes and procedures, goals, culture, technology, and 
buildings and infrastructure should all be viewed as interdependent and given joint 
consideration” (Challenger and Clegg, 2011: 345).  In the field of emergency planning and 
response, socio-technical systems frameworks have been used to understand the complex 
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dynamics contributing to crowd-related disasters (Challenger and Clegg, 2011), to analyze 
crowd behavior following disasters (Challenger et al., 2010a, 2010b) and to optimize the 
resilience of emergency response teams (Comfort et al., 2001, Comfort, 2007, Comfort and 
Kapucu, 2006).   
In the context of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM), Louise K. Comfort has 
studied the role of ICT in enhancing processes of ‘cognition’, defined as “the capacity to 
recognize the degree of emerging risk to which a community is exposed and to act on that 
information” (Comfort, 2007: 189).  Communications, according to Comfort, are essential for 
building a “common operating picture” which in turn facilitates the integration of agencies and 
accelerates decision-making.  Quite distinct from the ‘multi-segmentary machines’ analysed 
by Foucault, in which organic bodies were to be tools and weapons to create machines, the 
socio-technical systems of integrated emergency response aspire to distributed neural 
networks composed of nervous systems bound by communications infrastructures.  Notably, 
socio-technical systems are not organized to enhance and extract the productive power of the 
body’s physical labour as the multi-segmentary machine did, but instead focused on 
optimizing and distributing cognitive processes across a dispersed network (Carver and Turoff, 
2007).  It is, in short, an information processing machine rather than an engine.  In this respect, 
the contemporary ‘machine-body complex’ operating within integrated emergencies response 
may be analyzed as a kind of cyborg.  
In contemporary usage the cyborg refers most often to the union of the human and 
intelligent machine within an entity recognized as ‘post-human’. 74   For its proponents, 
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 The term cyborg (‘cybernetic organism’) was invented by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline in 1960 to refer to 
organisms, modified in various ways so as to better suit them to the demands of space travel.  Hacking, in a 
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developments associated with computing, nanotechnology, biotechnology and the cognitive 
neurosciences hold the promise of a radical merger of the human brain with computer based 
intelligence in the not too distant future (See Kurzweil, 2005).  Such accounts hold that the 
trajectory of contemporary technoscience is advancing towards a radical ontological shift in 
the very being of ‘the human’.  Andy Clark has downplayed the profundity of this shift, 
contending that we are, in fact, ‘natural-born cyborgs’: creatures whose minds are special 
precisely because they are tailor-made for multiple mergers and coalitions”(Clark, 2003: 7).  
For what is special about human brains, and what best explains the distinctive 
features of human intelligence, is precisely their ability to enter into deep and 
complex relationships with nonbiological constructs, props, and aids. This ability, 
however, does not depend on physical wire-and-implant mergers, so much as on 
our openness to information-processing mergers.” (Clark, 2003: 5). 
 
Clark explains that in this sense we are becoming-cyborg “not merely in the superficial sense 
of combining flesh and wires, but in the more profound sense of being human-technology 
symbionts: thinking and reasoning systems whose minds and selves are spread across 
biological brain and non-biological circuitry” (Clark, 2003: 1). 
N. Katherine Hayles has written about how the figure of the cyborg serves both to 
deconstruct and reinscribe dominant accounts of human subjectivity.  While critical of the 
disembodiment of information which accompanies and supports many post-human accounts, 
she does identify the critical capacity of these trends to challenge the discursive dominance of 
the liberal humanist subject—an earlier enframing of the human ‘produced’ by market 
relations (1999: 3).  Hayles has traced the discursive conditions of emergence for the cyborg 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
highly revealing observation, notes that these efforts were designed to preserve ‘human nature’ within alien 
environments (Hacking, 1998). 
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within twentieth century science and popular culture (1999) and, in later work, how the figure 
of the computer has acted both as a discursive trope and the means through which ‘we’ are 
conditioned to recognize ourselves as ‘digital subjects’ (2005).  
Subsequent studies have sought to expand upon Hayles’ work by shifting the focus 
from a discursive analysis of post-human tropes to the processes through which technologies 
themselves actively shape human subjectivity.  Brian Rotman in his book Becoming Beside 
Ourselves (2008) focused on the role of materiality, rather than the content, of media 
technologies in shaping the subject.  Media technologies are not simple prosthetics which 
extend and enhance ‘natural’ human capacities, but assemblages capable of reconfiguring the 
subject at the existential and biological level.  Rotman argues that every media technology 
projects an ideal user.  Through repetitive engagements with this technology, the forms of 
agency associated with this ideal user feedback upon the user: eliciting, promoting and 
refining particular behaviors and forms of subjectivity.  Drawing on contemporary research in 
cognitive neuroscience, human anthropology, media theory and language theory, Rotman 
suggests that the media ecologies which subjects operate in serve to construct the conditions 
under which particular neurological architectures may evolve conducive to the operation of 
these technologies.  
Technologies, as we’ve observed, restructure our neurology, to impinge on the 
body and its psychic envelope along specific channels: conventionally either as 
prosthetic extensions of physical, cognitive, and perceptual powers (the usual 
effects of tools, machines, apparatuses) or, as media, through the corporeal 
changes of affect and subjectivity wrought by the cultural products they make 
possible (the usual effects of the arts, literature, film, and so on). But less obvious 
and no less interesting, more so perhaps because they operate invisibly, are the 
non-explicit, unintentional, and pre-cultural corporeal effects of technologies: their 
recalibration of time and space, their facilitations of new modalities of self, and the 
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work they do behind or beneath or despite the explicitly instrumental or signifying 
functions they are known by and are introduced to discharge (Rotman, 2008: 53) 
 
Rotman’s thesis is that the complex media ecologies now actualizing are inducing a form of 
subjectivity quite distinct from the subject who was constructed to engage with serial 
technologies, such as reading and writing, where data is presented and absorbed in linear 
succession.  In its place, a ‘para-self’ is slowly taking form, suited for navigating worlds 
characterized by an abundance of informational media.  Rotman draws on the example of GIS 
maps, such as Google Earth, which utilize layers to co-present images and information which 
may be dynamically viewed by users.  This requires, according to Rotman, the capacity to 
proactively navigate, sort, distinguish and synthesize various streams of information presented 
in parallel, rather than serial, form. 
What Hayles and Rotman, in their different studies, agree upon is that technologies are not 
simple prosthetics which extend and enhance a pre-formed human subject.  In important ways 
they act to reconfigure subjectivity.  In their particular enframing of the human subject, they 
serve to elicit and promote particular behaviours whilst, at the same time, suppressing others 
(Cf. Heidegger, 1977).  While technologies are undoubtedly the product of human efforts, they 
also feedback upon the user: facilitating, eliciting, and promoting new behaviors by engaging 
users in repetitive patterns of action.   Technologies thus need to be understood in terms of 
their positive effects of eliciting subjectivities. Yet, while these accounts advance provocative 
arguments on how the subject is configured through evolutionary forces and media ecologies, 
less is said about the role of governmental programmes more explicitly attached to the 
realisation of the ideal forms ‘projected’ by technologies themselves. How does government 
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intervene to influence, elicit, promote and optimize these ideals?    How do they frustrate their 
realisation?  What is the role of power?   
In order to realise the gains afforded by informational superiority to Integrated Emergency 
Management, it has been implied that associated efforts are required to mold, shape, and 
optimize the subject to integrate with these technologies: 
Increases in organized complexity require significant increases in information 
flow, communication and coordination in order to integrate multiple levels of 
operation and diverse requirements for decisions into a coherent program of 
action....Yet, human decision makers have limited cognitive capacity.  In rapidly 
changing environments, they are often unable to process the amount and range of 
information required to make timely, informed decisions essential for adequate 
coordination among the multiple components of the response system.  The 
sequence of organizational decisions repeatedly falls out of synchronization with 
technical requirement for mobilization of action.  Accordingly, organized 
performance in complex environments has been viewed as necessarily limited by 
human information processing capacity (Comfort et al., 2001: 144, see also Carver 
and Turoff, 2007). 
 
Despite critiques of the overreliance on techno-scientific ‘solutions’ for optimizing socio-
technical systems (Clegg et al., 2000), researchers have failed to explore, in any substantial 
manner, how emergency responders are governed so as to optimize their capacity to process 
these information flows so as to arrive at a timely decision.  The relative silence within 
resilience literatures on these questions can be contrasted however with the great deal of 
attentions these questions have received within military literatures associated with Network-
Centric Warfare (see previous chapter, 159-163). 
Preparedness exercises are one technique of governance which aims to foster resilient 
subjectivities and accelerate emergency responses.  Like military efforts designed to optimize 
the cognitive capacities of Network-Centric Warriors, preparedness exercises focus on 
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modulating the anticipation of ‘players’ as a means of accelerating their capacity to compile 
and process information flows and arrive at a timely decision.  In the following section we will 
examine in detail how preparedness exercises operate on the anticipatory predisposition of the 
subject to accelerating decision-making within conditions of duress.  For the time being, it is 
sufficient to note how the stress placed on preparedness exercises undermines the assumption 
that the provision of information and communications technologies unproblematically extends 
‘natural’ human tendencies of self-organization.  If subjects require governance in order to 
elicit subjectivities more amenable to the functioning of these technologies then the 
assumption that resilience strategies harness ‘natural’ human processes is undermined.  
Moreover, it puts into question the very meaning of the freedoms actualized by resilience 
discourses when subjects must be governed in order for the potential of security technologies, 
said to represent a precondition for liberal freedom, to be fully realised. 
 
Exercising Resilience 
 
Preparedness exercises are used extensively by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat as a 
means for training-in resilience.  Exercises serve to simulate an emergency event within which 
players may rehearse emergency responses.  The UK Resilience website promotes exercises as 
a necessary element of preparedness planning which are used to test emergency plans and 
procedures, “develop staff competencies and give them practice in carrying out their roles in 
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the plans”.75  Different ‘genres’ of exercise (Davis, 2007,  Cf. Thrift, 2004) including paper-
based ‘table-top’ exercises, computer-based simulations and ‘live’ role-playing exercises are 
relied upon in different measure, and often mixed, to exercise various functions, train different 
personnel and do so at variable costs. 
Preparedness exercises currently function as a prominent technique for developing the 
competencies and virtues associated with resilience (Adey and Anderson, 2012).  The Civil 
Contingencies Act (HM Government, 2004) mandates regular exercises for Category 1 
responders to be organized by local or regional authorities and encourages regular exercises 
for Category 2 responders.  Central government has organized a cross-governmental exercise 
programme to test the coordination of various tiers of emergency response--from central 
government and the Civil Contingencies Committee to regional and local response teams--to a 
wide range of challenges from natural disasters
76
 to viral pandemics
77
 to acts of terrorism.
78
  
Exercises have been conducted in international joint operations with the G8, NATO, and the 
EU, as well as on a bilateral basis
79
 however most exercises have been conducted at the local 
and regional levels organised around Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) (Cabinet Office, 2010b), 
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 ‘Exercises’ Cabinet Office Website, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises.aspx 
accessed: 13 March 2012. 
76
 Exercise conducted June-July 2004.  See ‘Exercise “Triton’ UK Cabinet Office Website 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudies/triton.aspx accessed: 
13 March 2012. 
77
 See ‘Exercise “Winter Willow’ Cabinet Office Website 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudies/winter_willow.aspx 
accessed: 13 March 2012 (conducted 30 January & 19-20 February 2007)., Exercise “Hawthorn’ Cabinet 
Office Website http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudies.aspx 
accessed: 13 March 2012`(conducted 5 April 2005)., ‘Exercise “Aurora”’ Cabinet Office Website  
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudies/aurora.aspx accessed: 
13 March 2012 (conducted September 2005).   
78
 Exercise conducted April 2005 in joint operation with the United States and Canada. See ‘Exercise “Atlantic 
Blue”’ Cabinet Office Website 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudies/atlanticblue.aspx 
accessed: 20 August 2010.  
79
 ‘National Exercises: Case Studies’ Cabinet Office Website 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises/nationalcasestudies.aspx accessed: 13 
March 2012. 
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reflecting  the responsibility placed on local authorities within Civil Contingencies 
management in the UK (Anderson and Adey, 2011b: 7).  The Emergency Planning College, 
run by Serco Plc. on behalf of the Home Office, provides specialist courses, seminars and 
workshops in emergency planning and business continuity.  The UK Resilience website 
provides guidance for businesses in the development of their own contingency plans though 
the Business Continuity Management (BCM) programme
80
 and promotes exercising these 
plans though discussion-based, table-top and live exercises
81
 for the purpose of “helping 
participants develop confidence in their skills and providing experience of what it would be 
like to use the plan's procedures in a real event.”82 
Recent scholarship has begun to examine preparedness exercises as a technology of 
risk-management.  A genealogy of preparedness exercises would trace a long history including 
war-gaming (Perla, 1990, Der Derian, 2003), Civil Defence exercises (Davis, 2007) and the 
use of systems analysis by futurologists such as Herbert Khan of the RAND Corporation 
(Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2005, Lakoff, 2007).  Davis has studied how exercises were utilised in the 
Cold War as a technique for rendering a potential nuclear confrontation ‘imaginable, 
manageable and most of all capable of being acted upon, at least in part.” (Davis, 2007: 3).  
Lakoff situates exercises, and the logic of ‘preparedness’, at the limit of insurance 
technologies, as a means for generating data on events which “cannot be mapped through 
actuarial knowledge and whose probability therefore cannot be calculated” (Lakoff, 2007: 
253).   Instead of relying on actuarial data, exercises render a future dystopian event through 
                                                          
80
 ‘Business Continuity’, UK Resilience, 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/businesscontinuity.aspx accessed: 13 March 2012. 
81See especially the ‘The Exercise Planners Guide’ (Home Office, 1998) and ‘Home Office guidance: Why 
exercise your disaster response’ at ‘Exercises’ UK Resilience, 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises.aspx accessed: 13 March 2012. 
82
  ‘Exercises’ Cabinet Office Website, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises.aspx 
accessed: 13 March 2012. 
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the imagination in relation to which plans can be tested and capabilities exercised which 
would be utilized in an ‘actual’ response.  Aradau claims that preparedness exercises represent 
a ‘new ratio’ which rivals techniques of statistical calculability insofar as it “proposes a mode 
of ordering the future that embraces uncertainty and ‘imagines the unimaginable’ rather than 
‘taming’ dangerous irruptions through statistical probabilities” (Aradau, 2010: 2-3).  Cooper, 
shows how the reliance on techniques of ‘speculative’ imagination within exercise correlate 
with the methodologies of speculative finance and meteorology as means for operating in a 
world increasingly characterized as uncertain, or even ‘turbulent’ (Cooper, 2010). 
As a speculative technique, exercises do not aim to predict the future, but look to 
render a possible, dystopian future in relation to which faculties can be nurtured and 
capabilities exercised in preparation for a potential event which is itself unknowable. Insofar 
as they do not aspire to prophesy, exercises are not assessed in relation to predictive accuracy: 
true or false.  Rather, they are assessed according to their ability to 1) generate feedback on 
existing plans 2) train-in required faculties of those associated with an emergency response 
and 3) build confidence in the integrity of emergency plans and the capacities of oneself and 
one’s colleagues.  It has been noted that exercises “authorize knowledge claims in the absence 
of actual events” (Lakoff, 2008: 419) by revealing gaps in existing response plans, directing 
budget allocation and highlighting areas requiring further technical or research support 
(Anderson and Adey, 2011b: 4).  While considerable theorization has been placed on exercises 
as a technique for rendering unpredictable futures actionable, less attention has been paid to 
the forms of subjectivity which contemporary preparedness exercises seek to elicit and 
promote.  How are emergency responders problematised? How is agency conceptualized?  
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What forms of subjectivity are valorised? How do practices of governance seek to promote 
these forms?  How do these governmental practices and subjectivities promote resilience?  
Here, it is important to recognize exercises not simply as sites of governance but as 
techniques of governance in themselves (in the same way in which a church is not just a place 
where governmental techniques, such as confession, are exercised, but a construct whose very 
architectural design has governmentalising effects, for example the creation of docile bodies).  
The exercise functions to situate players within a simulated emergency event, to dwell in its 
affective atmospheres, act-out pre-scripted plans and exercise the improvised coordination 
required for responding to an emergent complex emergency.  Recognizing the adoption of 
theatrical techniques and rehearsal methods within exercises some of the most interesting 
analyses of exercises have come from scholars of performance studies.  Tracey Davis, a 
performance historian, recognizes in respect to Civil Defence exercises that  
[t]his was not the art and entertainment known as “the theatre” yet it was staged; this 
was not “performance” yet it was performative, both in the sense of display and 
something that was done subject to evaluation.  It could be spectacular, or not; well 
coordinated, or not; involve extensive predetermined activity, or not; depend on 
fakery, deceit and illusion, or not.  Rehearsal was a methodology for exploration, 
inculcation, and discovery, referential of real-world problems, like games; 
dependent upon real-world skills, like work; and addressing real-world fears, like 
ritual (Davis, 2007: 4). 
 
For Davis, the exercise functions as a technique of governance seeking to elicit particular 
forms of subjectivity by “enacting a set of ideas though rehearsal imprinted behaviours upon 
the body, and in so doing created cognitive conditioning and a corporeal memory more likely 
to be reproduced in an emergency” (Davis, 2007: 85).  “[T]he point”, Davis concludes, “was 
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to become as effective as possible at coping in a future wartime crisis by normalizing it into 
routine while also practicing how to cope with the unexpected” (Davis, 2007: 90). 
Like theatre, the effectiveness of the exercise is conditioned on its capacity to generate 
a suspension of disbelief amongst its players, who are simultaneously ‘actors’ and ‘audience’ 
(Davis, 2007: 70-77).  To this end, verisimilitude is a primary consideration in the design of an 
effective exercise.  In a preparedness exercise observed for the purpose of this project, it was 
evident that planners took great care in providing specific date, times, places and metrological 
conditions so as to contextualize the events triggering the exercise. Materials including maps, 
press statements, briefing reports were present while pre-recorded television news reports 
punctuated the exercise providing additional information or introducing a twist in the plot.  
The realism of the exercise is thus essential for conjuring the suspension of disbelief necessary 
for the tensions manufactured within the design of the exercise to take-hold.  Some ‘live’ 
exercises have relied on even more elaborate methods for simulating realistic emergency 
events.  Amputees in Action advertises that it has worked with Hazardous Area Response 
Teams (HART), the Health Protection Agency and Scottish Resilience.
83
  The UK-based 
company offers professionally trained amputee actors for Emergency Services exercises and 
training courses (in addition to film and television roles) as well as a team of special effects, 
make-up, moulage and prosthetic artists “to enhance and extend the appearance and function 
of limb-loss scenarios”.84  The company slogan reads “De-sensitising, integrated life saving 
                                                          
83See “Our Services”, Amputees in Action website, http://www.amputeesinaction.co.uk/ourservices/ accessed 13 
March 2012. 
84
 See “Amputees in Action homepage” ”, Amputees in Action website,  http://www.amputeesinaction.co.uk/ 
accessed 13 March 2012. 
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your exercises as they should be” while a warning on the site reminds “Caution: Contains 
Graphic Scenes – Our Realism is your Strength”. 85 
 The importance of the element of surprise was stressed by one HART Incidence 
Response Unit (IRU) Simulation Lead in an interview in 2010.  The IRU Simulation Lead 
operated a mobile training vehicle specifically fitted for the purposes of simulation.  Two 
doors, located at the rear and side of vehicle permitted access to two different rooms.  The first 
was used for monitoring the second, and was equipped with a small desk, monitors, speakers 
and a microphone.  The second, appeared as a living room, occupied by a METIman
86
: a full-
size mannequin, remotely operated and equipped with on-board fluid, pneumatic and electrical 
systems used for nursing simulations.  By remotely controlling the METIman from the 
observation room, emergency planners can simulate a wide range of scenarios by controlling 
the speech, heart-rate, respiratory rate, blood-pressure, pupil dialysis, blink speed and even 
blood loss of the patient simulator.  The IRU Simulation Lead explained that in simulating 
particularly complicated, and indeed gruesome, scenarios ‘the idea is to introduce them to 
something against which anything else will pale in comparison’ (Interview with Simulation 
Lead).  But the emphasis is on conditioning the players to surprise.  As such, he noted “[o]ther 
times you might walk in and it’s just an old man sitting there watching TV” (Interview with 
Simulation Lead). By continually adjusting the nature of the exercise participants are not 
simply desensitised to catastrophic emergencies, but trained to constantly anticipate the 
unexpected whilst effectively operating within conditions of uncertainty. While the use of 
apocalyptic imagery (Schoch-Spana, 2004, 2008) and worst-case scenarios (Cf. Aradau, 2010) 
                                                          
85See “Our Services”, Amputees in Action website, http://www.amputeesinaction.co.uk/ourservices/ accessed 13 
March 2012. 
86
 See “METIman Nursing”, Medical Education and Simulation Website, 
http://www.meti.com/products_ps_metiman.htm accessed 13 March 2012. 
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are no doubt relied upon, their use may thus be overstated within academic literature on 
emergency exercises.  
This is especially true in light of budgetary restrictions imposed in recent years.  As a 
result, UK Civil Contingencies has sought to increasingly rely on more economical genres of 
exercises such as table-top exercises and computer simulations instead of ‘live’ exercises.  In 
addition to their varying costs, different genres may be more appropriate for exercising 
particular skills or training different Civil Contingencies personnel.  All exercises however are 
similarly designed to simulate the experience of operating within an emergency event.  Players 
are compelled to act-out their roles in order to simulate the experience of inhabiting an ‘actual’ 
emergency event (Adey and Anderson, 2012, Anderson and Adey, 2011b) so as to acclimatize 
the subject to decision-making within conditions of duress.  As a site in which plans can be 
exercised and ‘capabilities’ trained into emergency responders the preparedness exercises 
ultimately aim to facilitate learning.  More than just ‘making futures present and actionable’ 
(Anderson and Adey, 2011b: 1092), preparedness exercises simulate a history of crises in 
relation to which resilience may be fostered in anticipation of an actual emergency. 
Perhaps as important as learning to perform one’s duties within situations of duress is 
the fostering of confidence.  Exercises are also used to augment the confidence of individuals 
and their trust in those they rely upon to perform their duties efficiently. To generate 
confidence, players must be pushed out of their comfort zones, challenged and tested.  At the 
same time, these exercises would ultimately be self-defeating if they did not ultimately 
buttress the confidence of emergency responders in their own abilities, and trust in those of 
their colleagues.  Exercises therefore must not be so difficult as to discourage participants. On 
the other hand, if exercises are too easy or predictable—if the unfolding of the scenario does 
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not sufficiently inject excitement—then the suspension of disbelief may be interrupted, and 
the effectiveness of the exercise undermined.  As such, the careful design and modulation of 
the affective environment (Adey, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, Adey and Kraftl, 2008) of an exercise 
plays a very important role in ensuring the exercise functions to manufacture resilience 
amongst the players. 
 A primary way in which these atmospheres are modulated is through the manipulation 
of time.  Exercises rarely proceed entirely in ‘real-time’.  More often they are cut into 
segments which focus on periods of high action, with the relatively calm period between these 
operations eliminated.  Within these segments, the level of excitability of the players is 
modulated through adjustments in the ‘battle-rhythm’ of the event: the pace at which the 
emergency event to be responded to unfolds.  ‘Rising-tide’ exercises look to put into play an 
event which reveals itself gradually, while ‘sudden-impact’ events appear more abruptly.  
Modulation of the battle-rhythm across segments provides differential periods of excitement 
and rest across the time-frame of the exercise.  The need to fit the time frame of the exercise 
into a pre-established working day also provides its own challenges.  In the preparedness 
exercise observed for this study, for example, players responded to a simulated plane crash in 
a major British city.  The exercise’s designer explained that simulating an airline accident 
provided the requisite complexity to exercise all those functions which would be required in a 
terrorism simulation.  When asked why they did not simply simulate a terrorist attack, he 
explained that the excitement elicited by a terrorist attack would run the risk of swelling the 
response beyond the temporal and pedagogical boundaries set out within the exercise design.  
Resources had been allocated for an exercise to be completed in one day, over approximately 
six hours. 
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While preparedness exercises undoubtedly serve to induce corporeal memory and 
cognitive conditioning (See Davis, 2007) the extent to which they aim to impose an 
instrumentalised regime of actions upon the subject is questionable (Adey and Anderson, 2012, 
Cf. Aradau, 2010: 6). While opportunities for creativity and heroism are marginalized the 
purpose of these exercises is not to produce automatons, unthinkingly activated prescribed 
protocols. Preparedness exercises are principally geared towards the habituation of decision-
making within conditions of duress and uncertainty.  The focus of preparedness exercises is 
less on the routinisation of actions and more on exercising the capacity to make decisions 
under duress.  As such, scenarios may function differently from those associated with the War 
Books of the Cold War, which prescribed strict protocols in the lead-up to nuclear release.
87
  
Disciplinary controls witnessed within the emergency exercises observed were relatively loose, 
permitting some measure of ‘play’ as players negotiated which plans to operationalise based 
on only the limited information collected within an emergent event.  Within the context of 
Integrated Emergency Responses of UK Civil Contingencies, responders at all levels must 
learn to quickly collect and synthesize varied sorts of information, and then use this 
information to arrive at decisions regarding the specific plans to activate, responders to 
mobilize and agencies to inform.  If successful, these decisions would set in motion the 
construction of a governmental machinery specific to the demands of a unique and emergent 
event capable of resolving the crisis before it amplifies to a ‘catastrophe’ (Aradau and Van 
Munster, 2011). 
                                                          
87
 The British War Books of the Cold War have recently been declassified and can be located in CAB/175.  The 
War Book outlined the responsibilities of ministers and officials in each of three stages leading up to nuclear war 
(pre-Precautionary Stage matters, the Precautionary Stage, and War) and had to be continually revised based on 
diminishing estimates of the time it would take for international tensions to escalate to the point of nuclear 
release. See in particular CAB/175/2 on Exercise Felstead. 
The Chronopolitics of Resilience 
 
206 
 
Thus, while exercises play a fundamental role in providing feedback on plans, they 
also aim to foster the human faculties of resourcefulness, flexibility and autonomy.  As such, 
they resonate not only with efforts to optimize network-centric warriors (O'Malley, 2010a), 
but wider trends in the ‘responsibilising’ of subjects to manage their own risks (Dean, 1999, 
Rose, 1996a, O'Malley, 1996, O'Malley, 2004).  Exercises aim to fashion subjects capable of 
operating within a turbulent and uncertain world.  They seek to elicit a way of being-in-the-
world which is not only confident in the ability to persevere through risk but which might even 
‘embrace risk’ (Baker and Simon, 2002).  Indeed regular exercises have the effect of inducing 
a disposition of permanent preparedness and, as such, can be regarded as useful in both 
“stimulating and disciplining the imagination” (Khan in Lakoff, 2007).  Manipulation of the 
affective disposition of the subject for ‘training’ purposes creates autonomous subjects while 
simultaneously exposing the subject more fully to technologies of governing though risk.   
 
The Chronopolitics of Resilience 
 
In the previous chapter I showed how the resilience strategies of UK Civil 
Contingencies operate to rapidly foreclose a crisis.  What resilience strategies therefore aim to 
achieve is neither the elimination of threat nor protection from its effects, but the mitigation of 
the consequences of the emergency event.  As such resilience provides a risk-based form of 
security.  However, insofar as resilience also implies processes of recovery and regeneration, 
resilience discourses are imbued with a specifically temporal element.  Resilience strategies 
secure against an event by ensuring a crisis does not escalate to an emergency (Anderson and 
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Adey, 2011a, Anderson and Adey, 2011b).  Speed is as integral in this regard as mitigating 
exposure to threats through risk-based techniques: coordinating agencies so as to quickly 
close-down the crisis and re-establish ‘normality’.  Resilience can be understood as a security 
strategy aimed at optimizing the conditions of emergence of a population to quickly and 
efficiently adapt to and rapidly close down the duration of the crisis event and restore the 
linear, historical time of standard political processes.  As we have seen in our discussion thus 
far, accelerating emergency responses requires governance to elicit ‘resilient subjects’.  In this 
final section I will discuss the political and ethical implications of resilience strategies.  To do 
so I draw on the writings of several theorists on the politics of ‘the event’ and discuss the role 
of sovereign in responding to the event through a discussion of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. 
In The Writing of Disaster, Blanchot wrote of the non-representable status of the disaster.  
“The disaster, unexperienced.  It is what escapes the very possibility of experience--it is the 
limit of writing.  This must be repeated: the disaster de-scribes” (1995: 7).  For Blanchot, the 
disaster evades intellectual capture: it cannot be thought precisely because it is that which 
disestablishes thought. 
Inasmuch as the disaster is thought, it is nondisastrous thought, thought of the 
outside.  We have no access to the outside, but the outside has always already 
touched us in the head, for it is precipitous.  The disaster, that which disestablishes 
itself--disestablishment without destruction's penalty (1995: 6). 
 
The disaster, for Blanchot, is an event which evades intellectual representation and disrupts 
thought.  A similar characterization was used by Derrida during an interview subsequently 
published under the title Autoimmunity: Real and Assisted Suicides in describing September 
11
th
 as a ‘major event’: “an event that would bear witness, in an exemplary or hyperbolic 
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fashion, to the very essence of an event or even to an event beyond essence” (2003: 90).  
Derrida suggests that the identification of a ‘major event’ is related to its capacity to exceed, 
and potentially disrupt, existing frameworks of intelligibility.   
“The undergoing of the event, that which in the undergoing or in the ordeal 
at once opens itself up to and resists experience, is, it seems to me, a certain 
unappropriability of what comes or happens.  The event is what comes and, 
in coming, comes to surprise me, to surprise and to suspend comprehension: 
the event is first of all that which I do not comprehend.  Better, the event is 
first of all that I do not comprehend....--my incomprehension” (Derrida, 
2003: 90, transcriber's emphasis). 
 
The major event for Derrida is precisely that which resists intellectual appropriation. Alluding 
to the two faces of the event, Derrida suggests that a major event is so-designated in respect of 
its incomprehensibility.  As such, the major event corresponds to the opening of meaning.  By 
offering a problematisation the major event provides an opportunity for thought.  It “calls for a 
movement of appropriation (comprehension, recognition, identification, description, 
determination, interpretation on the basis of a horizon of anticipation, knowledge, naming and 
so on)” (2003: 90).  We are compelled by this disruptive event to try and capture it within a 
name, a date and, in particular, a meaning.  These efforts, however, will always be insufficient.  
The negative ontological status of the event precludes the designation of any meaning, leaving 
any effort to provide one necessarily underdetermined.   
Blachot’s account of ‘the disaster’ and Derrida’s definition of ‘the major event’ align in 
this respect with contemporary understandings of psychological trauma.  Caruth explains that 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a condition borne from “the confrontation with an 
event that, in its unexpectedness and horror, cannot be placed within the schemes of prior 
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knowledge” (1995: 153).  The experience of this initial trauma continues to disrupt into later 
life.  Young explains “PTSD is a disease of time. The disorder’s distinctive pathology is that it 
permits the past (memory) to relive itself in the present, in the form of intrusive images and 
thoughts and in the patient’s compulsion to replay old events” (Young, 1997: 7).  As a disease 
of time, PTSD shares the temporal structure of a haunting insofar as “One cannot control its 
comings and goings because it begins by coming back" (Derrida, 1994: 11).
 
 PTSD is treated 
with both pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy (Young, 1997: Ch. 6).  While most 
psychotherapeutic methods aim to build the subjects capacity to handle disruptive episodes, 
psychodymanic therapy aims to “restructure the contents of the traumatic memory, to the point 
where the patient is able to integrate it into his ongoing view of the self and make it bearable 
in consciousness” (Young, 1997: 179).  Parallel, proactive efforts are now being taken within 
resilience training programmes of the American (‘Comprehensive Soldier Fitness’) 88 , 
Australian (BattleSMART (Self-Management and Resilience Training)), British (‘Trauma 
Risk Management (TRiM)’) 89 and Canadian (Military Resiliency Training Program (MRTP)) 
militaries (O'Malley, 2010a).  These programmes aim to provide emotional training to soldiers 
prior to deployment so as to equip them with the emotional acumen to better psychologically 
process events experienced in the field which might otherwise contribute to the onset of PTSD. 
Resilience may be theorized as a security strategy of which seeks to pre-empt the 
‘major event’.  It is a security logic rooted in de-eventalization.  Resilience programmes aim to 
rapidly foreclose the emergency event, by limiting its devastation and minimizing its duration.  
By acclimatising emergency responders to crisis, preparedness exercises operate within 
                                                          
88“Comprehensive Soldier Fitness” US Army http://csf.army.mil/ accessed 26 March 2012 
89
 “Trauma Risk Management (TRiM)” British Army http://www.army.mod.uk/welfare-support/23245.aspx 
accessed 26 March 2012 
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dangerous and uncertain worlds.  Rather than inciting reflective thought on the ‘meaning’ (or 
lack thereof) of the disaster itself, preparedness exercises habituate responders to focus on 
their responsibilities during a crisis, invoking a regime of instrumental actions and decisions.  
The demand to arrive at a decision quickly closes out the possibility of reflective thought.    
The ideal time of the decision is instantaneous.  Decision becomes reflex.  In his analysis of 
the political implications of globalisation’s temporal compression (Virilio, 2005: 13,  see also 
Virilio, 1977, 1999), Paul Virilio developed the term 'chronopolitics' to refer to the 
consequences of the insistence on speed to processes of deliberation, negotiation and debate 
associated with contemporary liberal democracy:  
"The tyranny of real time is not very different from classical tyranny, because it 
tends to liquidate the reflective capacity of the citizen in favour of a reflex 
action. Democracy is about solidarity, not solitary experience, and humans 
need time to reflect before acting. Yet the real time and global present requires 
on the part of the telespectator a reflex response which is already of the order 
of manipulation.” (Virilio, 1999: 87). 
 
The chronopolitics of resilience follows from the security logic it enacts in relation to 
the event-time of a disaster, rather than the geopolitics of space.  De-eventalisation serves to 
buttress the political order.  Jenny Edkins has argued that “[m]emory, and the form of 
temporality that it generally instantiates and supports, is central to the production and 
reproduction of the forms of political authority that constitute the modern world” (Edkins, 
2006: 101).  Across a series of writings she has analysed how ‘trauma time’—the disruptive 
time  of the ‘major event’—acts to disrupt the linear narratives of history underpinning 
sovereign power (Edkins, 2003, 2006).  In the wake of a traumatic event “what we call the 
state moves quickly to close down any openings produced by putting in place as fast as 
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possible a linear narrative of origins” (Edkins, 2006: 107).  The ability of ‘the state’ to weave 
these traumatic events into the linear narrative supportive of political power serves to 
continually re-constitute the state in the wake of potentially destabilizing traumatic events 
(Edkins, 2002, 2003). In doing so, it may encounter resistance from those preferring that the 
meaning of such events remain open and with them, the indeterminacy of the political 
meaning they harbour. 
This sovereign act is exemplified within the Shakespearean tragedy Hamlet.  Hamlet is 
compelled within the play to respond to crimes committed by his uncle Claudius who has 
killed Hamlet’s father and taken Hamlet’s mother as his wife.  The disruption provoked by 
these crimes to the established order leads Hamlet to comment that “the time is out of joint” 
and curse his fate:  “that ever I was borne to set it right” (as quoted in Derrida, 1994: 1).  
Deleuze has explained  
“The joint ensures the subordination of time to those properly cardinal points 
through which pass the periodic movements which it measures (time, number of 
the movement, for the soul as much as for the world). By contrast, time out of joint 
means demented time, or time outside the curve which gave it a god, liberated 
from its overly circular figure, freed from the events which made up its content, its 
relation to movement overturned; in short, time presenting itself as an empty and 
pure form.  Time itself unfolds...instead of things unfolding within it” (1994: 88). 
 
The moral and political orders which uphold Hamlet’s world are supporting by the 
chronological unfolding of events within time.  This chronology however has been disrupted 
by ‘an empty and pure form of time’ which Deleuze has elsewhere analyzed in relation to the 
Stoic concept Aion (Deleuze, 1990a).  Moreover, it places both Hamlet’s reality and his 
identity in jeopardy.  To honour his father and restore his proper identity Hamlet must avenge 
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these crimes and set things right.  Hamlet must act to restore the order of things by operating 
within a ‘time out of joint’ to re-establish historical time and the historical lineage bequeathed 
to him.  Hamlet must paradoxically realign time by acting within a ‘time out of joint’ to 
restore the linear, narrative time of sovereign power by laying the foundation for a new 
chronology.  It is not trivial to note that sovereign violence is implicated in the restoration of a 
moral and political code.  To assert and reclaim his identity as one belonging to the old order 
Hamlet must also, paradoxically, defy this moral order by killing his uncle. In this sense, 
Hamlet’s decision displays the priority of the political force, located within a sovereign 
response to ‘the exception’, in the constitution of an order upon which this power is said to 
derive (see Schmitt, 2005).   
For Deleuze, Hamlet responds to this ‘time out of joint’ in a manner ‘worthy of the 
event’ (see Deleuze, 2004: 169).  Hamlet must relinquish both habit and memory, which 
smooth out paradoxes and provide for the subject a linear historical narrative in which time 
can be understood as a coherent whole, in forming his decision (Deleuze, 1994: 88-91).  
Instead, he must act based on engagement with an ‘empty’, virtual past which exists prior to 
the representation of events within a narrative order.  He must draw on the potential contained 
in this virtual past to perform an action which can only be measured in reference to an order 
which is yet to come.  To restore the order of things in which his proper place can be discerned, 
Hamlet is forced to sacrifice the coherence of his own identity.  To be worthy of the event is to 
respond to the event as a dynamic, unpredictable force of becoming in which the subject is 
actualized through divergent series, rather than through series yielding a coherent identity 
(Deleuze, 1994: 89-91).   
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A time out of joint disturbs our capacity to order our lived experiences within a 
narrative chronology though which meaning (and thus status) can be derived.  In doing so, it is 
also an opportunity to become something new.  Responding in a manner worthy of the event 
requires relinquishing with the stable identities underpinned by linear, chronological time 
which are always inadequate to the singularity of actual experiences.  Instead, an affirmation 
of life as creative becoming requires one to ‘learn how to live’ in a time out of joint (Derrida, 
1994: xvi-xx).  In this way, Derrida in Spectres of Marx has analyzed ‘time out of joint’ as an 
opportunity for justice.  The disjuncture represented by a time out of join is the ‘place of 
justice’ insofar as it “opens up the infinite asymmetry of the relation to the other” (Derrida, 
1994: 26).  An ethical decision is required in response to the disjuncture caused by crimes 
which, even though one did not commit them, nevertheless continue to haunt the present.  An 
ethical decision is one made from a location of groundlessness and uncertainty which should 
not be closed it down through the activation of instrumentalised legal rules or ‘moral recipes' 
(see also Nancy, 2005). 
As a security strategy, the resilience operations of UK Civil Contingencies rest on a 
precarious balancing act.  On the one hand, resilience strategies aim to optimize its conditions 
of adaptive emergence for liberal life.  Here, evolutionary fitness is the key to instantiating the 
transformative mutations necessary to avoid risks, and capitalize on profits, within dangerous 
and chaotic security environments.  However, by simultaneously acting to rapidly close down 
the emergency event and inhibit the capacity of such an event to precipitate a ‘major event’ in 
thought, its capacity to truly create new forms of life—new ways of ‘being-in-the world’ 
(Heidegger, 2010)—is compromised.  This is not an unintended effect.  The contingency and 
unpredictability of life’s becoming, especially when amplified through resilience programmes, 
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risks provoking political and economic instability by inciting the actualization of that which is 
truly new: new values and modes of being which cannot be circumscribed within liberal 
capitalist frameworks.  The resilience discourses of UK Civil Contingencies are thus haunted 
by the sovereign dream of asserting control over liberal life’s emergent becoming.  The 
championing of diversity is circumscribed to forms of life which do not challenge the values 
of liberal governance, and the diversity of enterprise required for the continuity security of 
economic profit.  A Nietzschean project of generating forms of life which enact new values 
sacrificed for to ensure the promotion and protection of the singular value of profit by diverse 
economic enterprises.   
  Yet, this balance is tenuous at best.  Enhancing the conditions of adaptive emergence 
for liberal life always risks the production of novel forms of life and the empowerment of 
those forms of life inimical to liberal life.  In respect of this precarious instability at the heart 
of resilience strategies, I believe resilience discourses may in fact harbour the potential for 
positive critique.  This will be elaborated upon in the conclusion of this study. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The resilience of telecommunications infrastructures is critical to enabling the 
emergent self-organization of emergency responses conducted by UK Civil Contingencies.  In 
the event that one or more of these critical infrastructures enabling liberal life is compromised, 
emergency responders must be assured of the continued circulation of information, people and 
resources utilized by the emergency services and necessary for the provision of essential 
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services.  Resilient telecommunications has thus emerged as a core preoccupation of UK Civil 
Contingencies where it is recognized as a ‘fundamental enabler’90 for UK resilience more 
broadly understood, as well as a condition of operability for advanced liberal economies  Yet, 
the contemporary problematic of ensuring informational superiority translates into decisional 
superiority means that telecommunications ‘solutions’ cannot be relied upon alone.  The 
government of emergencies responders is an important, but under-theorized element, of 
building UK resilience.  This chapter has investigated preparedness exercises as a technique of 
governance aiming to nurture and promote ‘resilient’ subjectivities.  Its aim is to elucidate the 
governmental rationalities operating within UK Civil Contingencies through an analysis of the 
practices of governance seeking to fashion resilient subjects. 
Preparedness exercises are used extensively within UK Civil Contingences as a means 
to test emergency response plans, exercise the faculties required within a response and develop 
staff competencies in preparation for an unknowable future event.
91
  As a technique of 
governance preparedness exercises aim to foster resilient subjectivities and accelerate 
emergency responses by simulating high-tension environments in which decision-making 
under duress may be exercised.  In the process, the subject is ‘responsibilised’ by having learnt 
how to arrive at decisions confidently and quickly within uncertain and turbulent 
environments, allowing them to be autonomous and ‘free’.  Governance here is not interested 
in the production of production of automatons, rapidly activating pre-scripted plans.  Rather, 
governance is directed towards conditioning the subject to operating within conditions of 
uncertainty.  As such, the governance of resilience operations shares a diagram of power 
                                                          
90
 ‘Introduction to Resilient Communications’ Cabinet Office Website, 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/resilient_telecommunications.aspx accessed 13 
March 2012 
91
 ‘Exercises’ Cabinet Office Website, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/exercises.aspx 
accessed: 13 March 2012. 
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associated with neoliberalism (see chapter 3) in which power is directed towards optimizing 
the conditions of emergence, rather than determining the trajectory, for what are considered 
natural and highly efficient emergent (social, cognitive or technological) processes. 
An analysis of the rationality of governance enacted within preparedness exercises the 
forms of subjectivity currently valorized as ‘resilient’.  As such, it alludes to a mode of valuing 
life understood, evaluated and problematised in respect of its capacity for adaptive emergence.  
In considering the politics of resilience, we should be attentive to the fact that every valuation 
simultaneously devalues (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009).  The valorisation of resilient lives 
(re-)problematises, and depreciates, forms of life deemed not resilient, or adaptive, enough.  
Recognition of this fact should compel us to ask: what then happens to life which is not 
adaptive? Life which cannot adapt?  Life which refuses to adapt?  Life which strategizes 
political resistance in terms of its refusal to adapt?  It should make us attentive to the ways in 
which this regime of valuation reinforces or departs from former ways of problematising these 
referents.  How, for example, have the introduction of resilience discourses within the field of 
international economic development (See Nsouli, 1995, United Nations Development 
Programme, 2004, United Nations Environment Programme, 2004, Verner and Egset, 2007, 
International Monetary Fund, 2010) served to reinforce longstanding problematisations 
surrounding conditions of poverty and insecurity within underdeveloped states in new ways?  
How are patterns of political exclusions being remapped in the process and strategies of 
political resistance refigured?  Similar questions must also, of course, be asked in the context 
of ‘developed’ liberal states most enthralled with resilience discourses and the speciation they 
advance. 
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One must therefore be aware of the inherent ethical implications of any speciation of 
life: that any regime of valuation, depreciates as much as it appreciates; that any process of 
classification determines what is to be excluded, as much as included; and that securing one 
form of life, more than often entails placing into jeopardy those forms which do not conform 
or are found inimical (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009).  One must acknowledge, 
moreover, that speciations are resisted at the ontological level even before they are politically 
(Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009); that life itself cannot be reductively enframed within a 
single speciation because life is itself, incalculable and invaluable (Nancy, 2005, Dillon and 
Reid, 2009: Conclusion).  Bearing in mind these important considerations, I would suggest 
that inherent instability of resilience discourses offer an opportunity for a positive critique of 
resilience which does not simply denounce them as ‘bad’, but looks to exploit the potentials 
harboured within their underlying epistemic frameworks for forging new lines of resistance 
and critique.  The outlines for such a project will be elaborated upon in the conclusions of this 
study. 
Conclusion 
 
218 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
But a stronger force grows out of your values and a new overcoming; upon it egg and eggshell break.... 
And may everything break that can possibly be broken by our truths!  Many a house has yet to be built! 
(Nietzsche, 2006, 'On Self-Overcoming': 90) 
 
In recent years, resilience discourses have proliferated in a range of fields engaging 
with the common problematic of providing security within environments characterised by the 
radical contingency of threats.  This thesis has argued that resilience is a value which now 
constitutes an emergent telos for liberal security initiatives.  Recognizing the singularity of 
resilience in distinction to the value of stability which had formerly guided liberal security 
initiatives this thesis has addressed the question, ‘how do we account for the emergence of 
resilience?’  A response is offered by way of a biopolitical genealogy of resilience.  A 
genealogy is a critical study of the historical conditions of emergence of values. Utilizing a 
biopolitical analytic, this thesis has demonstrated that the value of resilience has appreciated 
alongside transformations in the order of power/knowledge enacted by apparatus of security.  
Resilience is not a natural phenomenon, but the correlate of a particular speciation of life 
enacted by the practices and rationalities of neoliberal governance. Specifically, resilience 
constitutes a means of valuing life understood and assessed in terms of its evolutionary ‘fitness’ 
or capacity for complex emergence. 
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This thesis problematises those accounts—dominant within governmental and 
specialist resilience literatures—which explain the advent of resilience strategies on the basis 
of a scientifically validated re-evaluation of the referents of security.  Within these accounts, 
resilience is understood as a natural function of complex self-organizing systems, including 
social systems.  Such accounts have served to legitimize the adoption of resilience strategies in 
the field of UK emergency planning and response.  Since 2001, the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat has been mandated with optimizing the resilience of those systems supporting, or 
constitutive of, liberal life.  By seeking to facilitate and optimize the ‘natural’ self-
organizational processes of social systems, resilience strategies have been celebrated as 
indicative of a growing humanism in emergency governance and a greater commitment to 
human ‘freedom’. 
 Tracing a biopolitical genealogy of resilience, this thesis problematises these accounts 
by demonstrating that the value of resilience is the product of much more complex historical 
processes and significant governmental effort.  Firstly, resilience is shown to be the product, 
rather than the cause, of a broader restructuring of the rationalities and practices comprising 
liberal governance.  These transformations are traced within the empirical field of UK 
emergency planning and response.  Resilience is shown to be the expression of a neoliberal 
order of emergency governance which emerges in concert with transformations in the 
biopolitical order of power/knowledge enacted by apparatus of security.  Resilience is not 
natural, but the correlate to an ontopolitical speciation of life in which species-life is 
understood, valued, and problematised in terms of its capacity to adaptively self-organize as a 
response to crisis.    
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Secondly, the natural status of resilience is undermined by the extent to which it has 
depended upon, and continues to require, considerable governmental intervention for its 
realisation.  Resilience programmes continue to require significant investments of time, money, 
planning and training.  The British state, through its coordinating body UK Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat, has taken a lead role in this regard. Rather than signalling an 
abnegation of the state of its historical duties to provide security, the advent of resilience 
strategies has re-inscribed the state.  Security governance is reoriented from protection to 
preparedness: promoting ‘resilient subjectivities’ and optimizing the conditions of adaptive 
emergence.  Rather than operating in conditions marked by the absence of government, 
resilience strategies are premised on significant government effort to produce the conditions 
within which ‘freedom’ may be exercised. 
The introduction of this thesis outlines the problem-space and the methodological 
approach to this investigation.  Each subsequent chapter thereafter analyzes an event in 
relation to which this neoliberal order of governance consolidated.  In each case, these events 
are studied as problematisations of the established order which opened a space for the 
application and refinement of techniques of governance which would, over time, be forged 
into a neoliberal order of governance committed to the realisation of resilience. 
Chapter 1 investigated the institutionalization and early development of a British 
machinery of governance for managing emergencies.  It established the biopolitical imperative 
of this machinery in respect of its mandate to secure the ‘essentials of life’ which it showed 
corresponded to a militaristic enframing of ‘life’ forged within the context of total war.  
Secondly, by investigating how the ‘essentials of life’ were secured, this chapter discerned the 
emergence of a ‘scientific’ order of governance for managing contingencies.  Underpinning 
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this scientific order was an imaginary of contingency rendered calculable in the form of risk 
which was amenable to ‘scientific’ forms of management.  Taken together, these two lines of 
inquiry demonstrated that these imaginaries of uncertainty correlated with distinct speciations 
of life enacted by biopolitical machinery of emergency governance.  
Chapter 2 investigated the problematisation of this ‘scientific’ order in relation to 
challenges borne by the advent of thermonuclear weaponry and the threat it posed to the 
survivability of the British nation in the context of the Cold War.  It began by making explicit 
the common matrix of governmentality underpinning British post-war Civil Defence and the 
British Welfare State characterized by a responsibility  of the state to protect ‘the social’ from 
the dangerous anxieties which threatened its dissolution.  Focusing on the reparational form of 
security  provided by insurance technologies (Lobo-Guerrero, 2011), this chapter traced a line 
of flight (Deleuze, 1992) from the security logics underpinning the British Welfare State to 
that enacted by post-Strath Civil Defence logics which focused on the security of a ‘way of 
life’, rather than the material body.  Post-Strath Civil Defence plans were rooted in a logic of 
preparedness in which the prospect of survivability was manipulated to enable and promote 
the confidence required to operate within dangerous and uncertain worlds. 
Chapter 3 links these governmental techniques to the creation of a new epistemological 
order by investigating the development of resilience discourses within the complex 
ecosystems theory of the 1970’s.  Comparing the programme of governance advanced within 
these discourses to that being advanced by neoliberal critics of economic Keynesianism at that 
time, this chapter makes explicit the order of governance shared by resilience strategies and 
neoliberalism.    Tracing the historical co-evolution of ecology and economics, this chapter 
showed that this order of governance operates in relation to an imaginary of nature no longer 
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defined in essentialist terms, but in respect to multiple, emergent equilibria and fluctuating 
stability domains.  This shift in the archaeological structure of knowledges pertaining to the 
natural marks a radical departure from the imaginary of nature corresponding to classical 
ecology and liberal economics, indicating the emergence of a new epistemological order, 
affirmed by, and supportive of, neoliberalism.   
Chapter 4 detailed the operationalisation of resilience strategies within the realm of 
state security.  It traced a genealogy of the concepts and strategies utilized within the 
Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) operations of UK Civil Contingencies to those 
developed within the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  The application of these 
strategies was made possible by the common security problematic of the radical contingency 
of contemporary threat shared by the military and UK Civil Contingencies.  Resilience is 
theorized as an emergent security strategy which aims to optimize the performative 
adaptability of a range of complex systems to withstand, reorganize and regenerate quickly 
and efficiently in the wake of a potentially catastrophic event in order to minimize disruption 
to British life.  As such, resilience is a value which corresponds to a particular speciation of 
life focused on the capacity to rapidly adapt to, and evolve through, crises. 
Chapter 5 investigated the governmental rationalities designed to promote ‘resilient 
subjects’ through a concerted study of UK Preparedness exercises.  Exercises demonstrate that 
technological solutions to resilience must be supplemented with programmes of governance to 
optimize the speed and effectiveness of resilience operations.  Investigating Preparedness 
exercises as a technique of governance revealed how the value of resilience is enacted within 
the governmental rationalities informing contemporary UK Civil Contingencies.  In particular, 
the techniques used to elicit resilient subjects were analyzed to understand how subjectivity is 
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understood, valued and problematised within these discourses.  Resilience is theorized as a 
security strategy which aims to optimize liberal life’s conditions of emergence to quickly and 
efficiently adapt to, and rapidly close down, the duration of the crisis event and restore the 
linear, historical time of standard political processes.  The sovereign desire to maintain control 
over processes of emergent-becoming effects a tension within resilience strategies which seek 
to optimize processes of adaptive emergence whilst inhibiting the capacity of events to elicit 
forms of life supportive of values divergent from, or opposed to, liberal values. 
Methodologically, the critique of values performed by this genealogy directly responds 
to Peter Burgess’ provocation for Security Studies to take values seriously (Burgess, 2011).  
While values have never been foreign to the study and pursuit of security (where they are 
invoked to orient, support, legitimise, and critique security practices), they are too often taken 
to pre-exist, and by extension, provide a foundation for, particular security initiatives.  To the 
extent that values are understood to precede security practices, they also serve as the basis 
upon which security policies may be evaluated and judged.  The foundational role afforded to 
values presents the politics of security as a negotiation, debate or sometime even struggle 
between the legitimate and illegitimate values upon which to base security practices (e.g. 
realism v. liberalism in International Relations), the deserving and undeserving ‘referent 
objects’ of security (e.g. ‘the environment’, ‘the human’), and the just balance between liberal 
values (e.g. freedom, human rights and security).  Here, it has been noted, the security expert 
is one who can advise as how to best secure those values whose value was taken as axiomatic 
(Dillon, 1996: 20-21).   
Yet in important ways security initiatives do not simply follow from predetermined 
values. Security itself has long been recognized as a principle value in relation to which liberal 
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governance is oriented and legitimized (Baldwin, 1997, Wolfers, 1962, Foucault, 2007, 2008).  
It is the foundational value of Western political theory (Hobbes, 1996) and International 
Relations (Booth, 1994, Waltz, 1959, 1979).  Many have questioned the value of security,  not 
least in light of the paradoxical ‘dilemma’ (Herz, 1951) surrounding the radical insecurity 
which security initiatives inevitably produce (Der Derian, 1993, Foucault, 1998, Wæver, 
1995). Genealogical studies have critically interrogated the value of security by inquiring into 
the processes through which security has become axiomatic within Western political theory 
and practice (Der Derian, 1993, Dillon, 1996).  This study has taken inspiration from these 
studies but has developed its genealogical method differently.  Security is not analyzed as a 
value, but as an apparatus (dispositif) comprising a heterogeneous assemblage of discourses 
and practices oriented towards historically and socially contingent problematics.  As an 
apparatus, there is nothing essential about security with regards to either its meaning or its 
value.  Rather than focus on security as a value, this study is interested in the values which 
constitute the telos of historically situated security apparatus.  These values are not the 
primary focus of the study however, but are used as a means of exploring historical 
transformations in the rationalities and practices of security. 
As a genealogy, the primary aim of this thesis has been to problematise the self-
evidence afforded to the value of resilience by identifying the complex historical processes, 
and significant governmental efforts, underpinning its realisation.  By counter-actualizing 
those hegemonic narratives which obscure the process through which the value of resilience 
has appreciated this study has sought to open a space from which the political and ethical 
implications of these strategies may be more vigorously questioned and debated.  As such, it 
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does not present any definitive conclusions. I may suggest however, areas where this research 
has opened a problem-space which invites further research and political action.   
Conceptualizing resilience as a value marks an original contribution to resilience 
literature with implications for future research.    As a value, resilience may be understood to 
accommodate distinct ‘concepts’ of resilience promoted by contending orders of governance.  
Ambiguity surrounding notions of resilience, I would suggest, is neither the result of a lack of 
conceptual clarity, nor is it simply a product of the diverse disciplinary genealogies of present 
day resilience discourses.  The equivocality of resilience is a product of the co-presence of 
distinct orders of governance subscribing to divergent telos of security, reflected in the 
‘meanings’ of resilience they seek to determine.  As such, complexity approaches have not 
supplanted those rooted in systems theory.  As Foucault repeatedly insisted, successive 
regimes of power do not eradicate previous ones:  
So, there is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing 
the earlier ones to disappear.  There is not the age of the legal, the age of the 
disciplinary, the age of security. In reality you have a series of complex edifices in 
which, of course, the techniques themselves change and are perfected, or anyway 
become more complicated, but in which what above all changes is the dominant 
characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation between juridico-legal 
mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms of security (Foucault, 
2007: 8). 
 
In recognizing the layering of these orders of governance into historical strata, we should be 
cautious of offering teleological accounts of the historical destiny of complexity approaches to 
inevitably succeed in this contest.  History rarely proceeds in such an orderly linear fashion.  
Certainly, the contemporary governmental fascination with the ‘nudge’92 agenda suggests the 
                                                          
92
 The ‘nudge’ agenda, inspired by Thaler and Sustein’s book Nudge (2008), promotes governmental assistance 
in improving individual choice making by ‘nudging’ people towards choices that are ‘best’ for them.  It has been 
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revival of paternalistic forms of governance to supplement neoliberal approaches to resilience.  
Employing an approach which investigates resilience as a value would therefore entail 
sensitivity to the dynamics underpinning particular resilience discourses—the ways in which 
the co-presence of these orders may at times be mutually reinforcing and other times cause 
tension—within emergency planning and response and elsewhere.   
This approach may be particularly useful for investigating the application and 
development of resilience discourses within empirical fields including international economic 
development, community resilience programmes, ethnographies of Preparedness exercises and 
military psychology programmes related to the prevention of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD).  Indeed, this genealogy invites more detailed study of empirical sites to witness 
resilience discourses in the making.  How are these discourses understood, applied, 
transformed?  How are they negotiated and where do they breakdown?  Further study, based 
on a conceptualization of resilience as an emergent security value, should also be performed in 
relation to transformations in the economy of valued lives which have accompanied the advent 
of resilience discourses.  What forms of life are being valued/devalued?  How are lives, 
practices, communities being (re)problematised?  How does this reinforce/depart from former 
systems of valuation?  Such investigations would be beneficial in respect to both resilience 
programmes developed in liberal states and those being introduced in respect of the 
underdevelopment of the global south (See Nsouli, 1995, United Nations Development 
Programme, 2004, United Nations Environment Programme, 2004, Verner and Egset, 2007, 
International Monetary Fund, 2010). 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
taken up within the UK Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister’s  Behavioural Insight Team (aka. the ‘nudge unit’), 
and  the Royal Society for the Arts’ Social Brain project.  
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Second, this genealogy has implications for advancing critical research which has 
already begun to explore the connections between resilience and neoliberalism (Cooper, 2011, 
Cooper and Walker, 2011, Dillon and Reid, 2009, O'Malley, 2010a).  By drawing on a 
biopolitical analytic, this thesis demonstrates that criticisms which focus on the state’s 
abnegation to provide security (see Duffield, 2011, Reid, forthcoming) fail to recognize the 
ways in which resilience discourses re-inscribe the state.  This has the undesirable, if 
unintended, effect of reinforcing the claims of resilience advocates that resilience is a strategy 
based on the natural capacities of populations to operate in the absence of government.  By 
contrast, this thesis has detailed the ways in which resilience has necessitated, and continues to 
rely upon, significant governmental effort to be made possible.  While this may coincide with 
a reduction in the State, this thesis shows that it does not coincide with any diminution in 
governance.  Resilience re-inscribes the State within a project which aims to optimize the 
conditions of possibility for life understood in terms of its capacity for complex emergence.  
While governance may be directed to new objectives and operate upon different surfaces, it is 
nevertheless present.  In making explicit the neoliberal order of governance enacted within 
resilience discourses as well as the epistemological order to which it is an actualization this 
thesis aims to advance theorization of both resilience and neoliberalism as governmental 
projects in terms of their positivity. 
Finally, I have suggested that the epistemological order supportive of resilience 
discourses might be exploited through the development of a positive critique of resilience.  I 
have argued that the resilience strategies operating within UK Civil Contingencies rest on a 
precarious balance premised on the maintenance of sovereign control over the trajectory of 
emergent becoming.  Governance here seeks to simultaneously optimize processes of creative 
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emergence whilst trying to ensure that this does not empower, or elicit, forms of life which 
dismiss or reject established liberal capitalist values.  A positive critique would not limit itself 
to denouncing resilience discourses as bad, in order to open a search for alternatives.  It is not 
reactionary.  Rather, a positive critique would be rooted in the affirmation of the critical 
potential already harboured within the epistemological supporting resilience discourses.  It 
would advance through counter-actualization: mobilizing the critical potential of the regime of 
truth affiliated with resilience strategies towards new ends, and the creation of new values.  
Bearing in mind the ethical and political implications associated with any speciation of life, a 
positive critique of resilience would proceed pragmatically to exploit resilience discourses in 
ways which problematise, and destabilize, established regimes of power relations.  Pragmatic 
strategies such as these have proved successful in the past. Recall, for example, how Christian 
discourses were mobilized to articulate political demands based on the notion of equality in 
the colonies. 
A positive critique of resilience should be rooted in an insistence that we have hardly 
even begun to pursue, or even desire, resilience.  For the highest articulations of resilience 
recognize that it is not synonymous with self-preservation, but with self-overcoming.  
Affirming resilience must therefore entail a commitment to liberating resilience discourses 
from their current labour of ensuring the self-preservation of liberal life and inserting it into a 
radical project to forge new ways of life.  Affirming resilience would mean inverting the 
function by which the value of resilience is measured by its capacity to secure predefined 
British values, and placing resilience in the service of consolidating a political community 
around the pursuit of new values: A political community defined not in terms of who we are, 
but in reference to what we could be.  At a time in which myopic security policies are tearing 
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at the fabric of British society, creating in themselves the conditions of fear, exclusion and 
insecurity which breed the very dangers this costly security apparatus seeks to manage, it is 
imperative that a consideration of community be given greater weight within security 
discourses and security studies.  A resilient Britain may be better defined in relation to the 
strength demonstrated, and indeed gained, from the cohabitation of communities enacting 
distinct, and not always harmonious, values. 
This, however, is just one example of how resilience might be more productively 
affirmed.  How, and where, resilience discourses might be creatively formulated to advance 
positive critiques exceeds my own individual capacities, and is nonetheless beyond the scope 
of this study.  This thesis has offered as a genealogical critique of the value of resilience, and 
in doing so, sought to open a space within which the creative cultivation of such tactics might 
begin to be formulated. 
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